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After the introductory notes, this doctoral dissertation analyses some known business cases 
resulted in significant losses or bankruptcies. Some of those cases caused regional and even 
global economic disturbances and fostered global economic crisis. Also, importance of risks 
management in development, use and maintenance of information systems is emphasized.  
One of key challenges is the fact that the amounts of data stored in databases of business 
systems continuously increases which leads to the conclusion that it becomes harder to detect 
fraud, omissions and errors. If control processes are based on inappropriate methods and tools 
it is often impossible to perceive mentioned flaws in business activities. 
 It is clearly stated that information systems auditing one of key issues that could prevent or 
mitigate information systems risks and that should be covered in more details. 
Thesis describes problems and challenges in information systems auditing, existing 
frameworks, approaches and methods while focusing on development of specific computer 
assisted information systems auditing methodology (CAISAM). Although certain concepts, 
frameworks and even legal frameworks for information systems auditing exist for years, clear 
need for detailed, standard and repeatable methodology is identified. It is explained that 
without detailed methodology, information systems audits are non-standard, non-repeatable, 
inconsistent i.e. auditors perform audits in accordance with their personal preferences. 
CAISAM is thoroughly described, verified and evaluated on available cross border payment 
system transactions.  Although some other methods are used within methodology, Benford's 
Law is used as a fundamental. It is shown how Benford's Law tests of first, second, first two 
and first two digits can be extremely helpful in information systems auditing and investigating 
possible frauds, omissions and errors.  
It is also explained what are the possible improvements in each audit phase while focusing on 
characteristics which can lead to increased efficiency of computer assisted auditing tools. 
Information systems auditing issues, and especially those related to fraud, omissions and 
errors, are for a long time in the focus of my interest. This doctoral dissertation is my humble 
contribution to improvement of information systems auditing.  
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1.1 Description of a Problem 
Effective management of organisation's information system is of great importance to its 
development, success and even survival. In global information society, in which decision 
making process relies on adequate, timely and correct data, this importance comes from:  
- Increasing dependence on information and the information systems which ensure this 
information 
- Increasing risks and vulnerabilities and a large set of threats, such as cyber threats, 
information warfare, omissions and errors based on inappropriate usage of information 
systems 
- Cost of the present and future investments and expenditures in information systems 
- Technologies potential to significantly change organisations and business practices, 
business processes, create new opportunities for profit gaining and  growth and to 
dramatically reduce costs 
- Possibility of committing frauds, embezzlements and mistakes through unauthorized 
or uncontrolled use of information systems and/or information technology. 
Since importance of information system was recognized, a number of management 
approaches were introduced in order to improve its efficiency, correctness and effectiveness. 
One of extremely important management approaches is information systems audit. Modern 
information systems audit is practically on the scene since the early beginning of usage of 
computer technology in the institutions and organizations. 
Although nowadays there are widely accepted frameworks and approaches for information 
systems auditing, in the practice lot of variations in actual audits exist. There are numerous 
methods that are demanded by frameworks, approaches and legal acts that are applied in 
different ways in audit process. Also, although legal acts are based on certain de facto 
industrial standards in information systems auditing, they have their own specifics, covering 
some aspects more or less in details giving stress on certain areas depending on experience, 
risk assessment and business environments they suppose to cover. If legal act concerning 
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information systems auditing is to cover banking industry, then it will have focus on risks that 
are more related to banks. Obviously, data integrity should be in centre of such act, since most 
of frauds, losses and bankruptcies were committed because of lack of controls in access 
privileges, access control and authentication domains. Also, investment banking, foreign 
exchange and treasury applications are to be audited especially thoroughly since their usage is 
especially risky and may bring extreme profits but also extreme losses. 
Additionally, the amounts of data stored in contemporary databases of business systems grow 
exponentially. Immense data growth leads to the fact that it becomes harder and harder to 
identify possible frauds, omissions and errors during the audit conduct. If during the audit 
conduct classical audit approaches are used it is often impossible to perceive mentioned flaws 
in business activities, especially if flaws are just in its initial period. It is usually possible to 
note these flaws only after longer period of time when losses become enormous, as it is 
shown in chapter 2. Additionally, as it is explained in chapter 2, frauds based on computer 
technology represent new category of criminality. 
In order to eliminate or at least to mitigate these problems, auditing and regulatory 
communities propose necessity to use adequate risk management approaches and frameworks 
as it is shown in chapters 3 and 4 respectively. Since manual procedures are inadequate 
because of huge amounts of data residing in contemporary databases of business entities, 
modern and sophisticated methods based on computer assisted auditing tools, as it is shown in 
chapters 4 and 5, are becoming indispensable in audit conduct. So, since management of data 
is of crucial importance for any business and all major frauds were based on data 
manipulation, as shown in chapter 2, data review must be indispensable component of each 
audit. As data volumes in databases are usually extremely large commencing manual data 
review is out of question. Computer assisted auditing methods and tools may be of enormous 
help in achieving more detailed data audit and widening the scope covered by the audit 
process.  These methods and tools may ensure better efficiency, cover more or all data and 
increase correctness of audit work. However, although methods and tools are developed and 
existing for some years, they are very often misused and do not help in prevention and 
development of early warning system for discovery of frauds, omissions and errors within 
information systems of business entities. 
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Furtherly, although data auditing is indispensable component of each auditing process, use of 
computer assisted auditing tools and wide variety of methods for data auditing are promoted 
and described by use of authorities, still there is no accepted computer assisted auditing 
methodology. Without strictly established methodology each audit is commenced with 
different methods, their order and mutual relationships so conclusions on errors, omissions or 
frauds may be based on different assumptions. One of outcomes of such situation is that 
auditors use different methods even if the same auditing environment is regarded.  
Furthermore, two data audits of the same data set within the same business entity are usually 
not comparable and with different conclusions. Adequate data auditing methodology based on 
computer assisted auditing methods is indispensable for improvement of audit process and 
adequate use of computer assisted auditing tools. Execution of complete and efficient audit is 
not possible if adequate and accepted methodology for computer assisted auditing is not 
developed and applied on business data residing within information system databases. 
1.2 Objectives and Hypotheses 
In this doctoral thesis, risks in development and application of information systems and 
importance of information systems management in improvement of business system as a 
whole will be explained. Some cases of losses and bankruptcies based on faults in control and 
audit, especially because of lack of computer assisted audit, will be analysed. According to 
importance of operating risk in business environment, Basel II and FED approaches will be 
briefly analyzed. Analysis of existing methods and approaches for information systems audit 
will be accomplished.  
The necessity for definition of adequate methodology for computer assisted audit will be 
explained. The problem of development of methodology for computer assisted auditing will 
be addressed because that field of audit is not thoroughly investigated and systematized so 
adequate methodology with clearly defined methods, way of method’s application and 
sequence of their execution does not exist. Properties and advantages of certain methods and 
their application in methodology for computer assisted auditing will be thoroughly explained. 
Benford's Law, as a base method of methodology, will be explained and analysed in more 
details. Importance of Benford's Law as a link between different methods in methodology for 




Meta-model of computer assisted information systems auditing methodology will be 
developed. The principal result of this work will be particular developed methodology that 
will encompass list, mutual relationships and ways of usage of specific methods. Model of 
this particular methodology will be designed. Developed methodology will be applied on 
foreign payments system and evaluated. Especially detailed will be explanation of ways and 
possibilities of Benford’s Law use and its combining with other methods of methodology 
within foreign payment system audit. The adequacy of developed methodology will be 
checked within audit of foreign payment transactions system in Republic of Croatia. Research 
will be based on data of payment transactions generated by commercial and central banks in 
Croatia. Results will be interpreted in detail and developed methodology evaluated. 
Properties and instructions for adequate usage of computer assisted auditing tools will be 
defined as well as description of possible implementation problems. It will be shown that 
existing computer assisted auditing tools can ensure only partial support in audit process and 
that they need to be further improved.  
To summarize, the objectives of this paper are to: 
- identify needs for application of computer assisted information systems auditing 
- identify, systematize and evaluate existing approaches, frameworks and methods for 
computer assisted information systems auditing 
- check the possibility of Benford’s Law usage as backbone of methodology for 
computer assisted information systems auditing 
- define methods that will form methodology 
- set up a meta-model and model of computer assisted information systems auditing 
methodology 
- define the sequence and interconnections between specific methods 
- apply developed methodology on real data sets and prove that developed methodology 
improves audit conduct 
- give recommendations for extension of functionality of computer assisted auditing 
tools 
- point out the needs for further research 
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The first hypothesis of this paper states that it is possible to develop computer assisted 
information systems auditing methodology (CAISAM). 
The second hypothesis is that auditing process may be improved if developed CAISAM is 
applied. 
In order to prove these hypotheses, existing approaches and frameworks for information 
systems auditing are going to be identified. Since there is no known methodology for 
computer assisted information systems auditing, one very usable methodology will be 
developed. That methodology will be based on Benford’s Law which characteristics will be 
explained in details. Also, other supportive methods that form methodology will be 
thoroughly described and explained. Developed CAISAM will be verified on audit activity of 
real-world data set. It will be shown that this methodology is very effective in audit conduct 
and that audit process is significantly improved if such methodology is used.  
Additionally, other important recommendations and instructions for application of computer 
assisted auditing tools in auditing process will be explained. 
1.3 Terminology  
The auditing activity is used in various fields of human activity. Whenever the need for after 
the fact check-up appears, it is most likely that some kind of audit will be performed. 
According to a Merriam-Webster's dictionary, term audit denotes: "1. a: a formal examination 
of an organization's or individual's accounts or financial situation, b: the final report of an 
audit 2. a methodical examination and review". 
Information Systems Auditing and Control Association, a world leading organization in fields 
of information systems audit and control, defines audit as "formal inspection and verification 
to check whether a standard or set of guidelines is being followed, records are accurate, or 
efficiency and effectiveness targets are being met." 
Institute of Internal Auditors defined a term "internal auditing" as "an independent, objective 
assurance and consulting activity designed to add value and improve an organization's 
operations. It helps an organization accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic, 
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disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management, control, 
and governance processes." 
For the purpose of this work, term audit considers periodic reviews of risks and implemented 
controls, evaluation of threats and vulnerabilities, recovering of fraudulent activities and 
verification if implemented controls are appropriate. 
It is well known that business system and its underlying and supportive information system 
(IS) are deeply interleaved. Usually it is not possible to easily mark off the borderline between 
these two systems. Simply speaking, there is no business system without information system. 
That is why information systems auditing and business conduct auditing are terms that can not 
be fully and clearly separated. Practically, any business audit will include more or less 
information system audit activities. Also, information systems together with business systems 
are becoming heavily dependent on information technology (IT). Further to that, information 
system audit has to include audit of information technology which serves as a backbone of 
information system.  
Information systems audit must be a part of the business audit process, which is one of the 
enablers of eligible management of business entities. Although there is no generally accepted 
definition of information systems auditing, it can be stated that it is "the process of collecting 
and evaluating evidence to determine whether a computer system (information system) 
safeguards assets, maintains data integrity, achieves organizational goals effectively and 
consumes resources efficiently." [23, page 1].  
Furtherly, the broad definition of computer assisted auditing software includes any software 
that can be used by the auditor to perform audits and to achieve the goals of auditing [24, 
page 1]. According to that rather general definition, computer assisted auditing software can 
be broadly categorized as follows: 
- software for preparation of audit programme and audit execution follow up 
- penetration testing and network analysis software 
- operating systems and database management systems configuration analysis 
software 
- application code testing software 
- business process analysis software 
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- data audit software 
 
That categorization encompasses wide variety of software packages including but not limited 
to spreadsheets like Excel, word processors (Word), query by example tools, client 
development environments (Access), statistical tools (SAS) etc. 
Data audit software is the most often used of all above mentioned categories. That software is 
capable of selecting and extracting data from databases or flat files, performing different 
queries and usually has built in functions which can be very useful in data audit and analysis. 
In practice and literature term "computer assisted auditing software" is usually equalled to 
data audit software. However, even third expression is used very often: "computer assisted 
auditing tools" (CAAT). For the purpose of this paper, term "data audit software" from above 
categorization will be equalled with terms "computer assisted auditing tools" and "computer 
assisted auditing software". Therefore, terms "data audit software", “computer assisted 
auditing tools” and “computer assisted auditing software” will be used interchangeably, as a 
synonym.  
In literature the abbreviation CAAT also stands for "computer assisted auditing techniques". 
A term "computer assisted auditing techniques" includes techniques and methods for 
computer assisted auditing. A word “technique” in this expression encompasses not only 
techniques in their narrower sense but also methods. This is so, because in literature on 
computer assisted auditing techniques and tools, words “technique” and “method” are also 
used interchangeably. However, word “technique” was included in the acronym CAAT. And 
finally, it can be stated that each computer assisted auditing tool (or software) is based on 
specific computer assisted auditing techniques and methods. Also, in literature term 
“computer assisted auditing tools and techniques” (CAATT) is used as a compounding term 
for both “computer assisted auditing tools” and “computer assisted auditing techniques”. In 
[3] "CAATTs are defined as computer-based tools and techniques which permit auditors to 
increase their personal productivity as well as that of the audit function". This is quite very 
broad definition, similar to definition in [24, page 1] already mentioned in this paper. Further 
in [3] it is stressed that computer is the ideal tool for sorting, searching, matching and 
performing various types of tests and mathematical calculations on data. CAATTs allow 
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auditors to probe data and information interactively and to react immediately to the findings 
by modifying and enhancing the initial approach. 
This explanation narrows the definition of CAATTs to software that includes specific data 
analysis techniques and methods which enable adequate data audit and improve overall audit 
process. 
To conclude, computer assisted auditing in this paper is defined as a process of data 
extraction, examination and analysis in order to identify exceptions, potential fraud, omissions 
or errors. That process always includes use of certain computer assisted auditing tools and 
computer assisted auditing techniques and methods. 
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2. Analysis of Some Cases Resulting in Significant Losses or 
Bankruptcies 
In last decade IT solutions changed not only the ways business entities perform their 
businesses, but also significantly shifted risk areas, types of errors and omissions and even 
methodologies of certain types of criminal activities.  
During 1990's and 2000's, the general public was witnessing bankruptcies or significant 
financial losses of a number of companies. In some banks, the amount of losses 
skyrocketed and even almost resulted in complete country's bankruptcy, because state 
economies are largely dependent on banks. Usually, losses and bankruptcies are caused by 
inadequate risk control mechanisms especially in area of operational risks. Financial losses 
and even bankruptcies resulted from inadequate use of information systems, specifically 
information and computer technologies. In some cases, it is evident that losses resulted 
from activities which fall into category of computer criminal. 
Banking systems are specifically vulnerable to so-called "domino effect". The domino 
effect is a chain reaction occurring after a small change causes a similar change in 
neighbouring environment, which then in turn cause another similar change in its close 
environment, and so on. In economy, specifically in banking industry, domino effect is 
phenomenon in which losses or bankruptcy of one (often smaller) business entity causes a 
number of losses and bankruptcies of other business entities. It is of systemic importance 
to prevent domino effects in baking industry, which is one of major tasks of central banks 
and financial supervising and auditing authorities. Unfortunately, some recorded losses and 
bankruptcies were caused not only by local failures but also by macro and even global 
negative economic impacts. What should be in focus of supervisors, auditors, legal systems 
managing financial industry, management boards and information systems management is 
that in certain cases inappropriate information systems management can result in such 
systemic domino effects. 
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2.1 Analysis of Barings Bank Case 
Nowadays, it is completely clear how Nick Leeson, head of front and back offices in 
Barings Bank Singapore branch, conducted otherwise prohibited actions which finally lead 
to bank's bankruptcy.  
Leeson engaged in unauthorised trading in futures and options. Leeson was supposed to be 
arbitraging, seeking to profit from differences in the prices of Nikkei 225 futures contracts 
listed on the Osaka Securities Exchange in Japan and the Singapore International Monetary 
Exchange. Such arbitrage involves buying futures contracts on one market and 
simultaneously selling them on another at higher price. Since everyone tries to take 
advantage of a price difference on a publicly traded futures contract, the margins on 
arbitrage trading are quite small. Consequently, the volumes traded must be very large in 
order to earn any substantial profit because trader is buying something at one market while 
selling the same good at another market at the same time. Consequently, almost all risks 
are hedged and this strategy is not very risky so it certainly would not bankrupt the bank. 
However, instead of daily hedging bank’s trades, Leeson gambled on the future direction 
of the Japanese markets. He hoped contract prices will go up in the future. In this instance, 
even a percent change of the price could create millions worth profit or loss.  
According to Board of Banking Supervision of Bank of England report on Barings Bank 
Collapse, Leeson managed that details about account 88888 which, according to his own 
words, "related to errors" were omitted from report regularly sent to bank's headquarters in 
London. He managed to do that because he had IT team under his line of control. Leeson 
gave instructions to application programmers how to change report application. 
Interestingly enough, programmers did not perform any felony - there was no agreement 
between them and Leeson. However, programmers were only executing Leeson's orders 
without many questions. Unfortunately, transactions on account 88888 held details on 
Leeson's unauthorized trading.  
By 31st of December 1994 he had caused losses on this account of around 208 million 
pounds Sterling. However, he managed to make false representation that he was in fact 
making profits for the bank. Moreover, Leeson was recognized as an extremely successful 
trader in Barings Bank.  
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Leeson concealed unauthorised trading by a number of methods. Apart from suppression 
of account 88888 from Barings in London, he submissioned false reports to London which 
included the misrepresentation of the profitability of his trading. He also presented to 
management a number of false trading and accounting transactions. 
Auditing activities performed in 1995 showed losses skyrocketed to more than 800 million 
pounds Sterling, which equalled bank's capital. Soon afterwards, bank went bankruptcy 
and it was taken over by Dutch banking group ING for 1 pound Sterling. 
Double check procedures were absent. If London headquarter conducted regular 
reconciliation and report check with other available information, attention would be drawn 
on incomplete Singapore branch reports reasonably quickly. 
Further analysis of this case questioned the role and usefulness of internal audit 
department. In one of its earlier draft reports, internal audit suggested regular reconciliation 
of front and back offices data in Singapore branch. However, that was not accepted by the 
manager responsible for front and back office, i.e. Nick Leeson himself. Leeson justified 
his refusal of internal audit recommendation and commented that reconciliation would 
waste time and workforce resources. Senior managers accepted his justification, so 
recommendation was excluded from final report. Finally, internal audit department 
expressed serious concern because Leeson managed both front and back offices. Although 
the internal audit did not find out unauthorised trading, their report covered specific 
recommendations in the area of separation of duties in Leeson’s case. Unfortunately, these 
recommendations were never implemented in practice. The fact that Leeson was permitted 
to stay in charge of both front back office was a very serious failure.  
Furthermore, Leeson had all four important assumptions for fraud: 
- motivation – huge amount of money was at his disposal, 
- knowledge – he possessed very well knowledge on processes in front and back offices, 
- opportunity – he was manager controlling processes in both front and back offices; he 
was a key person in change management of business applications supporting the 
trading,  




External commercial audit was faulty. Until 1994 responsible commercial auditor was 
Deloitte & Touche. Leeson started with his fraudulent activities in 1992. After 1994, 
Coopers Leibrandt (nowadays known as PriceWaterhouse Coopers) audited Barings Bank 
but did not recover any anomalies in organization and control procedures. 
So, external commercial audit did not fulfil their obligations adequately. When Barings 
officially declared pre tax profit of 100 million pounds Sterling, Leeson's account 88888 
had 23 million pounds Sterling losses. External audit did not perceive that fact. Even worse 
negligence was repeated in next audit, when account 88888 totalled 208 million pounds 
Sterling.  
On the other side, internal audit identified lack of control procedures, but after Singapore 
management dispute, internal audit excluded findings and recommendations from official 
report. Also, internal audit objections on inadequate segregation of duties were ignored by 
top management in London headquarters. 
2.2 Analysis of Allied Irish Banks Case 
Fraud committed by John Rusnak, employee of Allied Irish Bank (AIB) front office, was 
also based on use of computer software, inappropriate auditing processes and serious flaws 
in segregation of duties. Fraud resulted in 691 million USD of losses on 8th of February 
2002. 
Rusnak controlled and changed value at risk, the most important measure value used by 
AIB in order to monitor its forex exchange trades. He did that by directly changing the 
values in the spreadsheet calculation of the value at risk used by other employees in risk 
control unit. While employee in risk control unit was supposed to check the value at risk 
amounts, he relied on the content of Rusnak's Excel spreadsheet. Rusnak manipulated 
transaction values used for value at risk calculation. Just a straightforward control of 
comparing data in spreadsheet with other data sources would reveal the fraud. 
Interestingly, occasionally since 1995 attention was given to a fact that prices of foreign 
exchange activities were not accessed and prepared independently of the employees 




In 2000, management of risk assessment unit responsible for foreign exchange activities 
expressed worries concerning the fact daily prices were obtained from spreadsheet created 
by traders. For some time, prices were printed from Reuter's information service and 
verified by risk control unit. Soon afterwards, risk control unit suggested that an Excel 
spreadsheet should be created which would download data from Reuter's service thus 
dismissing the necessity to manually check prices. It was agreed that on trustworthy front 
office employee should download trading data from Reuter's terminal to his personal 
computer and then append data to prepared Excel spreadsheet. That spreadsheet should be 
accessible by employees of front, back and middle offices. John Rusnak was nominated for 
that important task. From that moment on, all trading, reconciliation and control 
procedures performed in front, back and middle offices were based on data retrieved from 
before mentioned spreadsheet prepared by one trader.  
The internal control employee soon noticed defective procedure and correctly commented 
that trader who prepared prices could have manipulated data. Recommendation was that 
back office should access foreign exchange pricing data independently of front office 
prepared spreadsheet. For this, one more licence of Reuter's service should have been 
bought and software installed. The bank should invest 10.000 USD. However, risk 
assessment management stated there is a constant need to cost cutting and that there is no 
necessity for duplication of work. Conclusion was data will be still prepared in front office 
and used as a data feed in back and middle offices.  
Unfortunately, while objective was to save 10.000 USD, huge losses were recorded. No 
reconciliation or foreign exchange price checks were performed in back or middle offices.  
Although after some time risk assessments analysts spotted that Rusnak's spreadsheet was 
altered and different from Reuter's data, no action was taken. It was discovered prices for 
yen and euro currencies, the two Rusnak performed the most trades, deviated significantly 
from Reuters. 
Some six months after the risk assessment analyst revealed the prices spreadsheet was 
inconsistent with Reuter's data, only in April 2001, AIB remedied the issue. From that time 
on, both back and middle offices obtained independent copy of Reuter's service foreign 
exchange prices. However, losses were too significant, and in February 2002. AIB declared 
losses of 691 million USD caused by fraudulent foreign exchange trades. 
  
16 
2.3 Analysis of Riječka banka Case 
Riječka banka was a third Croatian bank according to asset amount. In 2000, privatisation 
of bank occurred in accordance with international tender. The biggest shareholder and de 
facto owner of the bank became Bayerische Landesbank Girozentrale (BLB) from Munich 
with 59,9% of shares. Since then, bank continually undertook activities for rising market 
share.  
Interestingly enough, bank earned ISO 9001 quality standard for all its business operations.  
Auditing of banking activities was undertaken for various reasons. For purpose of 
privatisation, consultancy and legal advisory companies Deloitte Touche, HSBC and 
Norton Rose were involved in detailed checks and audit. Due diligence was performed in 
order to asses commercial, financial and legal situation in the bank. That activity ensured 
to potential buyers additional information about the bank. 
Bank’s financial reports were audited and verified by PriceWaterhouse Coopers (formerly 
Coopers Leibrandt) until 1999, and KPMG after year 2000. Internal audit department 
performed regular, special and subsequent audits. 
Very first sign of problems in bank’s trading activities on foreign markets appeared in 
March of 1999 when unknown individual notified Croatian National Bank (CNB) about 
some irregularities. CNB quickly responded by informing bank’s board of management 
and insisted on explanation. Board of management replied to CNB that internal control 
procedures and monitoring of foreign trading transactions are in place and set in 
accordance to the best standards. Accordingly, front and back offices were segregated. 
Internal and commercial auditor did not notice any malfunction.  
During 2000, CNB on-site supervision was accomplished in the areas of profit, capital, 
asset sources, liquidity, internal control and audit and bank’s organization. Supervision 
concluded there were no significant irregularities. 
However, in March of 2002 bank’s board of management informs CNB on illegal activities 
related to transactions on foreign market that were revealed by internal audit department. It 
was assessed losses were between 83 and 103 million USD. KPMG, who audited the bank 
in 2001, withdrew its audit report. BLB notified CNB it would not recapitalize the bank 
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and so solve its losses. At the same time, private individuals and business entities started to 
withdraw their deposits. 
CNB started with special on-site supervision in order to determine proportions of illegal 
activities and their influence on the bank’s financial result. 
Bank accepted formal internal procedures for each area of its business conduct. These 
procedures determined responsibilities and duties of employees together with strict 
procedures how processes must be carried out. Quality procedures were setup in 
accordance with ISO 9001 standard. 
Therefore, operations including foreign market transactions were also covered by formal 
internal procedures. Specific and individual authorizations and restrictions were defined, 
permitted ways of transactions execution, rules concerning reporting of management etc. 
For each foreign market transaction type bank defined precise steps, documentation, 
responsibilities, duties and other procedural details. Separate formalized document 
confirmed who is responsible for conduct of certain transaction types. Also, it is defined 
what is maximum bank's exposure, what is maximum amount of single transactions and 
that all transactions must be closed on the opening day.  
However, procedures were not conducted in accordance with formally accepted procedures 
and fraud was committed in rather simple way. Chief dealer managed to systematically 
avoid procedures and forge documentation in the course of several years. He tried to gain 
profit on foreign exchange market by inappropriate exposures and continually accumulated 
losses. Losses were not recorded in bank's accounting system, and were concealed in 
several ways: 
- unauthorized borrowing from other banks 
- booking of non-existence deposits in bank's assets 
- contracting without final payments 
- booking of transactions in incorrect currency or due dates  
Chief dealer had opportunity to conceal his deeds because he carried out some activities 
that were beyond his authorization profile. At the same time, he traded on foreign markets, 
transferred funds by issuing payment messages, gave orders for booking in accounting 
system and even booked entries in accounting system. Also, it was noticed he very often 
stayed at work after the official working hours what was explained by having too much 
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work. After he stayed alone, he could perform activities without supervision and 
obstruction from other employees. Bank's advanced information system based on 
contemporary information technology solutions served as a very efficient means for 
contracting, transferring funds and phoney bookings. Some activities were performed 
under his own user account (operations in front office), but mostly under user accounts of 
his colleagues (operations in back office and accounting). He usually obtained usernames 
and passwords by social engineering techniques.  
Disputes by other banks, resulting from overdue contracts, were regularly handled and 
resolved by chief dealer. 
It is quite obvious that although procedures of conduct were defined and in accordance 
with best practices, control and audit activities were inadequate or even missing. Some of 
examinations that audit should have included are: 
- checking if adequate measures of segregation of duties between employees of different 
business units exist so that there were no employees who can manipulate data in front 
office, back office and in accounting 
- how reconciliation between front office and back office were done and who has the 
possibility to manipulate data 
- checking if data transferred from back office to accounting department are accurate and 
trustworthy 
- how employees authorize (login) to each information technology resource supporting 
business activity (SWIFT, Reuters, back office application, accounting application) and 
if all employees use their own authentication factors (passwords, smartcards, PINs) 
- checking if adequate procedure of password management is established and whether it 
is followed by all employees;  
- how application audit logs and audit trails are reviewed in order to check employees 
activities; reviews and check should have been done not only by management of 
foreign trade department but also by internal audit department, commercial audit and 
central bank's supervision 
Additionally, it is obvious that fraud was based on data manipulation. If data analysis was 
adequately performed, possibly by use of information technology tools, fraud could have 
been prevented or at least significantly limited.  
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It was identified that total bank's losses in this case were 96,2 million USD. 
Concerning the Riječka banka case, there were a few positive reactions and consequences 
drawn from the fraud and corresponding loss. First of all Croatian National Bank (CNB) 
and Government of Republic of Croatia reacted promptly, financially helped the bank what 
prevented bank's collapse and eventually possible domino effect. Individuals and business 
entities withdrawn some 350 million EUR from the Riječka banka but soon afterwards lot 
of clients returned. Also, thanks to stabilization activities performed by state officials, 
clients of other Croatian banks did not start to withdraw deposits. Furtherly, state 
authorities, institutions and agencies responsible for audit and supervision, as well as 
private entities started to pay attention to importance of information systems auditing. 
Understandably enough, leader in information systems auditing became Croatian National 
Bank. 
2.4 Analysis of Societe Generale Case 
Societe Generale, France's second biggest bank, almost went bankruptcy when the biggest 
trading losses in history was revealed in January 2008. The bank recognized losses were 
based on fraudulent moves by one of its junior traders named Jerome Kerviel. The amount 
of losses was 4,9 billion EUR. 
However, Societe Generale has ranked first or second during the past five years in client 
surveys of equity derivative firms, according to Risk Magazine. In 2007, it received the 
award for "Equity Derivatives House of the Year'' from The Banker, a London-based 
monthly magazine.  
On 24th of January 2008, Societe Generale reported that rogue trader Jerome Kerviel bet on 
stock index futures of European markets hoping for profit but resulting in the biggest loss 
in history of banking and financial industry until discovery of fraud committed by Bernard 
Madoff in December 2008. 
Generally speaking, future markets are the most popular daily trading markets and offer 
different markets such as stock index futures, currency futures and commodity futures. On 
all of these markets future contracts are traded. In future contracts it is specified that 
corresponding stock index, currency or commodity goods will be sold or bought at a 
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specific price on specific day in the future. Daily trading activity considers purchase of 
futures contracts in order to profit on the difference between buying and selling prices. 
Stock index futures are markets where the commodity being traded is stock index, such as 
DAX (index of Deutche Boerse in Frankfurt) or Dow Jones (Chicago Board of Trade). So, 
trading with stock index futures does not involve trading with actual stocks (shares) but 
with certain calculated indices. Calculation of profit or loss is done on contract expiration 
date when underlying trading account is increased or decreased by the difference between 
actual price and price stated in futures contract. 
Kerviel's futures trading came under interest for the first time on 18th of January 2008 
when risk manager saw a single trade that was over limits set by the bank. 
However, Societe Generale officials perceived rising problems on 21st of January 2008 
when stock markets in France, United Kingdom and Germany recorded a drop of 5%. It 
was later discovered that Jerome Kerviel exceeded his trading limits and traded with 49.9 
billion EUR, a value far greater than bank's capital. From 21st to 24th of January 2008, 
Societe Generale closed all opened (still not due) positions created by Kerviel which 
caused losses totalled at 4.9 billion EUR. Officials of Societe Generale described some of 
the means Kerviel used to evade bank's internally developed risk controls and detection. It 
is explained Kerviel was careful in closing the future trades after two or three days from 
purchase, just before the timed controls would cause notice would be sent from within 
application's internal control system to risk manager. Then, Kerviel would switch those 
values from older trades over to newly created trades. Some experts claimed that Kerviel's 
fraudulent scheme trades could have been unnoticed as a result of high volume of low risk 
transactions which were regularly and daily handled by trading division. Also, bank 
officials claimed that whenever control unit started to raise questions on some Kerviel's 
trades, he would interpret them as omission, Then he would cancel the corresponding 
transaction and replace it with another trade usually using a different instrument, dates and 
amounts to evade detection [33]. 
It is obvious that banks, despite the application of advanced risk management strategies, 
still can be under the threat that an employee with an understanding of its risk management 
processes can evade them and hide losses he caused. However, if auditing and data 
analysis were performed adequately, fraud could have been discovered much earlier.  
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2.5 Analysis of Madoff Case 
In December 2008, as the financial crisis still devastated worldwide economies, a new 
financial scandal happened. Bernard Madoff, greatly praised investor and former chairman 
of the NASDAQ stock exchange, informed his sons that his asset management firm was 
based on a fraudulent scheme. Soon afterwards, their lawyers reported Bernard Madoff to 
federal authorities. Already on 11th of December 2008, Bernard Madoff was arrested and 
charged with financial fraud.  
On 12th of March 2009, Madoff admitted guilty of crime he was charged for. It was soon 
revealed Madoff spoof his clients for 65 billion USD. Madoff claimed he was the only to 
blame for the fraud.  
Madoff developed a widely known fraud system based on pyramidal structure. Pyramidal 
structure fraud is based on constantly growing pyramid base, i.e. the fact that more money 
is invested than paid out as capital gains. That is of course possible if the pyramid base is 
growing faster than the obligations for pay off. Simply said, previous investors having 
claims due were paid off of the deposits of newer investors. So, payments to investors were 
sourced from new investors' base and not from gains of investment itself. Such system is 
called Ponzi scheme, after Charles Ponzi, Italian immigrant to USA in the first half of 20th 
century, who created notorious pyramidal scheme based on post coupons. 
Madoff system functioned well for years. However, due to deep financial crisis, some of 
his big customers requested to withdraw their investments. That finally caused knock down 
of a whole fraudulent scheme. 
Although Madoff himself was described as a non-technical person, despising information 
technology, the use of information technology was at the core of the fraud. As it is 
explained in [1], the IBM server, an AS/400 that dated from the 1980s, was so old that 
some data had to be typed in by hand instead of automatic data download from different 
sources. Yet Madoff refused to replace it. It stored all data about fraudulent activities. The 
server, which has been audited by the government, was the nerve centre of the fraud. The 
thousands of pages of statements printed out from it showed trades that were never made. 
After the arrest, Madoff disclosed he began with his pyramidal Ponzi scum in 1991. He 
claimed he had never invested any of his clients' assets ever since. Instead, he only 
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deposited the invested money on business account of his company in Chase Manhattan 
Bank. He was resolute to ensure high returns for his investors, despite financial crisis 
which started in 2008. Also, Madoff confessed he executed false trading transactions 
concealed by foreign money transfers and false reports toward SEC. 
Some accused Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of being inactive and 
inefficient in recovering Madoff's fraud. The SEC had previously conducted several 
investigations into Madoff's business practices since 1999, however each finished with 
positive remarks for Madoff investment business. Some also criticized SEC for 
incompetence, use of inappropriate control and auditing methods together with sketchy 
approaches.  
2.6 Conclusions on Causes  
In chapters 2.1 through 2.5 it is shown how huge amounts of money can be lost or how 
bankruptcies were filed because of inappropriate control and auditing mechanisms. 
Significant component in mitigation of operational risks is adequate management of 
information systems. There are numerous standards, methodologies and approaches for 
development and maintenance of information systems. However, since information 
systems development and maintenance is usually extremely complex and interdisciplinary, 
their implementation and change management may be faulty. Faults may result in 
opportunities for fraud, omissions and errors. So, additional control and checks are 
indispensable in the form of information systems auditing. Unfortunately, although 
information systems control measures and auditing standards existed for years, they were 
not always applied adequately. Especially, data was not audited and controlled in 
appropriate way. That made possible such disastrous financial results shown previously.  
Barings Bank bankruptcy was primarily outcome of: 
- Inappropriate segregation of duty. 
- Defects in data access rights settings which were result of inappropriate segregation 
of duty. 




- Inadequate control and auditing of business data and processes followed with non-
existent computer assisted auditing of data and processes. 
- Failure of change management procedures in development and maintenance of 
business applications. 
In the case of Allied Irish Bank, Riječka banka and Societe Generale following omissions 
enabled the fraud: 
- Inappropriate segregation of duty. 
- Defects in data access rights settings which were result of inappropriate segregation 
of duty. 
- Inadequate control and auditing of business data and processes followed with non-
existent computer assisted auditing of data and processes. 
In the Madoff case based on reasonably simple pyramidal fraud inadequate control and 
auditing of business data and processes followed with non-existent computer assisted 
auditing of data and processes caused the biggest scam in history of financial sector. 
What can be learned from all these cases is the following: 
- Information system and information technology can be used as a mean of execution 
and concealment of criminal activities. 
- Process change management procedures, specifically change management of IT 
application supporting business process, should be appropriately implemented. For 
business critical processes, at least two lines of change authorizations are 
necessary;  
- Segregation of duties in business processes is extremely important. Development 
and maintenance of IT solutions should be standardized, centralized and managed 
by lines of duty separated from those of business. Also, additional attention should 
be assigned to segregation of business functions. For all business functions, 
development of business applications must be centralized and segregated from 
business function which requests, uses and owns specific application. 
- Information systems control and audit is mandatory. Specifically, auditing of data 
is indispensable. However, since data volumes may be extremely large, thus 
disabling manual work, computer assisted auditing tools are prerequisite for 
efficient and complete data audit. By use of computer assisted data audit, auditor 
may conclude if processes were fraudulent, result of errors or omissions. 
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What is clearly noticeable in all of cases explained previously, frauds were based on data 
manipulation. Fraudsters manipulated data in databases, operating transactions and reports 
based on operating transactions. Fraud schemes were so advanced that risk managers, 
internal and external, both commercial and state, auditors were convinced procedures were 
followed and no significant risks were noted. Also, in financial terms, all institutions which 
suffered enormous losses in previously shown examples were proclaimed extremely 
successful and profitable even very shortly before breakdown. That brings the conclusion 
that applied auditing methods were not appropriate. According to available information, 
auditors did not perform complete and careful data audit. If data were checked, it was done 
on a sample, usually prepared by auditee. That, of course, enabled the fraudsters to prepare 
arbitrary data and prevent auditors to find important issues. Data could not have been 
audited completely because auditors did not use computer assisted auditing methods nor 
tools. Computer based tools (computer assisted auditing tools - CAAT) with pre-defined 
auditing methods should have been applied. That way, auditors would have been 
concentrated primarily on business activity instead on development of functions for data 
analysis and auditing. 
Additionally, obviously auditors performing the job were not skilful enough for such 
complex tasks of revealing fraud. That means that beside use of well designed computer 
assisted information system auditing methodology and CAAT, auditors have to improve 
their knowledge on business functions they audit, relations between function being audited 
and interfacing functions, knowledge on application systems supporting business, data 




3. Risks in Development and Use of Information Systems 
3.1 Importance of Information Systems Management 
There is considerable number of organizations in which information and information 
systems are the most valuable assets. Additionally, in contemporary competitive and 
constantly changing business environment, within the global crisis context which all 
economies are facing, management has increased expectations concerning quality of 
delivered information systems and information. Management requires additional quality, 
functionality and ease of use of information systems. It expects shorter delivery time and 
permanent improvement of services. At the same time, all mentioned above must be 
implemented at lower costs and with less personal/human resources. 
Some organisations understand the potential of adequate implementation and use of new 
technology and information systems. However, successful organisations understand, 
manage and govern the risks associated with application and use of modern technology and 
information systems. 
Since information are widely recognized as important business assets, business entities 
must provide quality, legal and security properties of their information, as for all other 
tangible or intangible assets. Management must also control and track optimisation of the 
use of available resources, including data within databases or flat files, application 
systems, hardware, technology and people - including users and IT development experts. 
In order to achieve adequate control and governance over its information system, 
management must clearly understand the status of its information system and agree what 
governance and security measures i.e. risk management controls they should implement.  
3.2 Importance of Risk Based Approach 
Contemporary business entities base their information systems on computer i.e. 
information technology. Information technology infrastructure and applications may be 
very complex, span different geographical locations, connect to public (unsecured) 
networks, allow direct communication with its customer base etc. With today’s audit 
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approach, tools and auditor’s expertise it is rarely possible to perform complete detailed 
audit of all subsystems and information systems components.  
Consequence of such situation is the fact that auditor is confronted with the questions of 
what information system component to audit, when and how frequently. The only possible 
answer to this is to implement a risk-based approach. 
There are numerous risk management methodologies which can be used in information 
systems risk assessment. However, risks of non-availability, non-integrity and non-
confidentiality are in primary focus of all risk management methodologies and auditing 
approaches. It has to be born in mind that although these risks are implicit to information 
systems, these risks affect different systems in different ways and with different losses. For 
retail banking at a branch in city centre risk of non-availability even for an hour can be 
considerable. Consequent losses can be especially significant if banking market and 
competition are both developed and if mean time between failures that result in non-
availability of retail banking function is shortened. The risk of non-integrity caused by 
unauthorized modification of data can be a source of frauds and potential losses. 
Unauthorized modification resulted from inappropriate access privileges was one of key 
issues that resulted in frauds explained in chapter 2. Potential intruder with more access 
rights that he should have is the major risk of fraud. This is especially true if person gained 
more access rights than it is needed through regular procedure of access rights assignment 
since it is not perceived as intrusion by eventual information system event monitoring 
system. Also, risk of non-confidentiality is particularly important since gaining 
confidential information by unauthorized persons can result in appearance of other risks - 
market, credit, reputation and even systemic. 
Naturally, risk-based approach in auditing must begin with adequate risk assessment. After 
risk assessment is accomplished, audit plan must be defined. Audit plan must consist of all 
steps that should be performed by actual audit. It has to explain time frames of each 
activity, personally assigned responsibilities which are dependent of knowledge and 
experience of individual auditors, auditee obligations, information needed and ways of 
obtaining them, together with technical prerequisites. 




1. Inventory the information systems in use in the organization and categorize them.  
2. Determine which of the systems impact critical functions or assets, such as money, 
materials, customers, decision making, and how close to real time they operate.  
3. Assess what risks affect these systems and the severity of impact on the business.  
4. Rank the systems based on the above assessment and decide the audit priority, 
resources, schedule and frequency [23, page 2]. 
The auditor can create an audit plan based on longer time frame that lists the separate audit 
assignments that will be scheduled, as well as the resources required. 
Mapping of results of business risk assessment with information systems components is 
one of the keys to successful audit. Auditing must follow business risk assessment and 
focus on riskier information systems components. In order to create applicable audit plan 
auditor must clearly define personal skills and experience needed for specific audit as well 
as other resources and prerequisites.  
After finishing audit plan it should be presented at the opening meeting with the senior 
management responsible for the information system area to be audited. It is possible that 
outcomes of that meeting will require one more round of amendments to audit plan. Such 
opening meeting gets management more involved and possibly clarifies previously 
questionable issues and misunderstandings. It helps audit in achieving smooth execution 
according to plan. 
During the information systems audit, findings are often quite technical in its nature. Of 
course, it is obligatory to perform in depth technical information systems audit since 
information systems is largely dependent on information technology. So, information 
systems audit with no, or lacking, technical analysis is inadequate and insufficient. 
Similarly, without data analysis based on computer assisted audit techniques software, 
information systems auditing will lack very important dimensions of data accuracy, 
assessment of potential for fraud and even adequacy of business processes. Additionally, it 
is required that all findings in information systems audit are clearly matched to 
vulnerabilities in business processes. That way senior business management can easier 
understand risks in highly technical and often not enough understood information systems 
and related information technology and relate it to business cases.  
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3.3 Operational Risk and Basel II 
Lately it was recognized that operational risks should be included into important risk 
control areas that certain entities, especially banks, should take into account when assess 
and manage risks. Operational risk management was put into focus of many banks by 
Basel II capital accord. The Bank for International Settlements body named Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision proposed a new capital accord in 1999, which has 
come to be known as Basel II. Then followed extensive consultative period with the 
committee releasing additional proposals for consultation in January 2001 and April 2003. 
The committee also conducted three separate studies to estimate the quality of those 
proposals. The finalized Basel II accord was released in June 2004 [46]. 
Basel II is based on three pillars: 
- Minimum capital requirements, 
- Supervisory review and 
- Market discipline. 
Generally speaking, Basel II retains the definition of bank capital and the market risk 
provisions of the 1996 Amendment. It largely replaces the old treatment of credit risk, and 
it requires capital for operational risk. 
Basel II capital accord mostly updates the previous treatment of credit risk, and it demands 
reservations of capital for operational risk. According to Basel II, operational risk is risk of 
loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems, or from 
external events. Although the operational risk can be applied to any business industry, this 
particular way of framing risk management is of particular relevance to the banking sector. 
Banking regulators, usually central banks and financial supervisory authorities, are 
responsible for establishing safeguards to protect against bankruptcy, insolvency, various 
problems in banking industry and specifically systemic failure of the banking system. 
Since operational risk contains significant risk for banks' functioning, it is defined how 
banks should define and which measures should be undertaken to mitigate that risk. 
The following list contains the official Basel II defined loss event types that correspond to 




1. Internal Fraud 
Losses due to acts of a type intended to defraud, misappropriate property or circumvent 
regulations, the law or company policy, excluding diversity/discrimination events, which 
involves at least one internal party  
Examples: 
- Transactions not reported (intentional)  
- Transaction type unauthorised (w/monetary loss) 
- Mismarking of position (intentional)  
- Fraud / credit fraud / worthless deposits 
- Theft / extortion / embezzlement / robbery 
- Misappropriation of assets 
- Malicious destruction of assets 
- Forgery 
- Check kiting 
- Smuggling 
- Account take-over / impersonation / etc. 
- Tax non-compliance / evasion (wilful) 
- Bribes / kickbacks 
- Insider trading (not on firm’s account) 
2. External Fraud 
Losses due to acts of a type intended to defraud, misappropriate property or circumvent the 




- Check kiting 
- Hacking damage 
- Theft of information (w/monetary loss) 
3. Employment Practices and Workplace Safety 
Losses arising from acts inconsistent with employment, health or safety laws or 





- Compensation, benefit, termination issues 
- Organised labour activity 
- General liability 
- Employee health & safety rules events 
- Workers compensation 
- Discrimination types 
4. Clients, Products, & Business Practice 
Losses arising from an unintentional or negligent failure to meet a professional obligation 
to specific clients (including fiduciary and suitability requirements), or from the nature or 
design of a product. 
Examples: 
- Fiduciary breaches / guideline violations 
- Suitability / disclosure issues 
- Retail customer disclosure violations 
- Breach of privacy 
- Aggressive sales 
- Account churning 
- Misuse of confidential information 
- Lender liability 
- Antitrust 
- Improper trade / market practices 
- Market manipulation 
- Insider trading (on firm’s account) 
- Unlicensed activity 
- Money laundering 
- Product defects (unauthorised, etc.) 
- Model errors 
- Failure to investigate client per guidelines 
- Exceeding client exposure limits 
- Disputes over performance of advisory activities 
5. Damage to Physical Assets  




- Natural disaster losses 
- Human losses from external sources (terrorism, vandalism) 
6. Business Disruption & Systems Failures  





- Utility outage / disruptions 
7. Execution, Delivery, & Process Management  
Losses from failed transaction processing or process management, from relations with 
trade counterparties and vendors. 
Examples:  
- Miscommunication 
- Data entry, maintenance or loading error 
- Missed deadline or responsibility 
- Model / system misoperation 
- Accounting error / entity attribution error 
- Other task misperformance 
- Delivery failure 
- Collateral management failure 
- Reference Data Maintenance 
 
Although all of these event types can influence proper execution of processes in 
information systems, internal fraud and execution, delivery and process management were 
most often of all operational risks cause of losses and even bankruptcies in banking 
industry in last decade. Management of operational risk is largely based on management of 
risks related with development and use of information systems and information 
technology.  
More on Bank for International Settlement approach to operational risk subject can be 
found in chapter 4.2. 
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3.4 Operational Risk and FED 
Federal Reserve System (FED) acts as a central banking authority of United States of 
America. The primary task of the FED is the creation of monetary policy which means it is 
bringing key decisions which influence the cost and availability of money in country 
economy. This also comprises discount rate policy, which together with open market 
operations constitute the monetary policy tools.  
Beside its monetary policy tasks, FED also has regulatory and supervisory responsibilities 
over US banks, bank holding companies, international bank branches in the USA and 
foreign activities of member banks.  
Furthermore, FED has a vital role in preserving the adequate functioning of the US 
payments system. FED also develops and maintains regulations related to consumer credits 
and consumer protection. 
According to FED terminology [51], operational risk emerges from the possibility that 
inappropriate information systems, operational problems, flaws or failures in internal 
(especially information systems based) controls, fraud, or unexpected man made or natural 
disasters will result in unplanned losses. Effective governance of information systems 
optimizes the benefits from technology and assures achieving enterprise objectives. The 
departments responsible for development of information systems primarily typically 
manage IT operations, network and database administration, application systems 
development and acquisition of new technologies and solutions. Information systems 
governance should encompass all of previously mentioned areas plus managing providing 
expertise in choosing and operating technology solutions for an institution's lines of 
business such as (e.g. in banking) commercial credit and asset management, or enterprise-
wide activities such as security, information systems project management, information 
systems change management, business continuity planning etc.. This dual role and the 
increasing use of technology raise the importance of IT governance in effective corporate 
governance. 
Inadequate governance of information systems strategy, applications and infrastructure can 
result with out of step between business and information systems goals, as well as the 
inefficient use of information systems resources. Also, weaknesses in information systems 
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governance can produce additional weaknesses and even can create prerequisites for 
fraudulent activities. The result is highly increased operational risk. Some examples of 
inappropriate information systems governance are:  
- Defect or lack of quality control and security mechanisms over information systems 
processes can result in incorrect data and information and reduce the credibility of 
information systems. 
- Inappropriate or non existing business control mechanisms add risks to omissions, 
errors and fraudulent events.  
- Defective or nonexistent information systems change management procedures may 
prevent implementation of adequate business needs and/or produce omissions, errors 
and frauds. 
- Inadequate organizational structures can prevent the achievement of business goals.  
- Unclear responsibilities and reporting lines can lead to defects in accountability and 
authority over business and information system processes [51].  
Operational risk may be a result of fraud, omission or error. Fraud, omissions and errors 
are usually consequences of management’s incompetence to manage data and information 
or to acquire products and services in appropriate manner can also inflict operational risk. 
Inappropriate management of operational risk may culminate in significant losses in 
information system including business obstructions or conduct of improper business 
activities. Banking institution is obliged to adequately determine, measure, oversee, and 
manage operational risk. Operational risk must be differentiated by management from 
other risk types with objective to assure permanent and consistent focus on mitigation of 
operational risk. The management's board must set up and approve special program for 
managing and monitoring of this risk type. That program should define what the bank’s 
tolerance for risk is, the effectiveness of bank's controls, management’s responsibility in 
relation to moderation of risk, and the necessary activities for effective management of 
information system. Operational risk management must include areas like application 
development and support, systems and infrastructure development and support, transaction 
management, customer service, internal controls, capacity planning and performance 
assurance. Operational risk from within information system also affects credit, compliance, 
strategic, reputation, and market risks: 
- Liquidity, interest, and price risks – Credit and market risks can materialize 
from external changes in markets, industries, or specific customers. Internal 
controls that rely heavily on the availability and performance of technology 
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create additional operational risk exposure. For example, a failure to properly 
implement changes to underwriting, account management, or collection 
systems can lead to significant losses, and higher loan servicing and 
collection costs. 
- Reputation risk – Reputation risk stems from errors, delays, or omissions in 
information technology that become public knowledge or directly affect 
business partners, customers and consumers resulting in a loss of confidential 
information and potential customer withdrawal of funds. Two activities that 
can lead to reputation risk are the unauthorized disclosure of confidential 
customer information and the hacking/modifying of an institution’s website. 
- Strategic risk – Strategic risk can stem from inaccurate information or 
analysis that causes management to make poor strategic decisions. For 
example, IT management could decide to save money by delaying an 
infrastructure upgrade to increase network bandwidth, which could result in a 
business line losing market share due to an inability to compete. 
- Compliance (legal) risk – Compliance risk results from the institution’s 
inability to meet the regulatory and legal requirements associated with its IT 
products and services. Legal risk may lead to civil or criminal liability if, for 
example, an institution discloses confidential information or provides 
inaccurate or untimely consumer compliance disclosures. [50] 
Management of information system business function must have an integral and corporate-
wide view of technology that supports information system. It must persist in maintenance 
of an active engagement in corporate planning with the aim of aligning information system 
and underlying technology with defined business objectives. Information system 
management also must provide that adequate controls exist throughout the bank. 
According to FED approach, management must assess risks and define how to manage and 
alleviate these risks. Management must permanently measure risk levels and compare them 
to results of business impact analysis. That is how management must continually redefine 
value of its business activities and prescribe acceptable risk levels. 
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4. Identification and Analysis of Existing Frameworks and 
Approaches for Information Systems Auditing 
Frameworks and approaches to information systems auditing can be broadly divided into 
three groups: 
1. Frameworks and approaches established and recommended by non-profit expert 
audit associations (e.g. Information Systems Audit and Control Association) 
2. Approaches defined by industry specific associations and authorities (e.g. Bank for 
International Settlements) 
3. Legally binding documents brought by country’s authorities 
There is no single approved and confirmed approach to information systems auditing, so 
there is no unique methodology that could be the one and only resource for information 
systems auditing planning, conduct and reporting. Probably unification is possible only on 
a high level definitions, scope and basic outlines of approach. However, unification on 
more detailed level will never be possible because each information system audited has its 
specifics, different risks, different business model and role of information system and 
corresponding information technology. 
As it is shown in chapters 1 through 3, information systems are very important part of any 
business. Additionally, computer based components of information systems do not only 
store business transactions and data but enable critical business processes of the business 
entity. It is fully understandable that business management must have appropriate 
knowledge, control and also serious concerns about information systems status and 
development. The objective of information systems audit is to help management in better 
understanding of information system, risks, possibilities to mitigate risks, achieving 
alignment between business and information system, easier definition of priorities etc. 
Auditing process assures that by producing findings and giving recommendations.  
Important issues that have to be covered by information systems auditing are: 
1. Availability  
It has to be answered on question if information system on which business is dependent 
will be available to business demands at all needed times? Is it reasonably protected 
against disasters or incidents?  
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2. Confidentiality  
Reasonable measures have to be carried out in order to preserve non-disclosure of 
information to unauthorized persons. 
3. Integrity  
It must be ensured that information provided by the information system is always accurate, 
reliable and timely. All reasonable measures should be implemented in order to prevent 
unauthorized modifications to data, applications, hardware, networking equipment, system 
or other software. 
After it is proved that risks in information systems have enormous impact on underlying 
business processes and functions, legal systems of considerable number of countries 
introduced necessity of information systems auditing. Procedures and approaches were 
usually overtaken from associations and good practice they supported (for example ISACA 
– Information Systems Audit and Control Association) but also from guidelines and 
requirements set by organizations influential in certain industries. The latter is especially 
applicable to banking industry and works of Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 
Federal Reserve System (FED) and International Monetary Fund (IMF). BIS, FED and 
IMF were for years instructing the banks and finance ministries about seriousness and 
significance of information systems auditing. 
In the following chapters, methodologies and approaches accepted and announced by some 
of these prominent organizations are described in more details.  
4.1 Approach of Information Systems Audit and Control Association  
The most influential non-profit expert audit organization is Information Systems Audit and 
Control Association (ISACA). With more than 86.000 members in over 160 countries, 
ISACA is global leader in the field of IT auditing and control. ISACA began its activities 
in 1967, when a small group of individuals with similar jobs, auditing controls in the 
computer systems that were becoming increasingly critical to the operations of their 
organizations, sat down to discuss the need for a centralized source of information and 
guidance in the field. In 1969, the group formalized, incorporating as the EDP Auditors 
Association. In 1976 the association formed an education foundation to undertake large-
scale research efforts to expand the knowledge and value of the IT governance and control 
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field [47]. ISACA developed globally applicable and accepted information systems 
auditing and control standards, guidelines and procedures.  
ISACA sponsors international conferences, promotes the importance of IT auditing and 
control, administers the globally respected CISA (Certified Information Systems Auditor) 
professional title earned by more than 60.000 persons. CISA certificate is de facto 
worldwide standard and prerequisite for information systems auditing. It also established 
CISM (Certified Information Systems Manager) professional certificate which covers 
information security management domain of information systems.  
Another of ISACA’s strengths is its chapter network. ISACA has more than 175 chapters 
established in over 70 countries worldwide. Chapters ensure professional networking of its 
members and experts, education, upholding the necessity of information systems auditing 
and control and other benefits on a chapter's territory. 
Furthermore, IT Governance Institute, established by the ISACA in 1998, brings original 
research, presentations at various conferences, and reports and documents created by 
experts in the area to assist management in their strive to make information systems 
successful in supporting the enterprise's objectives. 
ISACA's vision and mission statements predicate that it exists to assist in IT governance, 
IT control, IT management, IT risks and IT process, and their interaction with corporate 
governance, corporate management, corporate risks and corporate processes. ISACA does 
that by providing value through various services, such as research, standards, information, 
education and certification. The Association helps IS audit, control and security 
professionals focus not only on IT, IT risks and security issues, but also on the relationship 
between IT and the business, business processes and business risks.  
Croatian branch of ISACA (ISACA Croatian Chapter - ISACA CC) was founded in 2001, 
and already became a leader in IT auditing promotion and education in Croatia. ISACA 
CC is continuously working on raising the awareness among Croatian management 
concerning importance of IT auditing and security issues.  
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4.1.1 Information Systems Standards, Guidelines and Procedures for Auditing and 
Control Professionals 
ISACA established documents which are de facto standards and have the widest use in 
information systems auditing in the world. The document of primary interest for auditors 
and auditing practice is “IS Standards, Guidelines and Procedures for Auditing and Control 
Professionals”. That document is a framework for the information systems auditing 
ensuring a few levels of expertise. 
Standards section defines obligatory and minimum requisites for information systems 
auditing. Standards set the necessary amount and quality of work done by information 
systems auditors in order to fulfil professional responsibilities as set in ISACA Code of 
Professional Ethics for Information Systems Auditors. Their intention is also to prove to 
management that auditors who comply with Standards, Guidelines and Procedures are 
performing auditing work according to best existing practices. Standards also set 
requirements for CISA (Certified Information Systems Auditor) professional designation. 
Those who are not following Standards are subject to investigation and discipline actions 
up to suspension of CISA certificate. 
Currently, there are 16 standards available: 
S1 Audit Charter 
S2 Independence  
S3 Professional Ethics and Standards  
S4 Competence 
S5 Planning 
S6 Performance of Audit Work 
S7 Reporting 
S8 Follow-Up Activities 
S9 Irregularities and Illegal Acts 
S10 IT Governance 
S11 Use of Risk Assessment in Audit Planning 
S12 Audit Materiality 
S13 Using the Work of Other Experts 
S14 Audit Evidence 





Currently there are two standards under development: continuous audit and computer 
assisted audit techniques.  
Guidelines section ensures instructions how to implement Information Systems Auditing 
Standards. Auditor should consider guidelines in order to set out how to apply standards. 
Primary aim of the IS Auditing Guidelines is to ensure additional information how auditing 
should be performed in order to be compliant with the IS Auditing Standards. Currently 
there are 39 guidelines: 
G1 Using the Work of Other Auditors 
G2 Audit Evidence Requirement 
G3 Use of Computer Assisted Audit Techniques (CAATs) 
G4 Outsourcing of IS Activities to Other Organisations 
G5 Audit Charter 
G6 Materiality Concepts for Auditing Information Systems 
G7 Due Professional Care 
G8 Audit Documentation 
G9 Audit Considerations for Irregularities and Illegal Acts 
G10 Audit Sampling 
G11 Effect of Pervasive IS Controls 
G12 Organisational Relationship and Independence 
G13 Use of Risk Assessment in Audit Planning 
G14 Application Systems Review 
G15 Planning 
G16 Effect of Third Parties on an Organisation’s IT Controls 
G17 Effect of Nonaudit Role on the IS Auditor’s Independence 
G18 IT Governance 
G20 Reporting 
G21 Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) Systems Review 
G22 Business-to-consumer (B2C) E-commerce Review 
G23 System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) Review 
G24 Internet Banking 
G25 Review of Virtual Private Networks 
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G26 Business Process Reengineering (BPR) Project Reviews 
G27 Mobile Computing 
G28 Computer Forensics 
G29 Post-implementation Review 
G30 Competence 
G31 Privacy 
G32 Business Continuity Plan (BCP) Review From It Perspective 
G33 General Considerations on the Use of the Internet 
G34 Responsibility, Authority and Accountability 
G35 Follow-up Activities 
G36 Biometric Controls 
G37 Configuration Management Process 
G38 Access Controls 
G39 IT Organisation 
G40 Review of Security Management Practices 
 
There are three guidelines still in development stage: enterprise security architecture, 
project management methodology and return on security investment (ROSI).  
Procedures contain examples of detailed steps that auditor can undertake during auditing 
assignments. The procedures ensure information on how to closely follow the standards 
when performing the information systems auditing tasks. Currently, there are 12 
procedures: 
P1 IS Risk Assessment 
P2 Digital Signatures 
P3 Intrusion Detection 
P4 Viruses and other Malicious Code 
P5 Control Risk Self-assessment 
P6 Firewalls 
P7 Irregularities and Illegal Acts 
P8 Security Assessment—Penetration Testing and Vulnerability Analysis 
P9 Evaluation of Management Controls Over Encryption Methodologies 
P10 Business Application Change Control 




These three groups of documents (standards, guidelines and procedures) provide auditors 
with indispensable material for adequate practical information systems auditing. 
Documents thoroughly cover all areas of information systems audit and give clear 
explanations in both standards and guidelines sections with practical examples how audit 
should be performed in actual information technology environments within procedures 
section. Materials are under constant review especially guidelines and procedures sections 
which are by their more practical nature subject to more frequent changes.  
Before mentioned guideline “G3 Use of Computer Assisted Audit Techniques (CAATs)” 
explains the importance of computer assisted auditing tools and techniques, gives broad 
overview of CAATs use in audit planning, audit execution, audit documentation and 
reporting. However, this guideline does include definition of computer assisted information 
systems auditing methodology nor gives any recommendation on which methods should be 
used and when. Such broad approach leaves auditor with a number of choices resulting in 
varying and inconsistent audits performed by different (or even the same) auditors on 
different (or even the same) data sets. Although guideline G3 gives certain 
recommendations, especially concerning risks of using CAATs, CAATs planning steps, 
importance of arrangements with auditee and risks in gathering of audit evidence it 
certainly lacks more details in the field of audit execution, definition of methods and 
adequate computer assisted information systems auditing methodology. 
4.1.2 Control Objectives for Information and Related Technologies (COBIT)  
It is indispensable that business management has understanding of the risks and obstacles 
information systems and underlying information technologies are facing in order to ensure 
adequate direction of further development and proper management controls. COBIT, 
created and maintained by ISACA, is de facto standard methodology for binding business 
risks, management control and information technology areas. COBIT assures 
- control system to manage business requirements for confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, compliance and reliability of information.  
- that due diligence is exercised by all individuals involved in the management, use, 
design, development, maintenance or operation of information systems.  
- development of understandable and clear policy and good practice for control of 




Business entities must ensure quality and security requirements for their data and 
information, as for all other important assets. Management must carry out reasonable 
activities to optimise the use of resources, including data and information, business 
applications, technical infrastructure, facilities and personnel. 
COBIT is developed to be used not only as guidance for management and process owners, 
but also as a tool for information systems auditors. It sets clear definition of all 
indispensable information systems processes that usually exist in any business entity. 
Information systems audits can be carried out using process definition and 
recommendations for their optimization set in COBIT. 
COBIT sets out from a postulate that: information system resources must be managed and 
controlled by processes grouped in certain way in order to ensure the information that 
business needs to fulfil its objectives. COBIT consists of a 34 high-level control objectives 
grouped into four broad domains: planning and organisation, acquisition and 
implementation, delivery and support, and monitoring and evaluation. Each of these 
objectives can be matched with the information systems processes. The business process 
owner can assure management that an adequate control system is set in information system 
by putting in practice these 34 high-level control objectives. 
Briefly, the COBIT products include: 
- Board Briefing on IT Governance - Helps executives understand why IT 
governance is important, what its issues are and what their responsibility is for 
managing it 
- Management guidelines/maturity models - Help assign responsibility, measure 
performance, and benchmark and address gaps in capability 
- Frameworks - Organise IT governance objectives and good practices by IT 
domains and processes, and links them to business requirements 
- Control objectives - provide a complete set of high-level requirements to be 
considered by management for effective control of each IT process 
- IT Governance Implementation Guide: Using COBIT and Val IT TM - provides a 




- COBIT Control Practices: Guidance to Achieve Control Objectives for Successful 
IT Governance - Provides guidance on why controls are worth implementing and 
how to implement them 
- IT Assurance Guide: Using COBIT - Provides guidance on how COBIT can be 
used to support a variety of assurance activities together with suggested testing 
steps for all the IT processes and control objectives [42] 
 
Plan and Organize Domain 
This domain covers strategy and tactics, and concerns the identification of the way IT can 
best contribute to the achievement of the business objectives. The realisation of the 
strategic vision needs to be planned, communicated and managed for different 
perspectives. A proper organisation as well as technological infrastructure should be put in 
place. This domain typically addresses the following management questions [42]: 
- Are IT and the business strategy aligned? 
- Is the enterprise achieving optimum use of its resources? 
- Does everyone in the organisation understand the IT objectives? 
- Are IT risks understood and being managed? 
- Is the quality of IT systems appropriate for business needs?  
 
Processes in this domain are: 
PO1 Define a Strategic IT Plan and direction 
PO2 Define the Information Architecture 
PO3 Determine Technological Direction 
PO4 Define the IT Processes, Organization and Relationships 
PO5 Manage the IT Investment 
PO6 Communicate Management Aims and Direction 
PO7 Manage IT Human Resources 
PO8 Manage Quality 
PO9 Assess and Manage IT Risks 
PO10 Manage Projects 
IT 
Acquire and Implement Domain 
To realise the IT strategy, IT solutions need to be identified, developed or acquired, as well 
as implemented and integrated into the business process. In addition, changes in and 
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maintenance of existing systems are covered by this domain to make sure the solutions 
continue to meet business objectives. This domain typically addresses the following 
management questions [42]: 
- Are new projects likely to deliver solutions that meet business needs? 
- Are new projects likely to be delivered on time and within budget? 
- Will the new systems work properly when implemented? 
- Will changes be made without upsetting current business operations?  
 
This domain contains of following processes: 
AI1 Identify Automated Solutions 
AI2 Acquire and Maintain Application Software 
AI3 Acquire and Maintain Technology Infrastructure 
AI4 Enable Operation and Use 
AI5 Procure IT Resources 
AI6 Manage Changes 
AI7 Install and Accredit Solutions and Changes 
 
Deliver and Support Domain 
This domain is concerned with the actual delivery of required services, which includes 
service delivery, management of security and continuity, service support for users, and 
management of data and operational facilities. It typically addresses the following 
management questions [42]: 
- Are IT services being delivered in line with business priorities? 
- Are IT costs optimised? 
- Is the workforce able to use the IT systems productively and safely? 
- Are adequate confidentiality, integrity and availability in place for information 
security?  
 
Deliver and Support domain has following processes: 
DS1 Define and Manage Service Levels 
DS2 Manage Third-party Services 
DS3 Manage Performance and Capacity 
DS4 Ensure Continuous Service 
DS5 Ensure Systems Security 
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DS6 Identify and Allocate Costs 
DS7 Educate and Train Users 
DS8 Manage Service Desk and Incidents 
DS9 Manage the Configuration 
DS10 Manage Problems 
DS11 Manage Data 
DS12 Manage the Physical Environment 
DS13 Manage Operations 
 
Monitor and Evaluate Domain 
All IT processes need to be regularly assessed over time for their quality and compliance 
with control requirements. This domain addresses performance management, monitoring 
of internal control, regulatory compliance and governance. It typically addresses the 
following management questions [42]: 
- Is IT’s performance measured to detect problems before it is too late? 
- Does management ensure that internal controls are effective and efficient? 
- Can IT performance be linked back to business goals? 
- Are adequate confidentiality, integrity and availability controls in place for 
information security? 
 
Monitor and Evaluate domain includes following processes:  
ME1 Monitor and Evaluate IT Processes 
ME2 Monitor and Evaluate Internal Control 
ME3 Ensure Regulatory Compliance 
ME4 Provide IT Governance 
 
As it is noted above, across four domains, COBIT has identified 34 IT processes that are 
generally used. 
While most enterprises have defined plan, build, run and monitor responsibilities for IT, 
and most have the same key processes, few will have the same process structure or apply 
all 34 COBIT processes. COBIT provides a complete list of processes that can be used to 
verify the completeness of activities and responsibilities; however, they need not all apply, 
and, even more, they can be combined as required by each enterprise [42, page 13]. 
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In addition, corresponding to each of the 34 high-level control objectives is an audit 
guideline to enable the review of IT processes against COBIT’s 318 recommended detailed 
control objectives to provide management assurance and/or advice for improvement. The 
guidelines are action oriented and generic and provide management direction for getting 
the enterprise’s information and related processes under control, for monitoring 
achievement of organisational goals, for monitoring performance within each IT process 
and for benchmarking organisational achievement. To achieve desired goals and objectives 
management and auditors must constantly and consistently re-check procedures. Audit 
Guidelines outlines and suggests actual activities to be performed corresponding to each of 
the 34 high-level IT control objectives, while substantiating the risk of control objectives 
not being met. It assists in analysing an organisation’s IT control environment to 
substantiate their opinions and/or provide advice to management on internal controls [41, 
page 1]. 
ISACA also provides lessons learned from those organisations that successfully applied 
COBIT in their work environments through its implementation guidelines.  
4.2 Bank for International Settlements Approach 
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) is an international organisation which fosters 
international monetary and financial cooperation and serves as a bank for central banks.  
The BIS fulfils this mandate by acting as:  
- a forum to promote discussion and policy analysis among central banks and within 
the international financial community  
- a centre for economic and monetary research  
- a prime counterparty for central banks in their financial transactions  
- agent or trustee in connection with international financial operations  [37] 
 
The Bank’s head office is in Basel, Switzerland. There are also two representative or 
branch offices: in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic 
of China and in Mexico City. The BIS was established in 1930, which makes the BIS the 
world's oldest international financial organisation. As its customers are central banks and 
international organisations, the BIS does not accept deposits from, or provide financial 
services to private individuals or corporate entities. [37] 
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The BIS is a leading organization in risk management in banking industry. For decades it 
deals with and defines procedures for mitigation of credit, market and reputation risk. 
Although, in last decade it strongly focuses on operational risk management. 
The BIS strongly believes that certain rules must be implemented for the management of 
operational risk, as it is already done for decades for the management of other significant 
risks. The lacking management of operational risk can result in a fault statement of bank’s 
risk-return on investment rate and expose it to significant losses. Risk of inappropriate 
development, use and maintenance of information systems is understood as one of key 
operational risks. 
One of very important tasks of BIS is setting sound banking supervision policies. Banking 
supervision consists of a number of control measures and procedures:  
- regulation of bank's entry into market, conduct of business, going out of business  
- identification of owner's responsibilities for bank's conduct of business, 
- control of bank's risk management activities 
- consolidated banking oversight, 
- consumer's protection, 
- cooperation with other supervisory and auditing institutions (foreign and domestic) 
 
From this definition it is visible that supervision is much more than auditing which is more 
focused on review of internal risks, procedures and finding of possible fraudulent 
activities. 
In order to establish proper controls of information systems risks, a framework should be 
established with objective to install adequate auditing function within a bank. A bank 
should develop a framework for managing operational risk and evaluate the adequacy of 
capital concerning its operational risk. The framework should cover the bank’s appetite 
and tolerance for operational risk, as specified through the policies for managing this risk, 
including the extent and manner in which operational risk is transferred outside the bank. It 
should also include policies outlining the bank’s approach to identifying, assessing, 
monitoring and controlling/mitigating the risk. [46] 
BIS issued "Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision" where basic guidelines are 
set for banking supervision by financial authorities. The Core Principles are a framework 
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of minimum standards for sound supervisory practices and are considered universally 
applicable. The BIS drew up the Core Principles and the Methodology as its contribution 
to strengthening the global financial system. Weaknesses in the banking system of a 
country, whether developing or developed, can threaten financial stability both within that 
country and internationally. The Committee believes that implementation of the Core 
Principles by all countries would be a significant step towards improving financial stability 
domestically and internationally and provide a good basis for further development of 
effective supervisory systems  [43, page 2]. 
The document very briefly covered area of operational risk management (Principle 15): 
”Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have in place risk management policies and 
processes to identify, assess, monitor and control/mitigate operational risk. These policies 
and processes should be commensurate with the size and complexity of the bank.” [43, 
page 4]. Also, the document touched the desirable characteristics of supervisory approach, 
techniques and reporting in principles 19, 20 and 21: 
“Principle 19 – Supervisory approach: An effective banking supervisory system requires 
that supervisors develop and maintain a thorough understanding of the operations of 
individual banks and banking groups, and also of the banking system as a whole, focusing 
on safety and soundness, and the stability of the banking system.  
Principle 20 – Supervisory techniques: An effective banking supervisory system should 
consist of on-site and off-site supervision and regular contacts with bank management.  
Principle 21 – Supervisory reporting: Supervisors must have a means of collecting, 
reviewing and analysing prudential reports and statistical returns from banks on both a solo 
and a consolidated basis, and a means of independent verification of these reports, through 
either on-site examinations or use of external experts.” [43, pages 4&5]. 
In October 2003, the BIS issued paper “Sound Practices for the Management and 
Supervision of Operational Risk”. The paper consists of the following chapters:  
- developing an appropriate risk management environment;  
- risk management: identification, assessment, monitoring and control/mitigation;  
- the role of supervisors;  




It is clear that operational risk differs from other banking risks. Typically it is not directly 
taken in return for an expected reward, but exists in the normal course of corporate activity 
which affects the risk management process. At the same time, failure to properly manage 
operational risk can result in a misstatement of an institution’s risk profile and expose the 
institution to significant losses. Reflecting the different nature of operational risk, BIS 
defines a term “management” of operational risk as identification, assessment, monitoring 
and control or mitigation of risk. 
a) developing an appropriate risk management environment 
The board of directors should ensure that the bank’s operational risk management 
framework is subject to effective and comprehensive internal audit by operationally 
independent, appropriately trained and competent staff. The internal audit function should 
not be directly responsible for operational risk management. 
Both the board and senior management are responsible for creating an organisational 
culture that places high priority on effective operational risk management and adherence to 
sound operating controls.  
An operational risk framework should be based on an appropriate definition of operational 
risk which clearly articulates what constitutes operational risk in that bank. The framework 
should cover the bank’s appetite and tolerance for operational risk, as specified through the 
policies for managing this risk and the bank’s prioritisation of operational risk management 
activities, including the extent of, and manner in which, operational risk is transferred 
outside the bank. 
Since a significant aspect of managing operational risk relates to the establishment of 
strong internal controls, it is particularly important that the board establishes clear lines of 
management responsibility, accountability and reporting. In addition, there should be 
separation of responsibilities and reporting lines between operational risk control 
functions, business lines and support functions in order to avoid conflicts of interest. 
Senior management should have responsibility for implementing the operational risk 
management framework approved by the board of directors. Senior management should 
also have responsibility for developing policies, processes and procedures for managing 
operational risk in all of the bank’s material products, activities, processes and systems. 
Banks should have in place adequate internal audit coverage to verify that operating 
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policies and procedures have been implemented effectively. The board should ensure that 
the scope and frequency of the audit programme is appropriate to the risk exposures. Audit 
should periodically validate that the firm’s operational risk management framework is 
being implemented effectively across the firm. To the extent that the audit function is 
involved in oversight of the operational risk management framework, the board should 
ensure that the independence of the audit function is maintained. This independence may 
be compromised if the audit function is directly involved in the operational risk 
management process. The audit function may provide valuable input to those responsible 
for operational risk management, but should not itself have direct operational risk 
management responsibilities. In practice, the Committee recognises that the audit function 
at some banks (particularly smaller banks) may have initial responsibility for developing 
an operational risk management programme. Where this is the case, banks should see that 
responsibility for day-to-day operational risk management is transferred elsewhere in a 
timely manner [54, pages 6-7]. 
b) risk management: identification, assessment, monitoring and control/mitigation 
Banks should identify and assess the operational risk inherent in all material products, 
activities, processes and systems. Banks should also ensure that before new products, 
activities, processes and systems are introduced or undertaken, the operational risk inherent 
in them is subject to adequate assessment procedures. Risk identification is paramount for 
the subsequent development of a viable operational risk monitoring and control system. 
Effective risk identification considers both internal factors (such as the bank’s structure, 
the nature of the bank’s activities, the quality of the bank’s human resources, 
organisational changes and employee turnover) and external factors (such as changes in the 
industry and technological advances) that could adversely affect the achievement of the 
bank’s objectives. 
In addition to identifying the most potentially adverse risks, banks should assess their 
vulnerability to these risks. Effective risk assessment allows the bank to better understand 
its risk profile and most effectively target risk management resources. Risk indicators must 
be thoroughly analysed. They are statistics and/or metrics, often financial, which can 
provide insight into a bank’s risk position. Indicators must be reviewed on a periodic basis 
(such as monthly or quarterly) to alert banks to changes that may be indicative of risk 
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concerns. Such indicators may include the number of failed trades, staff turnover rates and 
the frequency and/or severity of errors and omissions. 
Banks should implement a process to regularly monitor operational risk profiles and 
material exposures to losses. There should be regular reporting of pertinent information to 
senior management and the board of directors that supports the proactive management of 
operational risk. In addition to monitoring operational loss events, banks should identify 
appropriate indicators that provide early warning of an increased risk of future losses. Such 
indicators (often referred to as key risk indicators or early warning indicators) should be 
forward-looking and could reflect potential sources of operational risk such as rapid 
growth, the introduction of new products, employee turnover, transaction breaks, system 
downtime, and so on. When thresholds are directly linked to these indicators an effective 
monitoring process can help identify key material risks in a transparent manner and enable 
the bank to act upon these risks appropriately. 
In addition to segregation of duties, banks should ensure that other internal practices are in 
place as appropriate to control operational risk. Examples of these include: 
- close monitoring of adherence to assigned risk limits or thresholds; 
- maintaining safeguards for access to, and use of, bank assets and records; 
- ensuring that staff have appropriate expertise and training; 
- identifying business lines or products where returns appear to be out of line 
with reasonable expectations (e.g., where a supposedly low risk, low margin 
trading activity generates high returns that could call into question whether such 
returns have been achieved as a result of an internal control breach); 
- regular verification and reconciliation of transactions and accounts, 
- checking for compliance with management controls; 
- policies, processes and procedures concerning the review, treatment and 
resolution of non-compliance issues; and 
- a system of documented approvals and authorisations to ensure accountability 
to an appropriate level of personnel 
 




Operational risk can be more pronounced where banks engage in new activities or develop 
new products (particularly where these activities or products are not consistent with the 
bank’s core business strategies), enter unfamiliar markets, and/or engage in businesses that 
are geographically distant from the head office. Moreover, in many such instances, firms 
do not ensure that the risk management control infrastructure keeps pace with the growth 
in the business activity. A number of the most sizeable and highest-profile losses in recent 
years have taken place where one or more of these conditions existed. Therefore, it is 
incumbent upon banks to ensure that special attention is paid to internal control activities 
where such conditions exist. Some significant operational risks have low probabilities but 
potentially very large financial impact. Moreover, not all risk events can be controlled 
(e.g., natural disasters). Risk mitigation tools or programs can be used to reduce the 
exposure to, or frequency and/or severity of, such events. For example, insurance policies, 
particularly those with prompt and certain pay-out features, can be used to externalize the 
risk of “low frequency, high severity” losses which may occur as a result of events such as 
third-party claims resulting from errors and omissions, physical loss of securities, 
employee or third-party fraud, and natural disasters. 
Investments in appropriate processing technology and information technology security are 
also important for risk mitigation. However, banks should be aware that increased 
automation could transform high-frequency, low-severity losses into low frequency, high-
severity losses. The latter may be associated with loss or extended disruption of services 
caused by internal factors or by factors beyond the bank’s immediate control (e.g., external 
events). Such problems may cause serious difficulties for banks and could jeopardise an 
institution’s ability to conduct key business activities. 
Banks should have in place contingency and business continuity plans to ensure their 
ability to operate on an ongoing basis and limit losses in the event of severe business 
disruption. Banks should identify critical business processes, including those where there is 
dependence on external vendors or other third parties, for which rapid resumption of 
service would be most essential. For these processes, banks should identify alternative 
mechanisms for resuming service in the event of an outage. Particular attention should be 
paid to the ability to restore electronic or physical records that are necessary for business 
resumption. Where such records are backed-up at an off-site facility, or where a bank’s 
operations must be relocated to a new site, care should be taken that these sites are at an 
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adequate distance from the impacted operations to minimise the risk that both primary and 
back-up records and facilities will be unavailable simultaneously. [54, pages 8-12] 
c) Role of Supervisors 
Since one of most important roles of the BIS is giving guidelines how state supervision 
should be performed, crucial part of this paper covers the question of supervisors. Banking 
supervisors should require that all banks, regardless of size, have an effective framework in 
place to identify, assess, monitor and control/mitigate material operational risks as part of 
an overall approach to risk management. 
Supervisors should require banks to develop operational risk management frameworks 
consistent with the guidance in this paper and commensurate with their size, complexity, 
and risk profiles. To the extent that operational risks pose a threat to banks’ safety and 
soundness, supervisors have a responsibility to encourage banks to develop and use better 
techniques in managing those risks. 
Supervisors should conduct, directly or indirectly, regular independent evaluation of a 
bank’s policies, procedures and practices related to operational risks. Supervisors should 
ensure that there are appropriate mechanisms in place which allow them to remain apprised 
of developments at banks. 
Examples of what an independent evaluation of operational risk by supervisors should 
review include the following: 
- The effectiveness of the bank’s risk management process and overall control 
environment with respect to operational risk; 
- The bank’s methods for monitoring and reporting its operational risk profile, 
including data on operational losses and other indicators of potential operational 
risk; 
- The bank’s procedures for the timely and effective resolution of operational risk 
events and vulnerabilities; 
- The bank’s process of internal controls, reviews and audit to ensure the integrity of 
the overall operational risk management process; 
- The effectiveness of the bank’s operational risk mitigation efforts, such as the use 
of insurance; 
- The quality and comprehensiveness of the bank’s disaster recovery and business 
continuity plans; and 
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- The bank’s process for assessing overall capital adequacy for operational risk in 
relation to its risk profile and, if appropriate, its internal capital targets. 
 
Supervisors should also seek to ensure that, where banks are part of a financial group, there 
are procedures in place to ensure that operational risk is managed in an appropriate and 
integrated manner across the group. In performing this assessment, cooperation and 
exchange of information with other supervisors, in accordance with established procedures, 
may be necessary. Some supervisors may choose to use external auditors in these 
assessment processes. 
Deficiencies identified during the supervisory review may be addressed through a range of 
actions. Supervisors should use the tools most suited to the particular circumstances of the 
bank and its operating environment. In order that supervisors receive current information 
on operational risk, they may wish to establish reporting mechanisms, directly with banks 
and external auditors (for example, internal bank management reports on operational risk 
could be made routinely available to supervisors). 
Given the general recognition that comprehensive operational risk management processes 
are still in development at many banks, supervisors should take an active role in 
encouraging ongoing internal development efforts by monitoring and evaluating a bank’s 
recent improvements and plans for prospective developments. These efforts can then be 
compared with those of other banks to provide the bank with useful feedback on the status 
of its own work. Further, to the extent that there are identified reasons why certain 
development efforts have proven ineffective, such information could be provided in 
general terms to assist in the planning process. In addition, supervisors should focus on the 
extent to which a bank has integrated the operational risk management process throughout 
its organisation to ensure effective business line management of operational risk, to 
provide clear lines of communication and responsibility, and to encourage active self 
assessment of existing practices and consideration of possible risk mitigation 
enhancements. [54, pages 13-14]  
d) Role of Disclosure 
Banks should make sufficient public disclosure to allow market participants to assess their 
approach to operational risk management. The BIS believes that the timely and frequent 
public disclosure of relevant information by banks can lead to enhanced market discipline 
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and, therefore, more effective risk management. The amount of disclosure should be 
commensurate with the size, risk profile and complexity of a bank’s operations. The BIS 
believes that a bank should disclose its operational risk management framework in a 
manner that will allow investors and counterparties to determine whether a bank 
effectively identifies, assesses, monitors and controls/mitigates operational risk [54, page 
14].  
4.3 Federal Reserves Bank (FED) Approach  
Since one of key roles of Federal Reserves Bank are banking supervisory and auditing 
activities, it issued a number of guidances and obligatory requirements banks should fulfil 
in order to be compliant with FED requirements. A key document covering a subject of 
information systems auditing issued by FED is "Audit - IT Examination Handbook". This 
document provides guidance to supervisors, auditors and financial institutions on the 
characteristics of an appropriate information system and technology audit function. 
One of key FED prerequisites of establishment of appropriate auditing procedure is 
definition of planned and structured audit program. It is essential that audit function has 
responsibility, knowledge and support of bank's board in evaluating bank's risk 
management practices, compliance with corporate policies concerning IT-related risks, 
internal control systems. This is a minimum set of tasks that must be preserved at bank of 
any size and complexity. Effective audit functions are risk-based, promote reliable IT 
controls, ensure quick solution to deviations and report the board of the suitability of 
implemented risk management practices and measures. 
FED understands that effective IT audit should: 
- Identify areas of greatest IT risk exposure to the institution in order to focus audit 
resources. 
- Promote the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information systems. 
- Determine the effectiveness of management’s planning and oversight of IT 
activities. 
- Evaluate the adequacy of operating processes and internal controls. 
- Determine the adequacy of enterprise-wide compliance efforts related to IT policies 
and internal control procedures. 
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- Require appropriate corrective action to address deficient internal controls and 
follow up to ensure management promptly and effectively implements the required 
actions. [38, page 2]. 
 
The board of directors and senior management are responsible for ensuring that the 
institution’s system of internal controls operates effectively. One important element of an 
effective internal control system is an internal audit function that includes adequate IT 
coverage. 
To meet its responsibility of providing an independent audit function with sufficient 
resources to ensure adequate IT coverage, the board of directors or its audit committee 
should 
- Provide an internal audit function capable of evaluating IT controls, 
- Engage outside consultants or auditors to perform the internal audit function, or 
- Use a combination of both methods to ensure that the institution has received 
adequate IT audit coverage. 
 
An institution’s board of directors may establish an “audit committee” to oversee audit 
functions and to report on audit matters periodically to the full board of directors. For 
purposes of this booklet, the term “audit committee” means the committee with audit 
oversight regardless of the type of financial institution.4 Audit committee members should 
have a clear understanding of the importance and necessity of an independent audit 
function. 
To comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, public stock-issuing institutions are 
required to appoint outside directors as audit committee members. All members of a stock-
issuing institution’s audit committee must be members of the board of directors and be 
independent (i.e., not otherwise compensated by, or affiliated with, the institution). 
Additionally, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) requires 
all depository institutions with total assets greater than $500 million to have independent 
audit committees. Although not all institutions are subject to these requirements due to 
their corporate structure (Sarbanes-Oxley) or their size (FDICIA), it is generally 
considered good practice that they use them as guidelines to ensure the independence of 
their audit committees. 
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The board of directors should ensure that written guidelines for conducting IT audits have 
been adopted. The board of directors or its audit committee should assign responsibility for 
the internal audit function to a member of management (hereafter referred to as the 
“internal audit manager”) who has sufficient audit expertise and is independent of the 
operations of the business. 
The board should carefully review the placement of the audit function in relation to the 
bank's management structure. The board should have confidence that the internal audit 
staff members will perform their duties with impartiality and not be unduly influenced by 
senior management and managers of day-to-day operations. Accordingly, the internal audit 
manager should report directly to the board of directors or its audit committee. 
The bank's board must understand existence of significant risks and appropriately 
undertaken control procedures including risks in new information system products, 
components and procedures. Board and operational management in all business functions 
must clearly understand that a number of risks are associated with reliance on technology, 
such as: 
- Inappropriate user access to information systems 
- Unauthorized disclosure of confidential information 
- Unreliable or costly implementation of IT solutions 
- Inadequate alignment between IT systems and business objectives 
- Inadequate systems for monitoring information processing and transactions 
- Ineffective training programs for employees and system users 
- Insufficient due diligence in IT vendor selection 
- Inadequate segregation of duties 
- Incomplete or inadequate audit trails 
- Lack of standards and controls for end-user systems 
- Ineffective or inadequate business continuity plans 
- Financial losses and loss of reputation related to systems outages.  
 
The board or its audit committee members should seek training to fill any gaps in their 
knowledge related to IT risks and controls. The board of directors or its audit committee 
should periodically meet with both internal and external auditors to discuss audit work 
performed and conclusions reached on IT systems and controls [38, pages 3-5]. 
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In each bank, independently of its size, capital or liabilities, effective risk-based audit 
function must be instituted. Risk-based audit function must encompass all institution’s core 
and critical processes. The order, frequency and depth of particular business process' audit 
will differentiate according to the risk assessment results for certain business process. 
Risk-based IT audit must:  
- Identify the institution’s data, application and operating systems, 
technology, facilities, and personnel; 
- Identify the business activities and processes within each of those 
categories; 
- Include profiles of significant business units, departments, and product 
lines, or systems, and their associated business risks and control features, 
resulting in a document describing the structure of risk and controls 
throughout the institution; 
- Use a measurement or scoring system that ranks and evaluates business and 
control risks for significant business units, departments, and products; 
- Include board or audit committee approval of risk assessments and annual 
risk-based audit plans that establish audit schedules, audit cycles, work 
program scope, and resource allocation for each area audited; 
- Implement the audit plan through planning, execution, reporting, and 
follow-up; 
- Include a process that regularly monitors the risk assessment and updates it 
at least annually for all significant business units, departments, and products 
or systems. [38, page 15&16] 
 
Special care should be given to development, acquisition, or conversion of business 
applications since they are one of basis for performing banking activities. Also, through 
business applications it is possible to gain enormous advantage comparing to competition, 
but also, if controls are lacking, huge losses and even bankruptcies may occur. Some 
examples of such outcomes are shown in chapter 2. Application development is a complex 
process which demands intensive interaction between IT department, business 
departments, and internal audit. It necessitates set up of exact steps to ensure that 
applications satisfy business requirements. The auditor should check if requirements are 
met after each development step. He must check if testing was performed according to 
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sound practices and established procedures and whether application controls are set on 
input, processing, output and store level. Also, audit trails must be established for key user 
and application activities. Audit function must form instructions how to check applications 
in their analysis and design phase. It is necessary because implementation of control 
structures into application which is already in production environment is usually extremely 
uncomfortable.  
After new application or critical change in existing application is approved and installed in 
production environment, auditors must carry out so-called post implementation check. This 
check must comprise of detailed testing of input controls, authentication mechanism, 
granted privileges, application algorithms, error handling, auditing of user and automated 
application activities and output results. This kind of test confirms not only if application 
operates as it is defined by user specification, but also checks if there are any flaws, 
mistakes or omissions in user specification that could not be found during previously 
performed testing and audit checks. This is possible since data available in testing 
environment in complex systems can be imperfect. Swift post implementation application 
audit will eliminate or at least minimize possible financial losses from application 
inefficiency, errors or missing controls. Also, reputation risk of incomplete or inaccurate 
information given to third parties or customers should be mitigated.  
It is very important to stress that FED was among first supervisory and auditing institutions 
which realized importance and necessity of reliance on computer assisted auditing methods 
and supporting software in examination of information systems. After FED's initiative, 
number of other commercial audit companies which used CAAT's started to grow 
considerably. FED demands that CAATs have to be used to enhance audit findings and 
recommendations. It is very important that by use of CAATs cost of data, internal logic 
and audit of procedures can be significantly reduced. The use of CAATs may include audit 
software, business data, trace functions in application development environments, audit 
trails analyzers and security information and event management systems.  
As a conclusion, FED insists that specific audit programme must be undertaken in 
following areas: 
- The adequacy of management's involvement in risk management functions and 
audit  




- Information security 
- Payment systems 
- Outsourcing 
4.4 Approach of Croatian National Bank 
Since the Riječka bank loss, Croatian state institutions and wide public clearer understood 
that information system audit must be unavoidable component of each audit. It became 
obvious that improvement of information technology control and audit is necessary and 
that information systems audit is multidisciplinary activity, encompassing knowledge 
about technology, information systems and business conduct. 
Unfortunately, it may be said Riječka banka case contributed more to idea of information 
system audit and control than any other event or initiative in Croatia. Since that time, 
Croatian National Bank (CNB) pursued very actively idea of information systems audit 
and control. Already in 2002, a new Banking Law covered some information systems 
auditing aspects. Also, Specialized On-Site Supervision department was established. That 
department, among other activities, performed information systems audit and control. 
Furtherly, in March 2006 CNB announced Guidelines on Information Systems 
Management in Order to Mitigate Operational Risk and Guidelines for Adequate 
Management of Outsourcing Risks. In July 2007, decision on adequate information system 
management was issued. All banks are obliged to act in accordance to these legal 
documents (law and decision) while guidelines show directions in which CNB will further 
proceed with legal acts concerning information systems audit and control. 
4.4.1 The Banking Law 
The Banking Law, which was proposed by CNB, accepted by the Croatian parliament and 
came into force in July 2002 was the first law in Republic of Croatia which dealt in more 
details with operational risk and information systems auditing. These subjects were 




In article 67, all risks that banks should manage and mitigate are numbered. One of the 
mentioned risks is “operational risk, including a risk of inadequate management of 
information technologies and other related technologies”.  
Internal audit was named as important factor in information systems auditing. In article 
107 it is stated “The internal audit shall conduct ongoing supervision of the entire 
operations of the bank for the purpose of verifying whether the bank... systematically 
manages risks arising from business activities of the bank in accordance with the principles 
of stable operations, including the management of resources of the information technology 
and other related technologies”.  
Furtherly, commercial or “certified” auditors are obliged to perform information systems 
auditing. In article 114, it is clearly noted that “in the course of conducting an audit 
certified auditors” should, among other duties, examine and give opinion on “the 
information system of the bank in accordance with the internationally accepted standards 
for the audit of information systems”. 
The Banking Law also gives guidelines to supervisory audits performed by CNB. In article 
115 it is stated that “in discharging its supervisory functions the CNB shall assess the 
lawfulness and regularity of bank operations, capability of a bank to manage operating 
risks”. This law also defines on-site supervisory audit function and sets out that banks are 
obliged to enable the central bank’s auditor to control “of the information technology and 
other related technologies” (article 119). It also ensures the prerequisites of use of 
computer assisted auditing tools: “The bank shall also provide the authorized person with 
the standard interface providing access to the system for database management used by the 
bank, for the purpose of conducting an examination supported by computer programs” 
(article 119). That means banks must ensure interface which will enable CNB auditors to 
apply CAATs on database instances in order to check data and records for omissions, 
errors and possible frauds. Mentioning of "standard interface providing access to the 
system for database management used by the bank" and especially important "examination 
supported by computer programs" is the first appearance of such terms in any legislative 
act of Republic of Croatia. Since then, CNB auditors regularly use CAATs and 
corresponding computer assisted auditing methods in their auditing work i.e. analysis of 
data and records describing business events stored in databases. Computer assisted auditing 
methods that are used are based on certain CAATs acquired by the CNB.  The use of 
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CAATs and corresponding computer assisted auditing methods by the CNB are the 
consequence of CNB's assurance that CAATs and underlying methods are extremely 
effective and that they should be compulsory in any information systems auditing in banks.  
Article 122 defines obligation of the banks in the area of “examination of computerized 
business books and records”. Banks must insure that central bank’s auditor has at “disposal 
all that is necessary to gain an insight into:  
1. all prescribed activities and procedures of the information system control at the 
levels of: (a) the bank, (b) management functions, (c) individual business processes 
and (d) transactions;  
2. activities and procedures for the development, acquisition and maintenance of the 
information system;  
3. policies and procedures for the safety of the information system and data 
protection.” 
 
The complex question of change management tracking is touched in article 122: “Any 
change in program solutions shall be documented in the time sequence of the creation of 
changes together with the day of the change.” 
This Banking Law was a solid basis for development of guidelines, decisions and legal 
documents that were to follow. CNB was aware of operational risks particularly of the 
risks arising from inadequate development, use and maintenance of banking information 
systems thus other legal documents covering this subject followed. One of very important 
issues covered by this law is necessity of ensuring interface to CAATs used by CNB 
auditors in commercial banks' databases. 
Specifically important document that was issued by the CNB in accordance with 
previously explained Banking Law are Guidelines for Management of Information System 
in Order to Mitigate Operational Risk. Guidelines covered nine domains of banking 
information systems and explained what types of activities are indispensable in order to 
improve information systems management and to mitigate risks. These domains are: 
organization of information management; risk assessment, mitigation of risks, controls, 
information classification; internal audit function; security of information system; 
maintenance of information system; business continuity planning; system development and 
outsourcing; e-banking systems. Guidelines are the first document produced by any 
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governmental or public institution which in more details describes how business entities 
should manage and mitigate risks within their information systems. That document is the 
consequence of CNB’s understanding of information systems importance within any 
commercial bank and CNB’s strong commitment in improvement of those information 
systems in banking community by means of auditing methods and underlying guidelines 
and legally binding documents. 
4.4.2 Decision on Adequate Information System Management 
The Decision was enacted in July 2007 by the Governor of the CNB. It was an effect of 
Guideline described in chapter 4.4.1, with the important difference that Decision norms are 
mandatory i.e. they must be fulfilled within certain time limits, while guidelines are 
advices on certain subject and are not obligatory. Generally speaking, central banks’ 
guidelines always precede legally binding acts and decisions thus giving some time to 
banks to take steps for alignment with central banks’ strategies and norms. The Decision 
regulates the requirements related to management of information systems of the banking 
institutions and thus serving as a basis for supervisory audits performed by the CNB audit 
experts. 
Article 2 comprises of comprehensive definitions of terms like software and hardware 
components, information assets, information technology and system, information system 
users and risks, properties of information and processes (confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, authenticity, non-repudiation, verifiability, reliability), controls 
(administrative, logical, physical), access rights management, audit trails, malicious code, 
electronic banking, outsourcing, incident, recovery time objective, critical business 
processes and backup data copies. 
Then, set of articles (3 to 11) governing framework for information system management 
are defined. Bank’s management board must nominate one board member responsible for 
development and supervision of information system management process. It must enact 
information system strategy which has to be in accordance with business strategy. Internal 
regulations which govern information system management together with responsibilities 
for the supervision of their implementation must be adopted. All information system users 
must be introduced to regulations related to information system according to their 
delegated needs. Bank must define criteria, methods and procedures for notification of 
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management and supervisory board about important facts on functionality and security of 
information system. A role of information system manager must be created by 
management’s board. This role must be independent of the information department 
manager as well as not under manager’s organizational influence. Scope, responsibilities 
and duties of this role must be established. Management board must appoint information 
technology steering committee responsible for monitoring and supervising the information 
system, its operations and compliance with the bank’s business goals and business strategy. 
Furthermore, bank must set up a project management methodology which defines criteria, 
methods and procedures for managing information system projects. 
Information system risk management is covered by articles 12 to 15. Bank must adopt 
information system risk management process which will include risk assessment, risk 
mitigation, monitoring and maintaining of the permissible risk levels. The results of 
information system risk assessment must be documented in the form of a report. Bank 
must assess and mitigate risks arising from contracts with companies, institutions and 
individuals who are in some way connected with the bank’s information system. 
Information, data and documents, must be classified and protected accordingly to their 
sensitivity with respect to integrity, confidentiality and availability. 
Internal audit must perform auditing of bank’s information system according to defined 
methodology which will include well established criteria, methods and procedures for 
information system auditing. In this Decision CNB does not define what methodology 
must be used, nor gives more details about methodology properties. However, in article 
114 of the Banking Law it is stated that information system must be checked and examined 
"in accordance with the internationally accepted standards for the audit of information 
systems”. That practically means that banks when defining their internal information 
system audit methodology must follow ISACA, BIS or eventually FED results in this field. 
A field of information system security is elaborated in articles 18 to 22. Each bank must 
adopt its information system security policy which will serve as a framework for 
information system security management. Responsibilities and roles must be defined for 
appropriate management of information system security (article 18). Article 19 deals in 
more details with access control to information system resources: "A bank shall control the 
access to the information system resources, premises where the information system 
resources are located and the resources supporting the functioning of the information 
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system. It shall also apply the appropriate administrative, logical and physical access 
controls. Special attention should be given to administrative access and remote access to 
the information system resources." Article 20 furtherly describes the need for system of 
user access rights management which will include registration, authorisation, 
identification, authentication and supervision of user access rights. A bank also has to 
assure the storage of audit trails which will enable auditors of event reconstruction, 
detection of unauthorised access and bringing conclusions about actions performed on the 
information system components. Information system components must be protected from 
malicious code by implementation of suitable logical, physical and administrative controls. 
A topic of information system maintenance is dealt with in articles 23 to 26. A bank must 
set up the process of asset management of information system hardware components 
during the life cycle of each asset. That process has to include procedures for detection, 
recording, disposing, monitoring, recovery and discarding the assets (article 23). Change 
management of business application and system software components is recognized as 
extremely important. So, banks must establish the procedures for determining the initial 
versions of software components, monitor all changes in the application software 
supporting banking services, monitor all changes in the database architecture supporting 
banking services, monitoring the changes in any other information system component that 
may affect the functionality or security of the information system. Changes in the 
monitored software components must be logged in order of their occurrence together with 
precise time of occurrence. Change management of software components must be 
supported by testing and approval before their installation on the production platform 
(article 24). Appropriate procedures for documentation creation, store and maintenance in 
accordance with the facts must be developed. Bank must ensure that all its employees are 
adequately and continuously trained for the use of corresponding information system 
components. 
Business continuity management issues are covered in articles 27 to 31. The process of 
business continuity planning must be established in order to provide availability of critical 
business processes. Bank must (article 27): 
- Create and document a business impact analysis in order to determine the impact 
on the bank's business of the unavailability of critical business processes and of the 
information system resources that support those critical processes. 
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- Establish business continuity plan ensuring the recovery of critical business 
processes within the maximum allowed time (recovery time objective) and mitigate 
losses that may arise from interruption of critical business processes. 
- Approve disaster recovery plan assuring the recovery and availability of 
information system components necessary for the carrying out of critical business 
processes within the recovery time objectives; 
- Periodically and after significant changes in the business processes or information 
system resources, perform the appropriate testing of the business continuity plan 
and disaster recovery plan. Written reports about testing results must be prepared. 
 
A bank must establish incident management process in order to ensure quick response and 
recovery in the case of security breaches or discontinuity of information system resources 
supporting critical business processes. A bank must inform CNB of all major incidents 
together with its effects and actions taken. Backup storage management process must be 
defined and approved. It has to include procedures for creating, storing, verifying and 
restoring backup data copies in order to provide the recovery of critical business processes 
within recovery time objectives. In accordance with bank's risk assessment, secondary 
location for backup storage must be set up at a sufficient distance from primary location 
(article 30). A bank has to prepare and put into work backup (secondary) computer centre 
with necessary information technology equipment in accordance with business impact 
analysis and risk assessment. The backup computer centre must be located at sufficient 
distance from primary computer centre, in the alignment with risk assessment (article 31). 
Information system development and outsourcing topics are covered in more details in 
heading IX. A bank has to define methodology for information system development while 
stressing the importance of functional and security aspects. Information system 
methodology must be coordinated with approved project management methodology. 
Information system development methodology must consist of procedures for analysis and 
design, programming, testing and releasing into production environment. All system 
software, application modules and IT hardware components must be appropriately tested 
and formally accepted before production release. For those reasons bank must set up 
separate development, testing and production environments. A bank has to check if 
legislation of the country in which service provider operates allows the CNB to perform its 
supervisory duties without any restrictions, before any decision about outsourcing of 
  
67 
information system component is made. Before decision about outsourcing, bank has to 
assess the risks related to outsourcing arrangement. A bank must monitor the way and 
quality of providing outsourced services. 
Concerning the electronic banking (heading X.), a bank must implement secure 
authentication methods in order to authenticate the identities of individuals, processes and 
systems. Whenever it is applicable, authentication procedure must include a combination 
of at least two factors of user identification. A bank must assure their clients of its identity 
in the electronic banking applications so that users can verify the bank remotely. Adequate 
audit trails must be stored in order to ensure the non-repudiation of client's and bank's 
activities. 
Although the Decision was enacted by Governor in 2007, majority of articles entered into 
force on 1st of January 2008. Entering into force of articles that require more preparation, 
financial and organizational activities was postponed to 1st of July 2008, 1st of January 
2009, 1st of July 2009, 1st of January 2010 and 1st of July 2010. It is important to stress that 
although Decision deals with definition of obligatory tasks for adequate information 
system management within banking industry, it serves as a basis for information system 
audits performed by the CNB. 
4.5 Conclusion on Existing Frameworks and Approaches 
In contemporary business environments, information systems auditors are requested to add 
extra value to auditing activity and business entity being audited. It is usually demanded by 
auditee itself, but also by legislative authorities i.e. laws and acts. These demands are 
especially enforced after enormous losses and a number of bankruptcies. Auditors are 
compelled to examine not only general information systems controls in order to confirm if 
information system is in general terms adequate and that certain activities have been 
undertaken that decisions can be based on data and reports from information system. They 
are forced to examine data and processes in details in order to prove that information 
system is reasonably resistant to fraudulent activities, omissions and errors.  
That means that auditors must clearly understand business and information systems 
processes, weaknesses in specific control mechanisms, fraud, omission and error 
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indicators, necessity for monitoring these indicators and be ready and willing to perform 
additional auditing and investigation when certain indicators are recovered. 
Auditors also have constantly increasing responsibility to appropriately document and store 
their findings and to be prepared to go to court in order to help eventual prosecutions. 
Modern information systems are complex and usually have many software, hardware and 
organizational components that should fit together to produce appropriate business 
solution. Assurance that information system is without weaknesses can be accomplished 
only if all its components are appropriately audited. It is of a major importance that 
information systems auditing encompasses [23]: 
1. Physical and environmental review - Physical security, power supply, air 
conditioning, humidity control and other environmental factors.  
2. System administration review - Security review of the operating systems, database 
management systems, all system administration procedures and compliance.  
3. Application software review - access control and authorizations, validations, error 
and exception handling, business process flows within the application software and 
complementary manual controls and procedures. A review of the application development 
lifecycle must be completed.  
4. Network security review - internal and external connections to the system, perimeter 
security, firewall review, router access control lists, port scanning and intrusion detection.  
5. Business continuity review - existence and maintenance of fault tolerant and 
redundant hardware, backup procedures and storage, and documented and tested disaster 
recovery/business continuity plan.  
6. Data review – checking of validity, completeness and integrity of business data in 
order to verify adequacy of controls and impact of weaknesses, as noticed from any of the 
above reviews. Such substantive testing should be done using computer assisted audit 
techniques.  
All abovementioned auditing areas must be thoroughly audited in order to present to 
management a clear assessment of the system. It is possible to have first five components 
almost perfect, that business application solution is developed according to user 
  
69 
(functional) specification but at the same time data entry controls are not appropriate. In 
that case, information system is designed as it is defined by business function which means 
it is aligned with business. However, such information system can lead to high number of 
omissions, errors and even frauds or losses.  
Moreover, for example network security towards public networks may have been 
implemented sufficiently well, but the access privileges to operating system supporting 
internal business applications may have been adversely implemented. If access privileges 
enable unauthorized employees with access to execute or even change certain application 
components, then risks of inappropriate use of applications grow enormously. Some 
examples of notorious frauds are explained in chapter 2. 
It is important to emphasize that audit process can be consisted of these components in 
different intensity. In the practice, certain audit proceeding is often focused only on one of 
above numbered components i. e. some of them are usually omitted. However, it is 
obligatory to execute all components, but it is not always feasible to perform all of them at 
once in one audit assignment. It is necessary that auditor and management judge the results 
of each audit assignment in mutual relationship, as one complete audit proceeding. Only 
then it is possible to adequately asses if information systems component of operational risk 
is appropriately mitigated. 
Data, usually stored in databases and managed by database management systems, is of a 
major importance for any business organization. Business decision making is strongly 
based on data produced within or outside organization. If data on which business decision-
making process relies upon are erroneous or incorrect, than decisions are obviously not 
made on appropriate basis. This may lead to huge financial losses, bankruptcies of 
businesses and even systemic disorders in state, regional or even global economies. Some 
of such notorious cases are described in chapter 2.  
Furthermore, number of transactions and data stored in databases is constantly and quickly 
increasing. Also, the way businesses are conducted i.e. business processes is getting more 
and more complicated. For example, number and complexity of financial instruments 
(bonds, loans, bills etc.) in financial industry is significantly increased in last years. This 
means that business processes that should be managed are considerably more complicated. 
As business processes are producing more and more data with increased complexity it is 
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obvious that it is not possible to perform the data audit without computer technology based 
tools. Also, accordingly to importance of data in management of any business 
organization, it is necessary to give special attention to data checks and analysis i.e. to 
control and auditing of business data. So, more advanced approaches which will not be 
exclusively based on manual controls and analysis of certain data samples must be 
implemented throughout auditing process. Practically, such large data sets that became 
regular in today’s business environments must be analyzed and checked with specialized 
computer (software) tools. Such specialized computer based tools that assist in data audits 
already exist on the market under the name of CAAT (computer assisted auditing tools). 
As a minimum, CAAT must have specific built in functions for data audit like selection, 
extraction, join, summarization, stratification, calculated columns, duplication detection, 
rounded values, gaps, Benford’s Law etc. 
As it is briefly noted in chapter 4.1.1, ISACA issued guideline “G3 Use of Computer 
Assisted Audit Techniques (CAATs)” in order to set direction in which computer assisted 
auditing should be developed. Guideline emphasised that the use of CAATs should be 
controlled by the auditor to provide reasonable assurance that the audit objectives and the 
detailed specifications of the CAATs have been met. The auditor should: 
- Perform a reconciliation of control totals from different data sources if 
appropriate 
- Review output for reasonableness 
- Perform a review of the logic, parameters or other characteristics of the 
CAATs 
- Review the organisation’s general information system controls, which may 
contribute to the integrity of the CAATs (e.g., program change controls and 
access to system, program, and/or data files) 
 
When using test data, the auditor must be aware that test data only point out the potential 
for erroneous processing since this technique does not evaluate actual production data. The 
auditor should also be aware that test data analysis can be extremely complex and time 
consuming, depending on the number of transactions processed, the number of programs 
tested and the complexity of the programs/systems. Before using test data the auditor 
should verify that the test data will not permanently affect the live system. 
  
71 
When using generalised audit software to access the production data, the auditor should 
take appropriate steps to protect the integrity of the organisation’s data. With embedded 
audit software, the auditor should be involved in system design and techniques should be 
developed and maintained within the organisation’s application programs/systems. 
When using utility software, the auditor should confirm that no unplanned interventions 
have taken place during processing and that the utility software has been obtained from the 
appropriate system library. The auditor should also take appropriate steps to protect the 
integrity of the organisation’s system and files since these utilities can easily damage the 
system and its files. 
Customised queries or scripts allow the auditor to specifically target desired information 
for analysis. Customised scripts are highly useful for environments where other CAATs 
are not available but usually require specific technical skill sets to create them. Therefore, 
the auditor should obtain assurance of their integrity, reliability, usefulness and security 
through appropriate planning, design and testing before reliance is placed on CAATs, and 
ensure that proper source data are used and that output from scripts and queries are in the 
proper format. Customised query and script code should be maintained in a secure location 
to prevent unauthorised changes from occurring. 
When using application software tracing and mapping, the auditor should confirm that the 
source code being evaluated has generated the object program currently being used in 
production. The auditor should be aware that application software tracing and mapping 
only points out the potential for erroneous processing; it does not evaluate actual 
production data. 
The auditor must use and document the results of appropriate procedures to provide for the 
ongoing integrity, reliability, usefulness and security of the CAATs. For example, this 
should include a review of program maintenance and program change controls over 
embedded audit software to determine that only authorised changes have been made to the 
CAATs. When CAATs reside in an environment not under the control of the auditor, an 
appropriate level of control should be in effect to identify changes to the CAATs. When 
CAATs are changed, the auditor should obtain assurance of their integrity, reliability, 
usefulness and security through appropriate planning, design, testing, processing and 
review of documentation before reliance is placed on the CAATs [45].  
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Although ISACA, as a leader in field of information systems auditing, promotes CAATs 
and issued before mentioned guideline G3, appropriate strict and detailed methodology for 
computer assisted auditing is still not established. As a consequence, auditors implement 
CAATs according to guidelines, approaches or directions defined by their local legal 
authorities. Although these documents give certain overview and highlights how CAAT 
should be used at the same time they lack necessary depth and details. Simply, there is no 
methodology containing the definition of methods, their way of use and mutual 
relationships.  
So, such methodology should consists of appropriate and effective methods for data audit 
and model containing steps of methods usage, their relationships, inputs, outputs and 
possible conclusion-making process. One of key steps in process of methodology 
development is choosing adequate methods. Lately, Benford’s Law earned attention and 
focus of some auditors and academy researchers. As it is already stated in [10], [17] and 
some other works, Benford’s Law may be very useful in auditing of information systems 
so it is chosen as a principal method of methodology being developed in chapter 7. In 
chapters 5 and 6 extensive explanation of Benford’s Law properties, various tests and 
conformance criteria are given.  
Apart from Benford's Law, adequate methodology for computer assisted information 
systems auditing should consist of some other methods enabling efficient execution of 
audit process. Specific methods that proved efficient in practice of data extraction and 
analysis can also be very useful in audit process based on data audit. These methods that 
are candidates for use in specific computer assisted information systems auditing 
methodology are explained in the following chapter.  
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5. Analysis of Particular Methods for Computer Assisted 
Information Systems Auditing 
There are number of methods used in process of computer assisted auditing. Some of these 
methods are even supported within computer assisted auditing tools which improves their 
strengths and capabilities. Methods are outcome of frameworks and approaches described 
in chapter 4 and are regularly used in computer assisted auditing activities. The list of 
methods that follow is certainly not final and often combinations of methods are used: 
- Append - It merges two data tables with identical columns into a single data table. 
An example would be to append two sets of rows from different periods stored in 
two data tables into one data table. Append is similar to union relational operator 
with a difference that append operation does not exclude duplicated records from 
newly formed data table.  
- Index/sort - A content of a data table is sorted in ascending or descending order on 
certain columns. If more than one column is chosen for a sort, it will be performed 
in the order of choice. Ascending and descending sorts may be combined. 
- Summarize - This method totals numeric columns based on a specified key column. 
One example is totalling invoice amounts (summarization column) by supplier 
number. This method is explained in more details in chapter 5.4. 
- Calculated column or field – A variety of spreadsheet like statistical or 
mathematical functions are necessary property of CAATs. Examples of these 
functions are standard arithmetical operations (addition, subtraction, multiplication, 
division, exponential calculation, roots), calculation of absolute values, counting of 
values, average etc. A calculated column or field is based on the data within table.  
- Duplication detection - Duplicate values are extracted within a specified data 
columns. For example, this method can be used to find eventual duplicate invoices 
paid within the purchase data table. More on duplication detection method can be 
found in chapter 5.6. 
- Selection (extraction) - Specified records are extracted from data table in order to 
ease the search. Selection is carried out using so called “where” clause which 
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contains condition. Within CAAT, selected data are usually copied to another data 
table. Further explanation of this method can be found in chapter 5.2. 
- Gaps – Method is used for identification of cuts in a specified column in data table. 
Using this method, auditor may easily search for gaps in column which values, 
when sorted, should form sequential array without any break. For example, method 
can find missing customers from within account receivables in certain period of 
time.   
- Join - Specified columns from two data tables are combined into a single table 
using values in key columns used for comparison. For example, table with all 
master data on banks could be related to the payment transactions table using 
equality expression between bank code columns in both tables. This method is 
explained in more details in chapter 5.3 and used in methodology developed in 
chapter 7.2. 
- Stratification – This method counts the number and value of table records falling 
within intervals predefined by auditor. Stratification method provides very useful 
view into the data, providing help for data and business conduct understanding. A 
method is explained in more details in chapter 5.5 and used in methodology 
explained in chapter 7.2.  
- Benford’s Law – It is designed to find abnormal deviations of specific digits in 
values, as well as deviations in digit combinations in certain number sets. It is 
furtherly used to find abnormal duplication of values or clustering around specific 
limits. Benford’s Law defines the expected frequencies of the digits in value data 
sets if data are authentic and non-manipulated. Benford’s Law is explained 
extensively in chapters 6 and 5.1 and represents the basis of the computer assisted 
information systems auditing methodology designed and verified in chapter 7. 
- Rounded values - this method produces sorted list of number values rounded to 
multiplies of 5 or 10. Rounded values are sorted descending according to frequency 
and rounded value itself in descending order. More detailed explanation is 
presented in chapter 5.7. 
- Horizontal analysis - This method analyzes the increases and decreases in balances, 
normally financial statement, over two or more periods. Examples are calculations 
for balance sheet, income statement and/or budget-to-actual analysis data. 
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- Vertical analysis – It examines balances, normally in financial statements, in a 
single period where each balance asset value is shown as a percentage of the total 
assets and every income value is shown as a percentage of the total sales.  
- Trend analysis - This method includes comparing any of the analytical tests over 
two or more periods. It is used to measure whether the data in a selected numeric 
data table column shows upward or downward trend in time and then to define the 
best fitting straight line. Trend is also used to forecast values on the assumption that 
the trend pattern i.e. straight line will continue in the future. The use of trend 
analysis is very important in any fraud detection because fraudulent transactions 
often create deviations in time that could go undetected if only the single year were 
being analyzed and if no trend straight line would be defined. 
- Correlation – This method, also called correlation coefficient, is a measure of the 
strength and direction of a relationship between the values in two numeric table 
columns. In other words, correlation method is utilized for determination how 
closely the values in two numeric table columns are related. 
- Regression – Calculates a dependent column value (e.g. payment amount) based on 
number of independent column values (e.g. bank code, type of transaction, country 
of payment etc.). Regression also ensures specific precision percentage for each test 
so that the auditor can assess the reliability of the test.  
- Pivoting – Pivoting method is an interface to data tables in which auditor may 
define how data is displayed and organized. Auditor defines rows and columns 
which should be displayed, together with aggregation totals according to specific 
conditions. 
- Sampling – CAAT should include a few methods of sampling (e.g. systematic or 
interval, random, stratified random sampling). Sampling can be used if number of 
records being audited becomes too large for a computer power auditor has in 
possession. 
According to previous research, status of auditing approaches, frameworks and experience, 
conclusions about specifically adequate computer assisted auditing methods can be made. 
Specifically useful auditing method which is used in auditing processes only lately and still 
quite scarcely is Benford's Law.  
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Benford's Law, as it is explained in more details in [6], [8], [10], [11], [17] and [19], 
includes a number of tests. Especially valuable are first digit test, second digit test, first 
two digits test and first three digits test. These tests proved to be extremely efficient in 
practical auditing process. They can improve investigations on data in a sense that auditor 
does not have to initially define what type of fraud, omission or error is being investigated. 
After Benford's Law tests are applied on data, auditor can reasonably easy notice 
deviations which afterwards have to be compared to business rules and further explained. 
Various Benford's Law tests enable different focuses on audit data as well as efficient 
check of complete data set being audited.  For these reasons, Benford's Law is the central 
method in model of methodology designed in this paper. 
 
Selection method is irreplaceable when speaking of methods for analysis, filtering and 
extraction of data. It is a basic operation of relational algebra used for focusing on certain 
attributes (data columns) and rows (records, tuples). Join method is also one of basic and 
indispensable operations of relational algebra. It enables relating ("connecting") different 
tables with common attribute(s). Summarization ensures grouping of data according to 
unique values in selected attributes and performs chosen mathematical functions on some 
other attributes. Stratification method produces counts, percentages and other mathematical 
functions based on pre-defined data layers. The objective of duplication method is to find 
duplicated values in certain attribute(s) thus identifying value (usually number) invention. 
Rounded values method produces descending ordered list of numbers rounded to 
multiplications of 5 or 10, which can be very useful in identification of estimation. 
 
According to experience and assessed usefulness of methods, previously numbered 
methods are used within created methodology. So, methods that constitute computer 
assisted information systems auditing methodology developed in this paper are: 
1. Benford’s Law  
2. Selection 




7. Rounded values 
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5.1 Benford’s Law 
As it is described in more details in chapter 6, Benford's Law defines expected digit 
frequencies in certain number sets. It is noticeable that in sets of numbers from many data 
sources, certain digits are distributed in a particular way. According to the first digit 
Benford's Law, digit "1" appears as the first digit in number for almost one third of the 
time, and larger digits appear on the leading number position with lower and lower 
frequencies. E.g. digit 9 appears as a first digit in slightly more than 4,5% numbers. The 
basis for Benford's Law lies in the fact that values of real world data sources are often 
distributed logarithmically, thus the logarithm of this real world data sources is distributed 
uniformly. Benford’s Law may be applied to the first, second, first two and first three 
digits in numbers. That is why there are in fact four methods based on this law: the first 
digit test, the second digit test, the first two digits test and the first three digits test. 
Benford's Law of the first digit i.e. probability P of appearance of digit z1 in number 
system with base 10 on leftmost position in number can be expressed by the following 
formula: 
P(z1)=log10(1+1/z1), z1[1..9]    (1) 
Formulas for probabilities of appearance of the second, first two and first three digits in 
number system with base 10 are: 







   (2) 
 P(z1z2)=log10(1+1/z1z2), z1z2[10..99]    (3) 
 P(z1z2z3)=log10(1+1/z1z2z3),z1z2z3[100..999] (4) 
Each of these methods uses certain numeric attribute as input and counts frequencies 
certain combination of digits, depending on specific method. Output is list of all digits 
combinations and their respective frequency.  
5.2 Selection 
Selection is one of operations of relational algebra which is used for extractions (or 
selections) of data that holds for defined condition. Selection is very powerful operation 
which is most commonly used query-based operation in business application software.  
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In relational algebra, selection (sometimes called restriction or exclusion) is a unary 
operation written as σxOy(r) or σxOc(r) where: 
- x and y are relation's attribute names  
- O is a binary operation in the set (greater than, greater or equal than, equal, 
not equal, lesser than, lesser or equal than). It may also consist of logical 
Boolean operators (AND, OR, NOT). 
- c is a constant  
- r is a relation 
 
The selection σxOy(r) selects all rows in r for which O holds between the x and the y 
attribute. 
The selection σxOc(r) picks only rows in r for which O holds between the x attribute and the 
constant value c. 
In database management systems, selection relational algebra operation is designated by 
SELECT SQL statement. That statement extracts all rows (records, tuples) from a table 
(term “table” in database management system terminology corresponds to term “relation” 
in relational algebra) whose attributes hold against selection criteria:  
     t2 = select(t1,P) 
 
Table t2 is created out of table t1, and it contains only rows from table t1 which satisfy (or 
hold against) the predicate P.  
A predicate is simply an expression made out of Boolean algebra whose operators are the 
logical Boolean expressions (and, or, not) and arithmetic expressions (<, <=, >, >=, =, <>), 
and whose operands are either attribute names or attribute domain constants. A predicate 
may also represent another select statement thereby producing relation nesting. In practice, 
selection is usually used together with projection operation. Projection operation includes 
only chosen attributes out of table (relation) and may include mathematical functions over 
included attributes (e.g. maximum, minimum, average). 
Input data for selection method is table (or relation in relational algebra terminology). 
Selection’s predicate in fact represents method’s algorithm. Output of selection is again 
table, restricted on only those rows which satisfy predicate.  
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Selection method is very powerful and it is mandatory in computer assisted auditing. 
Without this method, it is not possible to effectively audit business activities. This is true 
even if audits are performed without computer assisted auditing tools. 
5.3 Join 
Join is operation of relational algebra which is fundamental to the model. It would not be 
possible to decompose data structure into number of relations if there would not be a 
method for their composition when necessary. This is precisely what a join operator 
performs. It combines rows based on the comparison of one or more common attributes in 
both relations in join. It is written as  
          or 
where r and s are relations, x and y are attribute names of relation. Also, instead of y, 
constant c may be used. 
 
Join operations can be classified as theta, equi-join, natural and outer (or external) join. 
Theta () join means that its result follows the general definition of the join operation. 
Theta is a predicate which consists of one of the binary operators in the set (greater than, 
greater or equal than, equal, not equal, lesser than, lesser or equal than) and specifies the 
join condition. If join condition  equals "=", the operation is called an equi-join. Natural 
join is in fact equi-join from which duplicate attributes used for join are excluded. The 
resulting joined relation contains only one attribute for each pair of attributes holding same 
data. 
Outer join does not require each data row in two joined relations to have a matching 
record. Resulting joined relation holds each row from at least one of relations even if no 
corresponding matched row exists, depending on outer join type. There are three types of 
outer joins: left outer joins, right outer joins, and full outer joins. The resulting relation of a 
left outer join (or shorter "left join") always contains all rows of the left relation (r), even if 
the join condition does not find any relating row in the right relation (s). So, left outer join 
always returns all rows from the left relation (r) together with rows from right relation (s) 
matching according to  condition. If there are no matching rows in right relation (s), 
attributes of right relation (s) will contain only NULL values. If the right relation (s) 
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returns more than one matching row for certain row in the left relation (r), the rows in the 
left relation will be repeated for each distinct row on the right relation (s).  
The opposite case holds for right outer join (shorter "right join"). In case of full outer join, 
result is union of theta join, left and right joins. One should bear in mind union is a set 
operator, so all rows that are eventually identical in separate relations which are members 
in union (theta, left and right) will remain only in one instance in resulting relation.  
There is no explicit notation for outer join operations in standard SQL. However, it is 
easily implemented in all modern databases by combination of expressions based on 
Boolean operators. 
5.4 Summarization 
Summarization method aggregates amounts of interest according to specific attributes (or 
columns in SQL notation). Summarization extracts and group all different attribute values 
chosen by auditor and aggregate according to defined attributes. Auditor must define 
which attributes have to form unique combination of values (aggregation base attributes), 
which attributes have to be aggregated on (aggregation value attributes) and what 
summarization function has to be performed (aggregation function). For each unique 
extracted row value of aggregation base, summarization is executed for aggregation value 
attributes according to aggregation function. Notation is as following: 
    SAB,AV,f(r) 
S stands for summarization method, AB stands for aggregation base attributes, AV denotes 
aggregation value attributes, f is aggregation function, while r is relation. There are number 
of aggregation functions that can be applied: average value, sum of amounts, count of 
rows, minimum value, maximum value etc. Auditor has to remember that each 
combination of aggregation base attributes shows up in resulting relation only once, and 
attributes representing aggregation value hold result of aggregation function for all rows 
with same aggregation base attributes value.  
Selection and join methods may be used in order to prepare data i.e. to extract and add 
additional attributes to final relation ready for summarization.  
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In SQL, summarization method may be represented with GROUP BY statement. The 
GROUP BY statement is used in conjunction with the aggregate functions to group the 
result-set by one or more columns. 
5.5 Stratification  
Stratification method includes creation of specific data strata (data layers) in accordance 
with defined value-based categories. As input parameters, method uses relation, attribute 
and strata limits. So, auditor has to choose which column is of special interest (usually 
number or date data type), define number of strata and their limits (upper and lower 
values).  
It is not required that auditor should include all values of certain relation's attribute (table 
column) when applying stratification method (from minimum to maximum value). All 
rows are included in respective data strata, depending on values and strata limits. After 
stratification method is performed, auditor may investigate each stratum and make 
conclusions on data characteristics. This method is especially useful if combined with 
exception analysis. Auditor may learn about limit values for certain table columns and then 
additionally analyze column values and rows out of limiting bounds. Notation of 
stratification method (ς) is: 
     ς x,l(r) 
where x stands for attribute for which strata should be created while l denotes set of 
boundaries (lower and upper bound)  for each strata.  
Method processes each table row and classifies it into corresponding strata, depending on 
attribute value x. Both totalling and counting functions may be applied on attribute x, and 
assigned to certain strata which results from pre-defined limit values. Method results in: 
- count of rows and totalling of attribute values belonging to each strata 
- calculation of percentage of rows in each strata in relation to total number of rows 
- counting of all rows with attribute x value lesser than the lowest strata boundary 
(lowest limit exceptions) and greater than the greatest strata boundary (greatest 
limit exceptions); percentage of both values in relation to total number of rows; 
totalling values of attribute x below and above lowest and greatest limit exceptions 




After performing calculations on rows and values of each stratum, auditor may be 
introduced to a profile of the data in the database. Then, auditor may easier analyze any 
discrepancies from expected trends. 
5.6 Duplication 
Duplication method checks for numeric values (amounts) which appear more than once in 
attribute of interest of certain relation. As input parameters, method uses relation (r) and 
attributes (x) of interest, and its notation is: 
   Dx(r) 
Usually, only one attribute for duplication values check is chosen. This method finds all 
values in chosen attribute that have multiple appearances in relation. Output of these values 
is sorted according to number of appearances in descending order and value in descending 
order. The objective of this test from auditing perspective is to find relatively small groups 
of recurring numbers. As it is shown in [17], when people invent numbers, they often tend 
to repeat values. This may be of major significance to auditing process. This test is usually 
performed only on value subsets which have excessive positive deviations in first two and 
first three Benford’s Law tests.  
5.7 Rounded values 
Rounded values method finds numeric values (amounts) which are rounded to multiples of 
5 or 10. Of course, method may be extended to multiples of 100, 1000 etc. which are all 
multiplies of 10, or to 25, 75 etc. which are all multiplies of 5. Notation is: 
     Rx,m(r) 
where x is numeric attribute, m is multiplication value and r is relation. Method checks 
values of attribute x for all rows in relation and checks if value is multiplication of m. In 
fact, method searches for values in x that are divisible by m without remainder. Method 
also counts recurrences of all rounded values. Method’s output is sorted by frequency of 
rounded values in descending order and rounded value itself in descending order.  
  
83 
This method looks for abnormal repetition of rounded values because such findings may be 
proof of estimation. Estimation is usually strongly related to omissions, errors and even 
fraud. 
5.8 Conclusion on Methods for Computer Assisted Auditing of 
Information Systems 
Methods explained in chapters 5.1 through 5.7 are proved to be very efficient in audit 
processes. They form significantly broad scope for efficient data analysis which can be 
used for fraud, error and omission detection. In Table 1, overview of methods is presented 
by description of their objectives, inputs and outputs.  
Method Objective Inputs (I) and Outputs (O) 
Benford's Law 




deviations from BL 
FDT frequencies 
Attribute of relational table containing number 
values (I) 
9 subsets for digits 1-9 with actual frequencies 
and corresponding deviations (O) 
Benford's Law 





deviations from BL 
FTDT 
Attribute of relational table containing number 
values (I) 
90 subsets for digits 10-99 with actual 
frequencies and corresponding deviations (O) 
Benford's Law 
First Three 




deviations from BL 
FThreeDT 
Attribute of relational table containing number 
values (I) 
900 subsets for digits 100-999 with actual 
frequencies and corresponding deviations (O) 
Benford's Law 
Second Digit 
Test (BL SDT) 
Finding actual 
frequencies and 
deviations from BL 
SDT 
Attribute of relational table containing number 
values (I) 
10 subsets for digits 0-9 with actual frequencies 
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and corresponding deviations (O) 
Selection Selecting rows 
satisfying WHERE 
criteria 
Rows of relational table (I) 
Rows of relational table satisfying WHERE 
clause criteria (O) 
Join Combining rows 
from two relational 
tables according to 
join type 
Rows of two relational tables usually with at 
least one common attribute (I) 
Rows of newly formed temporary relational 
table satisfying join type and criteria (O) 
Summarization Grouping and 
aggregation of rows 
Rows and attributes of relational table, 
aggregation functions (I) 
Rows grouped on unique attribute values, 
aggregated on selected attributes with certain 
aggregation function (O) 
Stratification Creation of data 
layers according to 
pre-defined limits 
Rows and attribute of relational table, strata 
limits, mathematical functions (I) 
Data layers with counted and summarized rows 
together with calculated percentages for chosen 
attribute (O) 
Duplication Finding numeric 
values which appear 
more than once in 
attribute of interest 
Rows and attribute of relational table (I) 
Rows grouped and sorted descending by  
frequency and descending by numeric value of 




numeric values in 
attribute of interest 
Rows and attribute of relational table (I) 
Rows grouped and sorted descending by  
frequency and descending by numeric value of 
chosen attribute (O)  
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Table 1. Methods and corresponding objectives, inputs and outputs 
 
Although the efficiency of individual methods listed in Table 1 in practice proved to be out 
of question, they are used individually in accordance with abilities and judgement of 
auditors. There is no strict sequence of their usage, no steps and mutual relationships are 
defined. Since no methodology is defined that will relate and order described methods 
when performing audit process, each auditor uses them in different setting. The 
consequence is that auditors use different methods in various sequences with possibly 
inconsistent input data and results. This is a fact even if the same computer assisted 
auditing tool is used in two different audits, and even if the same business process and data 
are being audited. Also, the same auditor using the same computer assisted auditing tool 
processing the same business process and corresponding data but in two different actual 
audits can produce completely different results which can lead to very different 
conclusions. Without adequate methodology, auditing processes are hardly comparable and 
comparability of audits is of a major importance. Additionally, inappropriately applied 
methods, their mutual relationships and possibly wrong conclusions made by auditors 
result in inadequate audits.  
In order to improve audit process, adequate computer assisted information systems 
auditing methodology should be developed on the basis of abovementioned methods. Since 
Benford's Law will represent a basis of this methodology, its usage will be investigated and 
described in details. The advanced capabilities of different Benford's Law tests (the first 
digit, the first two digits, the first three digits and the second digit) will be presented in the 
following chapter. Methodology for computer assisted information systems auditing, 





6. The Role of Benford's Law in Information Systems Auditing 
6.1 Definition and Description 
Benford's Law defines expected digit frequencies in certain number sets. The most often 
works in literature focus on Benford’s Law for first digit. That is probably why it is often 
called „First Digit Law“, „First Digit Phenomenon“ and „Leading Digit Phenomenon“. 
However, digits on any position in a number sets will follow certain probability of 
appearance. 
The first or leading digit in a number is leftmost positioned digit, i.e. digit with the most 
value. For example, in number 205, digit “2” is the first digit. It is clear that digit “0” is not 
possible as a first digit but can appear on second and consecutive positions. 
It is noticeable that in sets of numbers from many data sources, leading digit is distributed 
in a particular way. According to Benford's Law, digit "1" appears as the first digit in 
number for almost one third of the time, and larger digits appear on the leading number 
position with lower and lower frequencies. E.g. digit 9 appears as a first digit in slightly 
more than 4,5% numbers. The basis for Benford's Law lies in the fact that values of real 
world data sources are often distributed logarithmically, thus the logarithm of this real 
world data sources is distributed uniformly. 
So, Benford's Law opposes uniform distribution since it states that in certain number sets, 
for example digit “1” will occur on leftmost position with probability of around 30,1% 
which is much greater than the expected 11.1% (i.e., one digit out of 9) according to 
uniform distribution. It is confirmed that this counter intuitive result can be applied to a 
wide variety of data sets and that it even holds to any base of numeric system. Of course, 
when changing number bases, actual digit distributions will change. Benford's law states 
that the leading digit z (z ∈ [1..b − 1] ) in base b (b ≥ 2) occurs with probability 
P(z)=logb(z + 1) − logbz = logb((z + 1)/z).  
Benford's Law of first digit i.e. probability P of appearance of digit z1 in number system 




  P(z1)=log10(1+1/z1), z1∈[1..9]    (1) 














Table 2. Probabilities of each digit on the first position in number according to Benford's 
Law (base b=10) 
 
It was explained that Benford's Law also applies to other significant digits in numbers. 
Furthermore, if second digit is observed, probability P of appearance of digit z on 2nd 
position in number is: 







    (2) 


















Table 3. Probabilities of each digit on the second position in number according to 
Benford's Law 
 
Also, Benford's Law defines following rules of appearance of first two (3) and first three 
(4) digits in number: 
 P(z1z2)=log10(1+1/z1z2), z1z2∈[10..99]    (3) 
 P(z1z2z3)=log10(1+1/z1z2z3), z1z2z3∈[100..999] (4) 
 
Very interesting examples of Benford's law compliance are shown in 
[http://mathworld.wolfram.com/BenfordsLaw.html]. Taking data from several disparate 
sources, the table below shows the distribution of first digits as compiled by Benford 
(1938) in his original paper.  
col. Title 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 samples 
A Rivers, Area 31.0 16.4 10.7 11.3 7.2 8.6 5.5 4.2 5.1 335 
B Population 33.9 20.4 14.2 8.1 7.2 6.2 4.1 3.7 2.2 3259 
C Constants 41.3 14.4 4.8 8.6 10.6 5.8 1.0 2.9 10.6 104 
D Newspapers 30.0 18.0 12.0 10.0 8.0 6.0 6.0 5.0 5.0 100 
E Specific Heat 24.0 18.4 16.2 14.6 10.6 4.1 3.2 4.8 4.1 1389 
F Pressure 29.6 18.3 12.8 9.8 8.3 6.4 5.7 4.4 4.7 703 
G H.P. Lost 30.0 18.4 11.9 10.8 8.1 7.0 5.1 5.1 3.6 690 
H Mol. Wgt. 26.7 25.2 15.4 10.8 6.7 5.1 4.1 2.8 3.2 1800 
I Drainage 27.1 23.9 13.8 12.6 8.2 5.0 5.0 2.5 1.9 159 
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J Atomic Wgt. 47.2 18.7 5.5 4.4 6.6 4.4 3.3 4.4 5.5 91 
K ,  25.7 20.3 9.7 6.8 6.6 6.8 7.2 8.0 8.9 5000 
L Design 26.8 14.8 14.3 7.5 8.3 8.4 7.0 7.3 5.6 560 
M Reader's Digest 33.4 18.5 12.4 7.5 7.1 6.5 5.5 4.9 4.2 308 
N Cost Data 32.4 18.8 10.1 10.1 9.8 5.5 4.7 5.5 3.1 741 
O X-Ray Volts 27.9 17.5 14.4 9.0 8.1 7.4 5.1 5.8 4.8 707 
P Am. League 32.7 17.6 12.6 9.8 7.4 6.4 4.9 5.6 3.0 1458 
Q Blackbody 31.0 17.3 14.1 8.7 6.6 7.0 5.2 4.7 5.4 1165 
R Addresses 28.9 19.2 12.6 8.8 8.5 6.4 5.6 5.0 5.0 342 
S ,  25.3 16.0 12.0 10.0 8.5 8.8 6.8 7.1 5.5 900 
T Death Rate 27.0 18.6 15.7 9.4 6.7 6.5 7.2 4.8 4.1 418 
 Average 30.6 18.5 12.4 9.4 8.0 6.4 5.1 4.9 4.7 1011 
Table 4. Distribution of first digit – compiled by Frank Benford 
American astronomer Simon Newcomb was first who found out that numbers more 
frequently begin with smaller digits than with greater digits. Newcomb noticed that pages 
in logarithm tables were dirtier at the start, i. e. more used, and progressively cleaner as 
approaching to the end. He concluded that numbers more often begin with digit 1 than with 
any other digit, and in addition, that probability of each following digit (up to 9) at the 
most significant position in number progressively decreases. 
Frank Benford gathered more than 20.000 observations from different sources 
(geographical area, population, river areas, physical constants etc.). He analysed 
frequencies of first digits for each number set. After he summarized all individual analyses 
he concluded that probability of first digit being 1 is 0,30103 which equals log102, 
probability of first digit being 2 is 0,17609 which equals log103/2 etc. 
There is rather extensive literature on various fields of usage of Benford's Law. Also, there 




In [19] it was shown in details how data auditing based on Benford’s Law was executed in 
accounting department. Audit observed 28.736 invoices authorized for payment by the 
accounts payable system of a business segment. After performing the first digit test it was 
noted that the largest deviation is for the first digit 1, where the actual proportion exceeds 
expected proportion by 1,3 percent. However, with the results of Z-statistics it was 
concluded that the first digit test conformed to properties of Benford’s Law. The second 
digit test shown that digit 0 and digit 5 on the second position in number exceeded those of 
Benford’s Law. It was concluded, since invoices are the selling prices of goods and 
services, it is not surprising there are excess second digit 0 and 5. It was mentioned that 
separate digital analysis tests were performed on 1,6 million invoices of US Industrial 
conglomerate. Performed test shown nearly identical deviations so auditors can expect the 
same biases when analyzing invoices. The first two digits test (FTD) showed significant 
excess of 5 two digits combinations which could be result of fraud, errors or processing 
inefficiencies. As an extension, number duplication test was performed. Authors were 
focused on 50 most frequent dollar values and additionally observed values that had excess 
in FTD test. Among other conclusions it was proved that some duplication of values 
resulted in inefficient way of invoice processing. 
In [4] it was explained that FTD test may be used in contract audit. A comparison of the 
actual contract amounts to expected FTD frequencies according to Benford’s Law may 
highlight a higher than expected occurrence of contracts with amounts starting just bellow 
sole sourcing limit. Further investigation of these contracts may identify that individuals 
deciding on sole source contracting is directing them to friends or relatives. 
In [20] it is described how Benford’s Law principles were used in accounts payable 
disbursements audit in one federal agency. The first digit test shows that leading digit 1 
occurs with a substantially higher frequency than its predicted recurrence under Benford's 
law. Second step that was conducted was number duplication test for all values with digit 1 
at leftmost position. It shown excess of one single value when compared to Benford’s Law 
frequencies.  
6.2 Intuitive Explanation 
This law is based on assumption that number set sorted ascending forms geometric series.  
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Furtherly, Benford's law can be clarified under assumption that logarithms of number sets 
are uniformly distributed. For number sets expressed in base 10, it means that the same 
probability holds that number will be between 10 and 100 as between 100 and 1.000. For 
numbers between 10 and 100, logarithm falls between 1 and 2, while for numbers between 
10 and 100, logarithm falls between 2 and 3.. For some real world number sets, especially 
those with exponential growth over time like sales data, salaries, contracted sales values, 
income tax, invoices, etc. this is reasonable hypothesis. 
To simplify above statements, exponential growth can be described as phenomenon of 
doubling in constant periods of time. For example, if certain value needs two years to 
double, and it has property of exponential growth, it will again double after two more 
years. So, value will have growth of four times at the end of fourth year, eight times at the 
end of sixth year etc. If certain value is started to be observed when it had value of 10 and 
it is doubling each two years, value will have first digit "1" throughout whole first two 
years. During the third and fourth year, period for next doubling, observed values will have 
leading digit "2" and "3" (values from 20 inclusively to 40 exclusively). Then, in fifth and 
sixth year, values will have leading digits "4", "5", "6" and "7". It is easy noticeable that as 
first digit is rising in value, larger digit values are less and less time occupying first 
position. Somewhere in the first half of seventh year, leading digits will pass "8" and "9". 
Then, values will reach 100 i.e. leading digit will become "1" again. At the end of that 
doubling period (end of eighth year), values will fall somewhere in range [150, 160>. It is 
easy noticeable that if all values (or at least representative sample) are taken from period of 
time spanning few doubling periods the largest probability of first digit holds for digit "1", 
then for digit "2", and so on, while digit "9" will have the least probability of showing on 
leftmost position in values.  Above example shows that number sets consisting of 
exponentially growing values conforms to Benford's Law. However, from available 
literature it may be concluded that Benford's Law holds for many other cases in which 
exponential growth of values is not visible. 
Intuitive explanation of Benford's Law is pretty clear. If company with early turnover of 
10.000 kunas is observed, first digit is 1. Digit 1 will stay on first position of turnover 
amount until turnover rise for 100%, which is 20.000 kunas. After this, only rise of 50% is 
needed in order to change first digit from 2 to digit 3. It is clear that early company's 
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turnover will have digit 1 the most of the time because the most time is needed to change 
first digit from 1 to 2. 
Similar explanation was offered by Nigrini in [16]: "If we think of the Dow Jones stock 
average as 1.000, our first digit would be 1. To get to a Dow Jones average with a first 
digit of 2, the average must increase to 2.000, and getting from 1.000 to 2.000 is a 100 
percent increase.  
Let's say that the Dow goes up at a rate of about 20 percent a year. That means that it 
would take five years to get from 1 to 2 as a first digit. But suppose we start with a first 
digit 5. It only requires a 20 percent increase to get from 5.000 to 6.000, and that is 
achieved in one year.  
When the Dow reaches 9.000, it takes only an 11 percent increase and just seven months to 
reach the 10.000 mark, which starts with the number 1. At that point you start over with the 
first digit a 1, once again. Once again, you must double the number (10.000 to 20.000) 
before reaching 2 as the first digit.  
As you can see, the number 1 predominates at every step of the progression, as it does in 
logarithmic sequences."  
6.3 Properties of Conformance of Number Set to Benford's Law 
In order for Benford’s Law to be valid for a number set, data when sorted must form 
geometric sequence. Interesting example of a set that conforms to Benford’s Law is 
Fibonacci sequence. The only prerequisite for Fibonacci sequence to be in conformance is 
that sequence is large enough. 
In [17] and [18] criteria are set for number series to conform to Benford's Law: 
1. Number series must describe values of same or similar phenomenon. E.g. lake area, 
heights of mountains, total yearly revenue of companies, total daily turnover on stock 
exchange. 
 
2. Number series should not have defined minimal and maximal values. If minimal 
commission on foreign currency exchange in exchange office is 3 kunas, then set of 
commission values will not fit to Benford's Law, because large number of commission 
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values will have digit 3 as a first digit. Digit 0 is allowed minimum. Also, if a maximum 
value is defined, number set will not follow the law. For example, personal tax deduction 
maximum in Croatia is 12.000 kunas. Number distribution will tend to that limit and will 
cause non conformance to Benford's Law because of excessive digit 1 at leftmost position. 
 
3. Number series should not comprise of so called assigned numbers. These numbers 
are assigned to various phenomena instead of description, and their important attribute is 
that there is no sense to perform mathematical operations on these numbers. Examples are 
citizens’ identification numbers, bank account numbers, telephone numbers, numbers on 
car registration plates etc. 
 
4. This law does not apply to numbers which creation is influenced by psychological 
factors, like prices in supermarket or ATM cash withdrawals. 
6.4 Invariance Property of Benford's Law 
Very important feature of Benford's Law is invariance. If certain number set fits Benford's 
Law, then the set will follow the law independently on measurement unit in which it is 
expressed. Consequently, if all numbers in a set that conforms to Benford's Law are 
multiplied by a constant different from zero, then new set will also conform to the law. For 
example, if the law is followed by set of total yearly companies’ turnover, then the law will 
be followed independently on currency in which turnovers are expressed. Invariance rule 
also holds for reciprocal number sets. For example, if the law is followed by set of prices 
in kunas per stock, it will hold for numbers of stocks per kuna. 
In this work invariance will be tested on specific example of number set conforming to 
Benford's Law. Original number set consists of 50 numbers and is shown in column OV 
(Table 5). Original number set conforms to Benford’s Law. Invariance property is tested 
by multiplication with a constant number. For this test, each value in original set is 
multiplied by constant 3,23 and results are stored in column OVMC. The aim was to check 
if number set after multiplication will confirm invariance i.e. if values in OVMC column 
will follow Benford’s Law.  
ordinal 
number OV OVMC 
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1 10,4 33,6 
2 11,7 37,8 
3 12,1 39,1 
4 12,4 40,1 
5 14,3 46,2 
6 14,8 47,8 
7 15,1 48,8 
8 15,6 50,4 
9 15,9 51,4 
10 17,5 56,5 
11 17,8 57,5 
12 18,1 58,5 
13 18,4 59,4 
14 19,2 62,0 
15 19,6 63,3 
16 20,4 65,9 
17 21,4 69,1 
18 22,6 73,0 
19 23,7 76,6 
20 24,3 78,5 
21 25,8 83,3 
22 26,3 84,9 
23 27,6 89,1 
24 28,1 90,8 
25 31,4 101,4 
26 33,3 107,6 
27 35,7 115,3 
28 36,6 118,2 
29 38,3 123,7 
30 39,8 128,6 
31 42,4 137,0 
32 44,6 144,1 
33 46,7 150,8 
34 48,3 156,0 
35 49,1 158,6 
36 52,1 168,3 
37 54,7 176,7 
38 57,1 184,4 
39 59,4 191,9 
40 63,2 204,1 
41 66,7 215,4 
42 68,7 221,9 
43 72,5 234,2 
44 75,3 243,2 
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45 77,8 251,3 
46 83,1 268,4 
47 87,5 282,6 
48 89,6 289,4 
49 94,6 305,6 
50 97,2 314,0 
Table 5. Multiplication of number set conforming to Benford’s Law by a constant 
In Table 6 frequencies and probabilities for first digit in original and multiplied number set 
are shown.  
digit BLp OVf OVp OVMCf OVMCp 
1 0,3010 15 0,3000 15 0,3000 
2 0,1761 9 0,1800 9 0,1800 
3 0,1249 6 0,1200 5 0,1000 
4 0,0969 5 0,1000 4 0,0800 
5 0,0792 4 0,0800 6 0,1200 
6 0,0670 3 0,0600 4 0,0800 
7 0,0580 3 0,0600 3 0,0600 
8 0,0512 3 0,0600 3 0,0600 
9 0,0458 2 0,0400 1 0,0200 
total: 50  50  
Table 6. Frequencies and probabilities for first digits in original  
and multiplied number sets 
 
Column BLp has Benford’s Law probabilities for each first digit, column OVf has 
frequencies of each first digit in original number set, OVp has probabilities of each first 
digit in original number set, OVMCf denotes frequencies of each first digit in multiplied 
(new) number set while OVMCp has probabilities of each first digit in multiplied (new) 
number set. 
After brief analysis it may be concluded that new number set (created after multiplication 
with a constant) also conforms to Benford's Law. Some differences that appear significant 
(for digits 5 and 9) can be justified by small number set in which minimum absolute 
deviations result in significant relative deviations. 
In [17, pages 27-28] market values (number of stocks outstanding times market price per 
stock) of 4.000 companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) are analyzed. 
It is stated that list of market values in US dollars should conform to Benford's Law. Also, 
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if any currency conversion (e.g. from dollars to British pounds) is performed, the new list 
will also conform to Benford's Law. Nigrini concludes that because conversion from one 
currency to another merely requires multiplication by a constant, Benford's Law will hold 
for a new list no matter in what currency values will be expressed. Also, conclusion that 
can easily be made is that by performing Benford's Law tests, no deviance can be noticed if 
data set is multiplied by percentage. So, if someone raises values in Benford's Law 
conformed data set by 10% (which is in fact multiplication by a constant 1,1) new data set 
will not deviate in Benford's Law terms. Furtherly, it is explained that even duplications of 
data i.e. double appearance of each transaction in set will not cause deviation from 
Benford's Law. Example describing daily volumes of buying and selling transactions in 
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) was given. 
In this system, the transactions are double counted: each transaction is counted as a sale 
when the stock is bought into NASDAQ and again when the stock is sold to an outside 
buyer. Nigrini states that the daily volumes of double counted transactions conform closely 
to Benford's Law as well as the daily volumes of single counted transactions. This means 
that if original data set conforms to Benford's Law and someone performs the action of 
repeating whole data set (e.g. copying and pasting) that it will not cause deviation from 
Benford's Law. So, if such double counted number set is audited by means of Benford's 
Law it will not show any deviance and practically no doubling will be noticed. 
6.5 The First Digit Test 
The first digit test is initial Benford’s Law test. It is often used only as a test of 
reasonableness of selected data set. That is why auditors often call it “common sense test”. 
However, the first digit test is most often used of all Benford’s Law tests explained in 4.1. 
It can be used for making conclusions if significant number duplications exist in certain 
data set as well as for detecting clusters for certain leftmost digits.  
The first digit frequencies in hypothetical example of invoice totals and corresponding 
Benford’s Law frequencies are shown in Table 7.  
digit fo Po fBL PBL D Dc 
1 4221 0,297 4.284 0,301 -0,004 - 
2 2487 0,175 2.505 0,176 -0,001 - 
3 1761 0,124 1.779 0,125 -0,001 - 
4 1301 0,091 1.380 0,097 -0,006 - 
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5 1406 0,099 1.124 0,079 0,020 + 
6 902 0,063 953 0,067 -0,004 - 
7 812 0,057 825 0,058 -0,001 - 
8 708 0,050 726 0,051 -0,001 - 
9 633 0,044 655 0,046 -0,002 - 
sum 14.231  14.231    
Table 7. The first digit frequencies in hypothetical example of invoice totals 
 
The column fo contains counts of numbers with the first digit from column digit. For 
example, there were 4221 invoices with leftmost digit "1" for its total values. The sum of 
fo column equals the number of observations in the data set i.e. total number of observed 
invoices. 
The column Po gives the probability (or actual proportion) that invoice total will have 
certain digit on its most valued position. In this example, probability of 5% is that invoice 
total will have digit "8" on leftmost position. Calculation is performed by dividing values 
in fo column (actual counts) with total number of observed invoices. 
The column fBL has the expected frequencies of Benford's Law for first digits. Expected 
Benford's Law frequencies are calculated by multiplication of Benford's Law expected 
probabilities (column PBL) and actual frequencies (column fo). 
The column PBL has the expected probabilities of Benford's Law for first digits. Numbers 
in this column are calculated from expression (1) in chapter 5.1. 
The column D has values of actual probabilities deviation from Benford's Law 
probabilities. It is calculated as difference between columns Po and PBL. Values above 
zero denotes positive deviations which means that there are more numbers with certain 
first digit in actual data set than it is expected by Benford's Law. Values below zero 
highlight that certain digit has lesser count in observed data set than expected by Benford's 
Law. 
Consequently, the column Dc shows the direction of deviation. The "+" sign denotes 
positive deviation (only for digit "5") while the "-" indicates negative deviations. Positive 
deviation means that frequency for certain digit is greater than corresponding Benford's 

















Figure 1. First digit probabilities of actual data set and Benford's Law probabilities 
Based on a visual analysis of this graph it could be stated that chosen data set of invoice 
totals are following the Benford's Law. However, from auditors' perspective, the digit "5" 
should be a matter of further analysis. The digit "5" has the only, conditionally said, 
significant spike on the graph. This spike is resulting from positive deviation of 0,02 in 
absolute value which corresponds to 25% in relative value. This may be a consequence of 
mistakes, flaws or even fraudulent activity. Of course, there may be a logical explanation 
for such deviation resulting from business internal processes or influences from business 
environment. In this case, further analysis that should be performed are the first two digits 
test, the first three digits tests, number rounding and number duplication tests. These tests 
could proof or deny existence of deviations resulting from inadequate business processes 
and controls. 
The first digit Benford's Law test can not be a final proof that data is erroneous, fraudulent 
or flawed, nor that some irregular activities has taken place. Some more detailed and 
focused tests, together with analysis of business processes and rule, must be undertaken. 
However, the first digit Benford's Law test may be a first warning that some additional 
audit actions should be performed. 
Of course, there is a certain need to define conformance criteria i.e. to define when some 
number set conforms to Benford's Law and when it is not the case. Visual inspection can 
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not be a valid judgment. Certainly, judgment by the auditors "feeling about the numbers" is 
also not appropriate. Some statistical tests should be performed in order to test if actual 
number set conforms to Benford's Law. In this paper statistical tests used for conformance 
measurement are Z-statistics, Mean Average Deviation and Chi-square. These tests are 
explained in more details in chapter 6.9. 
6.6 The First Two Digits Test 
The first two digits test has much more audit relevance than the first digit test. It is more 
focused since it takes into account 90 combinations of the first two left most digits. After 
performing this test, auditor can spot finer irregularities or discrepancies and then perform 
additional analysis.  
The first two digits of a number are the first two most valued digits, e.g. in number 543, 
digits "5" and "4" are the first and second digits respectively. As it can be easily noticed, 
there are 90 possible combinations of the first two digits (from "10" to "99"). 
Another hypothetical example of invoice total amounts is shown in Table 8. 
digits fo Po fBL PBL D Dc 
10 7.767 0,04234 7.594 0,04139 0,00094 + 
11 6.855 0,03737 6.933 0,03779 -0,00042 - 
12 6.311 0,03440 6.377 0,03476 -0,00036 - 
13 6.002 0,03272 5.905 0,03218 0,00053 + 
14 5.398 0,02942 5.497 0,02996 -0,00054 - 
15 5.178 0,02822 5.142 0,02803 0,00020 + 
16 4.712 0,02568 4.830 0,02633 -0,00064 - 
17 4.465 0,02434 4.554 0,02482 -0,00049 - 
18 4.367 0,02380 4.308 0,02348 0,00032 + 
19 4.096 0,02233 4.087 0,02228 0,00005 + 
20 3.955 0,02156 3.887 0,02119 0,00037 + 
21 3.675 0,02003 3.706 0,02020 -0,00017 - 
22 3.447 0,01879 3.542 0,01931 -0,00052 - 
23 3.273 0,01784 3.391 0,01848 -0,00064 - 
24 3.244 0,01768 3.253 0,01773 -0,00005 - 
25 3.230 0,01761 3.125 0,01703 0,00057 + 
26 2.945 0,01605 3.007 0,01639 -0,00034 - 
27 3.245 0,01769 2.898 0,01579 0,00189 + 
28 3.888 0,02119 2.796 0,01524 0,00595 + 
29 4.264 0,02324 2.701 0,01472 0,00852 + 
30 2.221 0,01211 2.613 0,01424 -0,00213 - 
31 2.378 0,01296 2.530 0,01379 -0,00083 - 
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32 2.331 0,01271 2.452 0,01336 -0,00066 - 
33 2.333 0,01272 2.379 0,01296 -0,00025 - 
34 2.276 0,01241 2.310 0,01259 -0,00018 - 
35 2.305 0,01256 2.245 0,01223 0,00033 + 
36 2.124 0,01158 2.183 0,01190 -0,00032 - 
37 2.087 0,01138 2.125 0,01158 -0,00021 - 
38 1.987 0,01083 2.070 0,01128 -0,00045 - 
39 1.974 0,01076 2.017 0,01100 -0,00024 - 
40 2.087 0,01138 1.967 0,01072 0,00065 + 
41 1.889 0,01030 1.920 0,01047 -0,00017 - 
42 1.854 0,01011 1.875 0,01022 -0,00011 - 
43 1.765 0,00962 1.832 0,00998 -0,00036 - 
44 1.755 0,00957 1.791 0,00976 -0,00019 - 
45 1.807 0,00985 1.751 0,00955 0,00030 + 
46 1.669 0,00910 1.714 0,00934 -0,00024 - 
47 1.665 0,00908 1.677 0,00914 -0,00007 - 
48 1.633 0,00890 1.643 0,00895 -0,00005 - 
49 1.598 0,00871 1.610 0,00877 -0,00006 - 
50 1.556 0,00848 1.578 0,00860 -0,00012 - 
51 1.532 0,00835 1.547 0,00843 -0,00008 - 
52 1.489 0,00812 1.518 0,00827 -0,00016 - 
53 1.423 0,00776 1.489 0,00812 -0,00036 - 
54 1.412 0,00770 1.462 0,00797 -0,00027 - 
55 1.445 0,00788 1.436 0,00783 0,00005 + 
56 1.311 0,00715 1.410 0,00769 -0,00054 - 
57 1.156 0,00630 1.386 0,00755 -0,00125 - 
58 965 0,00526 1.362 0,00742 -0,00216 - 
59 929 0,00506 1.339 0,00730 -0,00224 - 
60 1.301 0,00709 1.317 0,00718 -0,00009 - 
61 1.277 0,00696 1.296 0,00706 -0,00010 - 
62 1.245 0,00679 1.275 0,00695 -0,00016 - 
63 1.252 0,00682 1.255 0,00684 -0,00002 - 
64 1.213 0,00661 1.235 0,00673 -0,00012 - 
65 1.199 0,00654 1.216 0,00663 -0,00010 - 
66 1.188 0,00648 1.198 0,00653 -0,00006 - 
67 1.174 0,00640 1.180 0,00643 -0,00003 - 
68 1.154 0,00629 1.163 0,00634 -0,00005 - 
69 1.102 0,00601 1.146 0,00625 -0,00024 - 
70 1.166 0,00636 1.130 0,00616 0,00020 + 
71 1.076 0,00587 1.114 0,00607 -0,00021 - 
72 1.081 0,00589 1.099 0,00599 -0,00010 - 
73 1.056 0,00576 1.084 0,00591 -0,00015 - 
74 1.033 0,00563 1.069 0,00583 -0,00020 - 
75 1.064 0,00580 1.055 0,00575 0,00005 + 
76 1.022 0,00557 1.042 0,00568 -0,00011 - 
77 1.001 0,00546 1.028 0,00560 -0,00015 - 
78 976 0,00532 1.015 0,00553 -0,00021 - 
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79 988 0,00539 1.002 0,00546 -0,00008 - 
80 977 0,00533 990 0,00540 -0,00007 - 
81 966 0,00527 978 0,00533 -0,00006 - 
82 952 0,00519 966 0,00526 -0,00008 - 
83 924 0,00504 954 0,00520 -0,00016 - 
84 926 0,00505 943 0,00514 -0,00009 - 
85 909 0,00495 932 0,00508 -0,00012 - 
86 908 0,00495 921 0,00502 -0,00007 - 
87 901 0,00491 911 0,00496 -0,00005 - 
88 897 0,00489 900 0,00491 -0,00002 - 
89 892 0,00486 890 0,00485 0,00001 + 
90 901 0,00491 880 0,00480 0,00011 + 
91 853 0,00465 871 0,00475 -0,00010 - 
92 855 0,00466 861 0,00470 -0,00003 - 
93 851 0,00464 852 0,00464 -0,00001 - 
94 838 0,00457 843 0,00460 -0,00003 - 
95 835 0,00455 834 0,00455 0,00000 + 
96 820 0,00447 826 0,00450 -0,00003 - 
97 807 0,00440 817 0,00445 -0,00006 - 
98 802 0,00437 809 0,00441 -0,00004 - 
99 804 0,00438 801 0,00436 0,00002 + 
Total: 183.459  183.459    
Table 8. The first two digit frequencies of invoice total amounts (hypothetical example) 
The column fo has total number of occurrences of first two digits from column digit. For 
example, in observed data set, there were 6876 occurrences of first two leftmost digits 
"11". The sum of fo column equals the total number of observations in the data set i.e. total 
number of observed invoices.  
The column Po contains the probabilities (or actual proportions) that invoice total amounts 
will have certain first two digits indicated in column digit on its leftmost positions. For 
example, actual proportion of digit "14" on leftmost position of invoice amounts is 0,02979 
or 2,9%. Calculation is done by dividing values in column fo (actual occurrences) by total 
number of observed invoices (183.459). 
The column fBL contains the expected frequencies of Benford's Law for first two digits in 
column digit. Expected frequencies according to Benford's Law are calculated by 
multiplying Benford's Law expected probabilities (column PBL) and actual frequencies 
(column fo). 
The column PBL includes the expected probabilities of Benford's Law for first two digits. 





where z1 denotes first (leftmost) digit and z2 second digit. Since decade number system is 
observed, logarithms with base 10 are taken into account. 
The column D has values of actual probabilities deviation from Benford's Law 
probabilities and it is calculated as difference between columns Po and PBL. Positive 
values in this column signify that there are more numbers with certain first two digits in 
observed data set than it could be expected by Benford's Law. Negative values in this 
column indicate that certain first two digits have lesser count in observed data set than 
expected by Benford's Law. 
Accordingly, the column Dc shows the direction of deviation. The "+" sign denotes 
positive deviation while the "-" indicates negative deviations. Positive deviation means that 
frequency for certain digit is greater than corresponding Benford's Law frequency, while 
negative deviation means frequency is smaller than related Benford's Law frequency. 
Figure 2 shows first two digits probabilities of observed hypothetical data set and 




Figure 2. First two digits probabilities of observed hypothetical data set (Po) and Benford's 
Law probabilities (PBL) 
 
Based on a visual analysis of this graph it could be stated that chosen data set of invoice 
total amounts are following the Benford's Law for majority of first two digits. However, 
auditors can easily spot significant positive spikes on first two digits in interval [27..29]. 
These digits have the only, conditionally said, significant spikes on the graph. Spikes are 
resulting from positive deviations of 0,00189 in absolute value for digits "27" to 0,00852 in 
absolute value for digits "29". Also, it is noticed that there are significant shortages of first 
two digits within set [30..32] and set [56..59].  
Digits D Dc PCd 
27 0,00189 + 11,99 
28 0,00595 + 39,06 
29 0,00852 + 57,86 
30 -0,00213 - -14,99 
31 -0,00083 - -5,99 
32 -0,00066 - -4,92 
56 -0,00054 - -7,04 
57 -0,00125 - -16,58 
58 -0,00216 - -29,15 
59 -0,00224 - -30,63 
Table 9. Focus on digits with excessive frequencies 
In addition to Table 8, column PCd appears in table 9. It holds percentages of deviation 
between actual and expected frequencies. It means that, for example, there is 11,99% more 
total invoice amounts with first two digits "27" than it could be expected by Benford's 
Law. Also, as spikes and values in PCd column show, there are excesses in frequencies for 
first two digits “28” and “29”. Additionally, as it is shown in Table 9, there are significant 
deficits of first two digits within sets [30..32] and [56..59]. 
During the audit activity, these positive, excessive frequencies listed in Table 9 must be in 
the focus of auditor’s interest. Digits with excessive frequencies hold numbers with 
excessive duplications or clustering around specific limits. 
This may be a consequence of mistakes, flaws or even fraudulent activity. Of course, there 
may exist a logical explanation that these deviations result from business internal rules or 
some influences from business environment. However, to make appropriate conclusion 
  
104 
further analysis may be performed like the first three digits tests, number rounding and 
number duplication tests. These tests could proof or deny that deviations result from 
inadequate business processes and controls. Also, it is important to understand business 
rules established within certain business process in company being audited. 
In our example, auditor may have discovered that there are certain rules established in 
company whose received invoices are examined. One of the rules may have stated that all 
invoices with total amounts above 3.000 kunas are subject to manager’s approval for 
payment. All invoices with total amounts less than 3.000 kunas require only co-signature 
by two financial department employees in charge of issuing payments. In Table 9 it is 
visible that there is significant surplus of invoices with first two numbers between “27” and 
“29”. It may be assessed personnel was trying to avoid 3.000 limit by negotiating invoices 
slightly bellow it. Also, it is suspicious that there is lack of first two digits between “30” 
and “32”. It may be a consequence of negotiating total amounts bellow 3.000 with supplier 
in order to avoid manager’s approval. In addition, there is significant shortage of first two 
digits between “56” and “59”. This may be a lead that personnel negotiated splitting of 
invoices in two with supplier. By splitting invoices between 5.600 and 6.000 (excluding) in 
two invoices with total amounts less than 3.000, the necessity for manager’s approval will 
again be averted. So, additional examination should be performed in order to check if 
significant number of invoices with total amounts between 2.700 and 3.000 exist. After this 
simple test is performed, auditor can confirm or deny his doubts. Also, auditor my check if 
authorization of invoices with total amounts between 2.700 and 3.000 is usually performed 
by same pair(s) of employees. If at the same time there is significant lack of authorizations 
done by these pair(s) of employees for amounts between 3.000 and 3.300, as well between 
5.600 and 6.000 kunas then it may be important fact which rises possibility of fraud 
commitment.  
Similarly as for the first digit test, the first two digits Benford's Law test can not be a final 
proof that data is erroneous, fraudulent or flawed, nor that some irregular activities has 
taken place. More focused tests, together with analysis of business rules must be executed. 
Although, the first two digits Benford's Law test is much more focused than the first digit 
test and it significantly narrows audit scope. The result of that narrowing is easier selection 
of audit targets which should be furtherly investigated. Auditors may use the first two 
digits test as a logical extension of the first digit test, as well as the second digit test.  
  
105 
Of course, there is a certain need to define conformance criteria i.e. to define when some 
number set conforms to the first two digits Benford's Law test. As with the first digit test, 
visual inspection can not be a valid judgment in auditing procedure. More on some 
statistical tests that should be performed in order to test if actual number set conforms to 
Benford's Law can be found in chapter 6.9. 
6.7 The First Three Digits Test 
Corporate data sets that are in focus of auditor are growing larger and larger. Extremely 
large data sets are usually quite demanding and not adequate for effective audit. That is the 
consequence of too large scope and focus being not detailed enough. Although the first two 
digits test may significantly improve focus of audit and very often enables creation of 
adequate audit targets, sometimes data subsets of the first two digits are too large and no 
significant deviation can be spotted. However, as it is stated in chapter 5.1, Benford's Law 
can be applied to any digit in number and also to first n digits in number set. So, the first 
two digits test can be furtherly adjusted to the first three digits test in order to preserve data 
set sizes auditable.  
Smaller subset tests like the first three digits test create smaller data sets with possibly 
more significant irregularities, assuring that data audit become more manageable. There 
are 900 possible combinations of the first three digits i.e. all integers in set [100..999]. The 
first three digits that are observed are in fact three leftmost digits in numbers i.e. three most 
valued digits. As with previous two tests, eventually leading zeros should be omitted from 
analysis. For example, in the number "2381" the first three digits are "238". Also, in the 
number "47", the first three digits are "470" since number "47" can be represented as 
"47,00".  
Since there are 900 possible first three digits combinations and only 90 possible first two 
digits combinations, it is obvious that the first three digits test will be much more focused 
than the first two digits test. The first three digits test will give to auditor significantly 
smaller data sets which are much more adequate for audit. In this paper (chapter 6.6), it is 
noticed and explained that the first two digits test can find out irregularities based on 
evading certain limits or thresholds if clustering is based on the first two digits. However, 
if clustering is not significant on the first two digits but on the first three digits, then only 
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the first three digits test can notice such clusters i.e. duplications of certain first three 
digits.  
Lets introduce hypothetical example in which auditor is examining invoices received from 
suppliers that were or about to be paid (accounts payable data) and that auditor performed 
the first two digits test. Auditor is especially focused on invoices amounts around 5.000 
kunas. Management defined specific rule for payment authorization: all amounts above 
5.000 kunas must be authorized by financial department manager while invoices with 
lesser amounts have to be authorized only by two employees of the operating level. Part of 
the first two digits test, that was in auditor's focus because of specific authorization rule, is 
shown in Table 10: 
digits fo Po fBL PBL D Dc PCd 
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
48 611 0,00909 602 0,00895 0,00013 + 1,50 
49 583 0,00867 590 0,00877 -0,00010 - -1,19 
50 556 0,00827 578 0,00860 -0,00033 - -3,81 
51 558 0,00830 567 0,00843 -0,00013 - -1,59 
52 559 0,00831 556 0,00827 0,00004 + 0,54 
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
total: 67234 67234    
      
Table 10. The first two digits test for received invoices 
 
Explanation of columns in Table 10 (digits, fo, Po, fBL, PBL, D, Dc, PCd) it the same as 
for these columns in Table 8 and Table 9 in chapter 6.6. In table 10 only first two digits 
that are close to “50” threshold are examined. Assumption was set that significant 
excessive counts for digits “48” and especially “49” will be found. However, after the first 
two digits test, auditor may conclude that there are no significant surpluses of numbers 
with first two digits “48” and “49”. On the contrary, frequency of digits “49” is even 
smaller than expected by Benford’s Law. There is 1,19% shortage of numbers starting with 
“49” (7 less in absolute value). Values starting with “48” are in slight, insignificant 
surplus. Only first digit combination “50” has discrepancy that earns attention – it is 
deficient for 3,81%. 
There is no significant negative bias for numbers starting with digits “51” and “52”. 
Auditor could conclude that data conform to Benford’s Law since there are no significant 
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positive spikes on graph shown on Figure 3 which is based on actual (Po) and Benford’s 
Law (PBL) proportions. 
 
Figure 3. First two digits - actual (Po) and Benford’s Law (PBL) proportions 
 
However, with the first three digits test, it is possible to disclose much more cases of fraud, 
mistakes or evasion than with the first two and especially the first digit tests. In Table 11 
excerpt from table of the first three digits test is shown. Only digit combinations that 
follow from the first two digits combinations from Table 10 are analysed. 
digits fo Po fBL PBL D Dc PCd 
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
480 63 0,00094 61 0,00090 0,00003 + 3,28 
481 61 0,00091 61 0,00090 0,00001 + 0,00 
482 62 0,00092 61 0,00090 0,00002 + 1,64 
483 61 0,00091 60 0,00090 0,00001 + 1,67 
484 59 0,00088 60 0,00090 -0,00002 - -1,67 
485 58 0,00086 60 0,00089 -0,00003 - -3,33 
486 61 0,00091 60 0,00089 0,00001 + 1,67 
487 61 0,00091 60 0,00089 0,00002 + 1,67 
488 63 0,00094 60 0,00089 0,00005 + 5,00 
489 62 0,00092 60 0,00089 0,00003 + 3,33 
490 53 0,00079 60 0,00089 -0,00010 - -11,67 
491 52 0,00077 59 0,00088 -0,00011 - -11,86 
492 54 0,00080 59 0,00088 -0,00008 - -8,47 
493 53 0,00079 59 0,00088 -0,00009 - -10,17 
494 53 0,00079 59 0,00088 -0,00009 - -10,17 
495 53 0,00079 59 0,00088 -0,00009 - -10,17 
496 54 0,00080 59 0,00087 -0,00007 - -8,47 
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497 66 0,00098 59 0,00087 0,00011 + 11,86 
498 71 0,00106 59 0,00087 0,00018 + 20,34 
499 74 0,00110 58 0,00087 0,00023 + 27,59 
500 32 0,00048 58 0,00087 -0,00039 - -44,83 
501 42 0,00062 58 0,00087 -0,00024 - -27,59 
502 47 0,00070 58 0,00086 -0,00017 - -18,97 
503 47 0,00070 58 0,00086 -0,00016 - -18,97 
504 66 0,00098 58 0,00086 0,00012 + 13,79 
505 65 0,00097 58 0,00086 0,00011 + 12,07 
506 65 0,00097 58 0,00086 0,00011 + 12,07 
507 64 0,00095 58 0,00086 0,00010 + 10,34 
508 64 0,00095 57 0,00085 0,00010 + 12,28 
509 64 0,00095 57 0,00085 0,00010 + 12,28 
510 59 0,00088 57 0,00085 0,00003 + 3,51 
511 55 0,00082 57 0,00085 -0,00003 - -3,51 
512 54 0,00080 57 0,00085 -0,00004 - -5,26 
513 55 0,00082 57 0,00085 -0,00003 - -3,51 
514 55 0,00082 57 0,00084 -0,00003 - -3,51 
515 56 0,00083 57 0,00084 -0,00001 - -1,75 
516 54 0,00080 57 0,00084 -0,00004 - -5,26 
517 58 0,00086 56 0,00084 0,00002 + 3,57 
518 56 0,00083 56 0,00084 0,00000 - 0,00 
519 56 0,00083 56 0,00084 0,00000 - 0,00 
520 59 0,00088 56 0,00083 0,00004 + 5,36 
521 56 0,00083 56 0,00083 0,00000 + 0,00 
522 55 0,00082 56 0,00083 -0,00001 - -1,79 
523 54 0,00080 56 0,00083 -0,00003 - -3,57 
524 57 0,00085 56 0,00083 0,00002 + 1,79 
525 53 0,00079 56 0,00083 -0,00004 - -5,36 
526 57 0,00085 55 0,00082 0,00002 + 3,64 
527 56 0,00083 55 0,00082 0,00001 + 1,82 
528 55 0,00082 55 0,00082 0,00000 - 0,00 
529 57 0,00085 55 0,00082 0,00003 + 3,64 
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
Table 11. First three digits combinations that follow from first two digits combinations 
from Table 10 
 
A few significant deviations can be spotted in Table 11. Positive differences between 
actual and Benford’s Law frequencies can easily be noticed for first three digits  “498” and 
“499”. On the contrary, there is lack of first three digits “500”, “501”, “502” and “503”.  




Figure 4. First three digits - "Spikes" and "sinks" 
 
From the above Table 11 and Figure 4 auditor may judge that operating personnel dealing 
with invoice authorization and payment was trying to avoid 5.000 limit. Additional 
argument for such judgment is a lack of numbers starting with digits "500", "501", "502" 
and "503". Sinks for these three digits combinations are clearly visible on a Figure 4.  
Shortages are ranging from 44% (for digits "500") to 19% (for digits "502" and "503"). 
From an auditor's perspective, it is very significant that shortages are the greatest for digits 
"500", and lesser toward digits "503". Auditor may assess that reason for such distribution 
is fabrication of invoices slightly greater than 5.000 (e.g. between 5.000 and 5.040 
exclusively). Fraudsters probably estimated it is less risky and less obvious if certain 
invoice amount is updated for a small amount. Also, there is a lesser "loss" for supplying 
company if amount is changed only for small figure. So, there is a certain probability that 
these invoice amounts are reduced in order to fall bellow 5.000 limit. Avoidance of limit 
could be done in arrangement with certain suppliers. Operating personnel could agree with 
some supplier(s) that invoices fall slightly bellow 5.000 limit in order to avoid additional 
check and payment authorization by manager. That way, even payments without received 
goods or services could be transacted. Motivation for such transactions on supplier side is 
obvious: supplying company rises its revenue and supplier salesman rises his bonus 
amount. Besides, supplying company eventually loose insignificant amount of money for 
delivered goods and services by reducing invoices for few kunas. Of course, for eventually 
paid undelivered goods and services supplying company earns full invoice amount. What 
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is yet missing here is only motivation of operating personnel in impaired company. 
Operating personnel might make a deal with supplying company to receive allowance for 
fraudulent paid invoices. So, motivation for fraudulent activity is clear for both 
participating parties. 
Additional audit activity may include checks if authorization of invoices with amounts 
between 4.800 and 5.000 kunas is performed usually by the same pair(s) of operating 
employees. Auditor should analyse authorizations of payments for invoices between 5.000 
and 5.040 exclusively. If there is a significant lack of authorizations done by before 
mentioned pair(s) of operating personnel, then it is important proof that fraudulent activity 
is on stage.  Auditor should also check how often certain suppliers are issuing invoices just 
bellow 5.000 kunas. If certain supplier has more than average occurrence in observed set of 
invoices, then it may be a lead that supplier agreed actions with operating personnel.  
6.8 The Second Digit Test 
Similarly to the first digit test, the second digit test may be used in auditing context as a 
check of data on reasonableness. Since there are only 10 combinations of second digits (0-
9), audit data subsets are too large for carrying out detailed auditing activity. Nevertheless, 
with second digit test it may be possible to make valuable conclusions about existence of 
number clustering or considerable number duplications.  
The example of the second digit test will be executed on hypothetical data set of insurance 
sales. Let us assume that life insurance company has a certain rules for bonuses calculation 
of insurance salesmen: 
- for contracted insurance policies with yearly premium bellow 5.000 kunas, bonus 
percentage is 1% 
- for contracted insurance policies with yearly premium between 5.000 and 15.000 
kunas, bonus percentage is 2% 
- for contracted insurance policies with yearly premium above 15.000 kunas, bonus 
percentage is 3% 
 
Let us suppose that auditor gathered data about yearly policies and that he performed the 
second digit test with outcome represented in Table 12. 
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digit fo Po fBL PBL D Dc PCd 
0 2.356 0,12859 2.193 0,11968 0,009 + 7,43 
1 2.213 0,12078 2.087 0,11389 0,007 + 6,04 
2 2.002 0,10927 1.994 0,10882 0,000 + 0,40 
3 1.887 0,10299 1.912 0,10433 -0,001 - -1,31 
4 1.778 0,09704 1.838 0,10031 -0,003 - -3,26 
5 1.839 0,10037 1.771 0,09668 0,004 + 3,84 
6 1.698 0,09268 1.711 0,09337 -0,001 - -0,76 
7 1.645 0,08978 1.655 0,09035 -0,001 - -0,60 
8 1.541 0,08411 1.604 0,08757 -0,003 - -3,93 
9 1.373 0,07494 1.557 0,08500 -0,010 - -11,82 
total 18.322  18.322     
Table 12. The second digit frequencies in contracted yearly insurance policies 
 
In Table 12, a few deviations are easily noticeable. Firstly, there are surpluses of the 
second digits 0, 1 and 5. Secondly, there are shortages of digits 4, 8 and 9.  













Figure 5. The second digit frequencies  
 
Based on a visual analysis of Figure 5 graph it could be stated that chosen data set of 
yearly insurance policies have significant positive deviations for the second digits "0" 
(excess of 7,43% from Benford's Law frequency) and "1" (excess of 6,04% from Benford's 
Law frequency). Also, there can be clearly seen that second digit "4" has shortage (-3,26% 
from Benford's Law frequency) and second digit "5" has positive spike (excess of 3,84% 
from Benford's Law). Auditor should learn more about rules for insurance salesman 
bonuses. Three rules explained shortly on page 78 set two limit boundaries. First boundary 
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is set to amount of 5.000 kunas and second to amount of 15.000 kunas. These boundaries 
have second digits "0" and "5" respectively. Rules define progressive bonus percentages 
according to rise in amount of contracted yearly premium. It can be suspected that on each 
boundary there are deviations from the Benford's Law second digit test. Surpluses are 
evident on second digits which may correspond to amounts just above the rule boundaries.  
According to excessive counts, auditor may suppose there are surpluses of yearly 
premiums with amounts just above bonus limits (5.000 and 15.000). As a consequence, 
there is lack of digit "9" (-11,82%) and digit "8" (-3,93%) as a second digit. The greatest 
excess of second digit is for digit "0" so auditor may assume insurance salesmen are 
pushing insurance contracts just above 5.000 limit in order to skip corresponding bonuses 
to next level (2%).  The same assumption can be done for shortages of second digits "8" 
and "9". Salesmen are pushing contracted insurance premiums from values close to 
boundary (from 4.800 to 5.000 exclusively) to values just over the boundary (5.000) and 
that is the reason for shortage in digits "8" and "9". Auditor may also understand this is 
done because salesmen are trying to pump their bonuses. The same may be assumed for 
excessive count of second digit "5": salesmen are pushing values between 14.000 to 15.000 
(exclusively) over 15.000 boundary in order to gain 3% bonus instead of 2%. Of course, if 
skipping over defined limits is confirmed by actual business event and these amounts 
freely chosen by policy holder, then there is no proof for fraudulent activity. 
Since the second digit test is too broad and has too large auditing sample, it is not possible 
to make final judgement exclusively by this test. Assumptions can be confirmed only after 
numbers are closely analysed. For example, if auditor additionally performed the first two 
digits test, he may get results that are denying previous, too early set, assumptions. The 
first two digits test could shown that excesses in second digits "0", "1" and "5" are results 
of excessive number of policies valued between 7.000 and 7.200 (exclusively) and between 
3.500 and 3.600 (exclusively). And reason for such discrepancies may be also very 
pragmatic and consequence of a state tax policy if tax relief boundaries are set on 3.500 
and 7.000 values. 
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6.9 Benford's Law Conformance Criteria 
In chapters 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 are defined and explained some properties of Benford's 
Law. In chapters 6.5, 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8 certain Benford's Law tests are explained and  
possible audit scenarios are developed.  
In a few examples it is shown how auditors may react on results of Benford's Law tests 
even without any specific statistical measure of deviation, apart from calculation of 
percentage deviation. Simple percentage of deviation measurement and visual inspection 
of graph results were suitable for making some important evaluations about number sets. 
Of course, these evaluations were matter of further analysis which was based on additional 
Benford's Law tests, analysis of business process rules, furtherly narrowing data set in 
order to get smaller audit set which is more suitable for auditing and making final 
conclusion. In usual auditing environment, Benford's Law tests are not used as a final 
proof of misconduct, omissions, fraud or inappropriateness of business process. After 
auditor realized that there are significant deviations in comparison to Benford's Law, 
usually additional investigation must be performed. That is why conformance criteria to 
Benford's Law in auditing environment are not of a crucial importance.  
However, although visual inspection of graphs shown in previous examples as well as 
simple percentage deviation calculus can be very often satisfactory in auditing 
environment, it is desirable to define certain conformance criteria. Conformance criteria 
should give clear answer if data set conforms to Benford's Law or not. In fact, 
conformance criteria should with certain probability answer a question whether data set 
follows the Benford's Law. Some conformance criteria also give the probability that non-
conformance is consequence of a chance alone.  
For purposes of conformance measurement of data set concerning Benford's Law tests, 
statistical methods like Z-statistics, Chi square and Mean Absolute Deviation will be 




Z-statistics is used as measure of statistical significance of deviation from Benford’s Law 
for each digit combination separately. It uses expected and actual probabilities as well as 














In this formula, Po denotes the observed (actual) proportion, PBL is expected Benford’s 
Law proportion, n is total number of observations. The term 
n2
1
 is correction factor which 
is used only if it is smaller than term PBLPo  .  
In fact, the Z-statistics measures if deviation of observed (actual) proportion from the 
expected (Benford’s Law) proportion is statistically significant or not. Larger the Z-
statistics for certain digit(s) the larger is probability that deviations are not accidental. 
Auditor may choose and set limiting Z-statistics value according to his acceptable level of 
accidental deviations. If the auditor decided he will accept only 1% of chance to make 
wrong conclusions, then he would define maximum Z-statistics of 2,58. If certain Z-
statistics is larger than 2,58, then it may be concluded that there is only 1% probability that 
significant deviation from expected frequency is result of a chance. So, if Z-statistics is 
larger than 2,58 auditor may conclude that probability of fraud, omissions or errors is quite 
high for observed data subset. So, in the cases of the Benford’s Law first digit test, Z-
statistics for each of 9 digits should be calculated. All Z-statistics larger than previously set 
limit level (e.g. 2,58 for 1% error level) should be marked as suspicious. Those digits 
should be furtherly investigated in order to check if deviations are result of frauds, errors or 
omissions or deviations are only consequences of a chance or business rules.  
In addition to 1% limit level (i.e. Z-statistics of 2,58), auditors may choose other maximum 
allowable Z-statistics. For example, if auditor wants to accept only 5% significance level 
which means there is only 5% probability that difference between actual and expected 
frequency values is accidental, he will set Z-statistics to 1,96 value. It is said that cut off 
value for each Z-statistics value is 1,96. All values that exceed this value should be flagged 
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as they deviate according to Z-statistics. Graphical illustration of normal curve and 
corresponding cut off values for 1% and 5% significance levels is shown on Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Normal distribution and different significance levels with corresponding cut off 
values 
Also, if auditor is willing to accept 10% probability that deviated frequencies are 
accidental, then Z-statistics should be set to 1,65. 
Although Z-statistics is quite powerful measurement, it may not always be very practical 
for auditing purpose. Also, it may not be used as an ultimate test of deviation significance 
in auditing environment. Auditor should not forget statistical environment is quite different 
from its auditing counterpart. As it is explained in [17, pages 42-43], when any individual 
value for Z-statistics exceeds 1,96 it may be concluded there is only 5% probability that the 
difference is caused accidentally. However, this is still quite a big probability and such 
differences, caused by chance, are quite often in auditing. Also, Z-statistics values are 
calculated for each digit separately. If we have 9 digits in focus (e.g. in the first digit test), 
each digit has 5% probability of having accidental Z-statistic greater than 1,96. Then, the 
chance that at least one of the nine digits will have Z-statistics out of limit is 37%. 
Furtherly, in performing ten first digit tests it may be expected to find significant Z-
statistics proved deviations in close to four cases. Such deviations would typically be 
completely random, with no practical audit significance. If randomly deviant Z-statistics 
are relatively common, is this test appropriate at all? How auditor can know which are real 
deviations and which are just result of random “noise”? Firstly, as it is explained in [17], if 
the data set simply does not conform to Benford’s Law, then typically many columns will 
have Z-statistics greater than limit level. In such case,  
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- data may be massively fraudulent,  
- data is erroneously extracted, 
- data suffers from severe small subset problems, or 
- Benford’s Law is simply not applicable to data auditor investigates, and data does 
not conform to Benford’s Law 
 
Secondly, which is of most importance to auditor, Z-statistics is only one of approaches to 
narrow down which digit combination could be fraudulent, erroneous or result of 
omissions. For example, if auditor investigates tax refund claims and the threshold for non 
taxable income is 50.000 then a positive deviation of two digit combination “49” is 
significant because it suggest that the tax payers try to avoid taxation. So, Z-statistics 
should be accompanied by other investigation methods, particularly by checking the 
business rules for process execution and data creation. 
To furtherly emphasise importance of above statements, we may conclude that for audit 
purposes it is not enough to use only Z-statistics test in order to confirm whether data are 
Benford’s Law compliant and if data is fraudulent, erroneous or it is resulting from 
omissions. 
6.9.2 Chi-square (χ2) 
Chi-square test is very often used in statistics in order to make conclusion if two data sets, 
at certain significance level, match each other. In this research it is used for checking if all 
digits as a whole conform to Benford’s Law. It means chi-square test is composite test, like 
Mean absolute deviation (MAD) test and unlike Z-statistics test. 
For each element of data set the chi-square test is calculated as follows: 
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where Po stands for the observed (actual) frequency, while PBL is expected Benford’s Law 
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In order to state Chi-square test proves two data sets are conformed null hypothesis must 
be accepted as true. A null hypothesis states that observed and Benford’s Law distributions 
are matching each other under certain significance level. Cut-off value for acceptance or 
rejection of null hypothesis depends on degrees of freedom and significance level. 
Significance level denotes probability that even if null hypothesis is accepted it is still due 
to chance alone. In this thesis, significant level will be always set on 5%. Also, the degrees 
of freedom are calculated as number of observations minus 1. That means the degrees of 
freedom will be 8, 9, 89 and 899 for the first, the second, the first two digits and the first 
three digits Benford’s Law tests respectively. It means that, according to 8 degrees of 
freedom and testing on significance level of 5%, in order to confirm null hypothesis that 
observed and the first digit Benford’s Law test distributions are equal, value of χ2 should 
be less than 15,507 which is cut-off value.  
6.9.3 Mean absolute deviation 
Mean absolute deviation (MAD) test may be used as an intuitive goodness of fit measure. 
Mean absolute deviation is calculated as average of totaled absolute deviations of each data 
set element. 
This measure does not have strictly defined limit values i.e. range in which it can be stated 
whether deviation of value sets is significant or not. As there are no cut-off values like with 
Chi-square, there are no strict rules by which auditor can state if certain number set 
conforms to Benford's Law after applying MAD test. Some examples of MAD use for 
intuitive explanation if certain number data set conforms to Benford's Law are shown in 
[19, page 59] and [17, page 79].  
For each data set element, absolute deviations (AD) are calculated as follows: 




where Po and PBL denote observed and expected frequencies according to Benford’s Law. 
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Mean absolute deviation is calculated for entire data set as follows: 







 1  
where “n” is total number of elements in data set and “i” is ordinary number of element in 
set. 
Unlike the chi-square and Z-statistics tests, MAD is not affected by the size of observed 
data set. That means the result is independent on the number of observations itself. 
However, in [17] it is stated that MAD is the best conformity test in an auditing context. 
The author states each auditor has to develop her/his guidelines for measuring conformity 
using the MAD and those guidelines may vary for different data sets. Certain guidelines 
are set for MAD cut off levels for disbursement data set [17, pages 118-122]. Based on 
author’s experience in disbursement audits, MAD cut-off values for the first digit 
Benford’s Law test are: 
- MAD in set [0; 0,4] – close conformity of data set to Benford’s Law 
- MAD in set <0,4; 0,8] – acceptable conformity of data set to Benford’s Law 
- MAD in set <0,8; 1,2] – marginally acceptable conformity of data set to Benford’s Law 
- MAD in set <1,2;∞> - nonconformity of data set to Benford’s Law 
 
However, auditor has to bear in mind that each data set has its own properties and MAD 
cut-off values. Thus, considerable experience is needed for setting up MAD limits with 




7. Design and Verification of Computer Assisted Information 
Systems Auditing Methodology 
As it is indicated in chapter 4, there are different frameworks and approaches for overall 
business and information systems audit developed by certain authorities. Since auditing 
activity tends to be extremely complicated and covers different business areas, use of 
auxiliary auditing methods and tools becomes compulsory. Also, as it is shown in chapter 
2, frauds become more and more advanced and resulting in much greater losses. 
Obviously, existing auditing methods and approaches are not adequate in contemporary 
business environments. 
Although computer assisted auditing is emphasized as important and indispensable by 
leading organizations in information systems auditing (ISACA), United States banking 
industry regulation (Federal Reserve Bank), so called „central bank of central banks“ 
(Bank for International Settlements) and a number of other regulation authorities, widely 
accepted methodology is still not developed. 
In addition, computer assisted auditing methods are used in existing software tools. 
Methods implemented in computer assisted auditing software are quite extensive in 
number and modes of use. However, there is no predefined methodology which could 
more precisely guide auditor while performing audits. As a consequence, each auditor 
chooses set of methods for each audit activity, use them in different sequences and makes 
different conclusions. This approach makes computer assisted auditing software not 
effective enough since audit activities based on such software without use of methodology 
are arbitrary (depending on auditor's choice), disparate, not standard and non-comparable. 
For that reason development of methodology for computer assisted information systems 
auditing is of the utmost importance. The process for development of such methodology 
must consist of the following: 
1. Definition of specific methods which will constitute the basis of methodology – 
defining input data, processing algorithm and output data (chapters 5 and 6) 
2. Defining general rules and model applicable for any computer assisted information 
systems auditing methodology resulting in adequate meta-model (chapter 7.1) 
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3. Defining steps of methodology and appropriate linkage i.e. sequence of methods 
application depending of output data resulting in adequate model of methodology (chapter 
7.2) 
7.1 Meta-Model of Computer Assisted Information Systems Auditing 
Methodology (CAISAM) 
Although large number of methods and corresponding computer assisted auditing tools are 
applied in practice, no specific methodology has been developed. A number of auditors use 
different methods within different procedures, steps and success. Certainly, such approach 
has numerous shortcomings resulting in inadequate audit activities, as it is described 
previously in this paper.  
Additionally, in available literature no meta-model of general CAISAM is developed. Such 
meta-model should be a basis for development of any specific CAISAM. So, first task that 
should have been accomplished in order to design methodology was development of meta-
model of CAISAM.  
After general CAISAM meta-model is designed, model of specific CAISAM based on 
Benford's Law will be created (chapter 7.2). Certain existing methods are chosen and 
linked into a new and consistent methodology which can be very efficiently used in 
auditing process and within existing CAATs.  
For the purposes of development of specific computer assisted information systems 
auditing methodology, meta-model is firstly presented (Figure 7) and explained in this 
paper. 
Generally speaking, meta-model is a model of metadata about certain domain. Meta 
modelling comprises of analysis and construction of models applicable and useful to some 
domain of problems. A model is a sort of abstraction of specific real world domain, while 
meta-model is higher level abstraction which emphasizes characteristics of all models form 
specific real world domain. 
Meta model of CAISAM is the abstraction of different possible methodology models 
covering information systems audit by use of certain data analysis methods. Each such 
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methodology must consist of processes of data provision, checking of collected audit 
sample, application of audit methods, checking results of audit method applications, 
conclusion on eventual fraud, omissions or errors after each audit method is applied and 
final conclusion on audit process. 
 
Figure 7. CAISAM Meta-model 
The CAISAM meta-model is based on 6 main steps: 
1. Data provision 
2. Audit sample check 
3. Application of audit method 
4. Audit sample check on fraud, omission and error 
5. Conclusion on fraud, omissions and errors 




Within each step one or more computer assisted auditing methods are applied. Data 
provision or data gathering (step 1 on Figure 7) is process of extracting data needed for 
audit activity from auditee's production database. After data is extracted, it should be 
stored on hardware and software equipment that is separate from production environment 
so that audit activity will be executed on non-production infrastructure. There are at least 
two types of reasons for such approach:  
- availability  and performance of production database should not be jeopardized by 
auditing activity 
- changes to production data must be prevented. 
 
After audit sample is created, any CAISAM must perform certain steps in order to check 
relevance and completeness of data (step 2 on Figure 7). Specific methodology must 
explain which methods should be used and how in this step. If audit sample proved to be 
adequate (answer "yes" in step 2.1), it may be continued with application of defined 
auditing method(s) on data (step 3). However, if audit sample was not adequate, data 
provision process must be reviewed, possibly updated and executed again (step 1). These 
processes of audit sample checking, reviewing and updating of data provision must be 
performed until audit sample is proved to be complete and relevant.  
 
After auditor judges that audit sample is adequate, specific computer assisted auditing 
methods are applied (step 3.). If the output result of specific method is within adequate 
limits, auditing activity should proceed with next method(s). However, if output resulting 
from certain method application is out of normal or previously defined boundaries that 
means auditor must check audit sample on fraud, omission and error (step 4.). This means 
acquired data must be compared to rules of conduct within specific business entity. If 
acquired data does not follow business rules and is deviated in fraudulent, erroneous 
manner or omissions in business conduct are made auditor must conclude on existence of 
fraud, omissions or errors within business entity (step 5.). It means auditor must explain 
why and how fraud, error or omission occurred within business entity. However, even in 
this step it is still possible that data is not deviated because of fraud, omissions or errors but 
because of inadequate audit sample (“no” in step 4.1) at the first place. If that is the case, 
audit sample should be re-checked again. It may happen that although audit sample was 
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checked in step 2., its inadequacy be proved after application of specific auditing 
method(s) in step 3. As it is shown in model of CAISAM based on Benford’s Law 
explained in chapter 7.2, repeating of audit sample check, review and update should be 
executed after first audit method (specifically the Benford’s Law first digit test in step 3.) 
has been applied on audit sample. After each method from step 3. in CAISAMs meta-
model (Figure 7) is executed (“yes” in step 5.1), auditor must make final conclusions on 
existence of fraud, omissions or errors i.e. on overall audit process. 
 
In the next chapter, model of specific computer assisted information systems auditing 
methodology based on the Benford’s Law tests is developed. Each step of specific 
methodology follows meta-model described in this chapter. 
7.2 Model of CAISAM Based on Benford's Law 
Development of model for a specific CAISAM should be based on meta-model explained 
previously in chapter 7.1. Specific CAISAM designed in this paper is largely based on 
Benford's Law (detailed explanation may be found in chapter 6), but also some other 
methods which are explained in chapter 5 are used. 
However, before any actual audit execution, adequate audit planning step should be 
undertaken. During audit planning phase following prerequisites should be realized: 
- clear definition of data structures to be processed including quantity, type, format 
and layout, 
- definition of methods to be undertaken together with ways of methods linkage, 
- definition of input and output data,  
- determination of resource requirements, i.e. personnel, CAATs, processing 
environment, 
- obtained access to the organisation’s information system facilities, programs and 
data, including database definitions. 
 
As computer assisted auditing techniques software is proved to be extremely efficient in 
audit examinations, it is necessary to asses usability of such software in certain audit. It 
must be defined what data in what format will be analyzed. Auditor must in advance define 
for what time period data should be collected, what the select criteria are, should there be 
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any aggregate functions applied, what registries are indispensable, are there any joins with 
other data tables that should be involved. Concerning the way of accessing data, it must be 
settled if data will be accessed off-line or on-line. If access method is off-line, which is the 
most usual, it is to be decided about export format. The most usual export formats are 
ASCII delimited and ASCII fixed width files. In both cases auditor must require certain 
file structure which encloses sequence of columns, data type of each column, eventual 
heading record and eventually final record in data file. As a rule, on-line access method 
should be avoided because of possible performance degradation and risk of unauthorized 
changes. If it is indispensable to access data in on-line mode, it should be done out of 
business hours or at least when information system database is used minimally and without 
update, delete or insert data access privileges. Also, it must be agreed what technical 
prerequisites are needed for establishing database connection (e.g. installation of database 
drivers). As it is already briefly indicated, one more obstacle which should be carefully 
discussed and agreed upon is definition of user and his access privileges in target database. 
User must be named and with read only (select) privileges. Additionally, all activities on 
database during on-line access must be monitored and logged in audit trails. Technical 
requirements must be agreed by IT department, while requirements concerning scope of 
data (content) must be demanded by the department who is the owner of the data. 
After planning steps for computer assisted auditing are completed, execution of specific 
auditing activity should commence.  
Crucial prerequisite for computer audit commencement is understanding of data, data 
structures and appropriate mapping or relating data to business processes and events. 
Developed computer assisted information systems auditing methodology covers methods 
and steps that must be undertaken in the audit execution phase of audit process. Audit 
planning, documentation and reporting should be done in accordance with description in 
chapters 8.1.1, 8.1.3 and 8.1.4. 
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Figure 8. CAISAM Model 
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First step (step 1 in Figure 8) in developed computer assisted information systems auditing 
methodology is data provision. During this step auditor must define ways of taking over 
data from production databases. It is indispensable that statements for data provision are 
clearly defined and that conditions are appropriately constructed. As already mentioned, 
one of major cares in computer assisted auditing is the quality of provisioned data. If data 
is not appropriately provisioned, the whole auditing process will most certainly fail. The 
objective of the first step is to ensure that data are ready for auditing i.e. relevant and 
comprehensive. This step includes usage of following methods: 
-  selection – in order to declare which data are relevant for audit, to obtain 
comprehensiveness or completeness of data 
-  join – in order to combine data from different data tables (relations) or even from 
different data sources 
 
Typical examples for this step is definition of SQL conditions according to period, types of 
transactions, certain departments, supplier, customer etc. Auditor should bear in mind that 
created selections and joins must be compatible with production database systems on 
which they will be applied. Although almost all modern databases are based on SQL 
standards, still there are slight differences.  
Then abovementioned methods must be applied to production database.  
After audit sample (AS) is created out of production database, auditor must check its 
relevance and completeness (step 2). This step must be executed because of following 
reasons: 
1. It is possible that auditor’s knowledge of data and data structures was not sufficient so 
planning phase and step 1 outcome in inadequate conclusions. Final results are SQL 
statements which produced incomplete or non relevant data. During this step auditor may 
correct wrong assumptions and improve his knowledge about data and data structures. 
2. In some cases IT personnel will execute SQL queries prepared by the auditor. Since 
auditor will not be able to monitor process of database log on and queries execution, there 
is possibility queries may have been changed and/or data have been accessed from non 
production database (development, testing, data warehousing, temporary).  
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Of course, if planning phase of computer assisted auditing process was performed correctly 
and in step 1 data was provisioned according to created queries, then step 2 will confirm 
relevance and completeness. 
Methods that should be used for data relevance and completeness check are selection, 
summarization (grouping), stratification and join.  
For example, selection may be used in order to check if some specific data type (e.g. 
transaction type) is extracted in certain time period. Summarization may confirm if all data 
types (e.g. all transaction types) are excluded from production database. This method will 
clearly show if some data type does not exist in audit sample. Stratification may be set as 
first required method in data relevance and completeness check. After initial strata are 
created, auditor may be able to notice discrepancy between expected and actual data set. 
Stratification will produce strata according to auditor’s instructions (e.g. transaction 
amount) which may show some data subsets were omitted from production database. This 
may be noticed if some strata lack data i.e. if there are problems with data segments. If that 
is a case, auditor may question created audit sample. Of course, it is useful to additionally 
check deviated strata. Join method should be used whenever relevance and completeness 
check is dependent on relations between audit sample and data in other tables or databases. 
Except natural or equi-join, auditor should concentrate on left and right outer joins. With 
outer joins it is possible to check if some data types in audit sample are missing. 
Additional selection and summarization together with auditors experience and expectations 
may be used in questioning data with data and business process owner. Also, following 
additional checks may be performed:  
- comparison of data in audit sample with data subsets from previous audits 
- comparison of data in audit sample with data from other databases storing same or 
similarly organized data (e.g. data warehousing, data backups) 
- comparison of data in audit sample with data in some other formats (e.g. paper) 
and/or with data from other sources (e.g. facility management system, vacation 
data, accounting data, data, application and  event logs, data from corresponding 
business entities – e.g. suppliers, tax authorities, customers). 
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If auditor has reason to discard audit sample as incomplete and non relevant, step 1 has to 
be repeated. Of course, auditor should mitigate reasons that resulted in inappropriate audit 
sample in the first place.  
Following actions should be taken in order to get relevant and complete audit sample:  
- auditor has to review his knowledge of data, data structure and business being audited 
- auditor must work closer with IT personnel in preparation and execution of SQL 
statements 
 
Another problem that may appear is that audit sample contains excessive data which means 
data was collected on much broader scope than required by auditor. For example, auditor 
may have required only selected types of payments in order to increase the focus on data 
but resulting audit sample contains all payment types. That way, focus may be lost and 
investigation of errors, omissions and fraud more complicated. Benford's Law method, on 
which CAISAM is based, requires more focused audit samples. If audit sample is too 
general, even if there are obvious deviations from Benford's Law, it may become quite 
cumbersome to relate deviations to business reasons. So, search for errors, omissions and 
frauds could take much more time than planned. A remedy for situation when audit sample 
has more data than necessary can be: 
- Audit sample is generated again from the original data. That means auditor must 
require more specific data, thus define data conditions that IT personnel will again 
execute on production database. 
- Audit sample set will be narrowed down from original audit sample. That means 
auditor must extract needed data, discard unwanted data, and create new, more 
focused audit sample. The extraction is done by use of selection method and 
application of appropriate extraction condition. Surely, this option is more practical 
and will be used in most of the cases. It also has additional advantage of improving 
auditor's knowledge of data even before the methods for investigation of omissions, 
errors or frauds were applied on data. 
 
Steps 1 and 2 have to be repeated until auditor accepts data set as relevant and complete. 
When and if chosen data set is accepted as relevant and complete, next method that should 
be executed is test of first digit Benford’s Law (step 3). The first digit Benford’s Law test 
will result in 9 data subsets (digits 1-9). Quite often, the first digit Benford’s Law test will 
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not be focused enough and will not give enough proof whether data is fraudulent, 
erroneous and/or not complete. Even if data subsets will significantly deviate from 
Benford’s Law distribution, usually auditor will not be able to make conclusions why 
deviations occurred.  
Data distributions should be compared to the Benford’s Law first test distributions in order 
to check for conformity. Conformity should be examined by chi-square test, mean absolute 
deviation test or Z-statistics test. How conformity tests should be applied is explained in 
chapter 6.9 and in [11]. Diagrams should be used in order to perform visual inspection of 
data distributions and their deviations. If data does not follow predefined distributions 
(“no” result in step 3.1), auditor must check if data is fraudulent, erroneous and/or data 
resulted from omissions. This check must be performed in step 4. 
However, if data satisfies Benford’s Law first digit distributions (“yes” result in step 3.1), 
next Benford’s Law test should be applied on data (step 6). 
Concerning step 4 (audit sample check on fraud, omissions and errors – “AS check FOE”) 
and 4.1 (conclusion on existence of fraud, omissions and errors – “FOE?”) auditor has to 
understand rules of business conduct especially in relation to limits (e.g. according to 
authorization for payments, tax obligations and bonus gains), regularly recurring events for 
certain calculations (e.g. existence of regular interest calculation), rules for calculated 
database fields (e.g. tax calculations), etc. Limit avoidances resulting in pushing certain 
amounts bellow or over predefined limits are rather often, so auditor should be aware of 
their existence. After Benford’s Law test shows deviations, additional checks on data 
should be based on selection, summarization, duplication and rounded values checking 
methods. Auditor must understand if there are specific reasons why data does not follow 
Benford’s Law. If numbers are clustered around certain limits and clustering can be related 
to limits set by management than there is high probability of committed fraud. It is 
important to notice steps 4 and 4.1 have to be repeated after each Benford's Law tests 
resulting in deviations (steps 7, 7.1, 10, 10.1, 13, 13.1). 
If tests against Benford’s Law significantly deviate, auditor may perform some additional 
tests only for certain digits which deviate from Benford’s Law frequencies in order to 
check against fraudulent or erroneous activity. Examples of use of certain analysis tests in 
steps 4, 7, 10 and 13 after each Benford's Law test shown discrepancies are:  
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- finding rounded amounts, amounts starting with multiplies of 10 or 100 (rounded 
values method) 
- counting frequency for each amount – searching for multiple occurrences (number 
duplication) of the same amounts especially in short period of time (duplication 
method) 
- finding rounded and duplicated amounts on very same day (rounded values, 
duplication  and summarization methods) 
- searching for rounded and duplicated crediting amounts for certain accounts in 
specific period of time (rounded values, duplication and summarization methods) 
- rounded and duplicated crediting amounts by detecting specific employees 
(rounded amounts, duplication and join methods) 
- amounts slightly below certain threshold – this checks if payer or payee wanted to 
evade entering certain tax limits or additional checks by authorities (selection 
method) 
- finding amounts slightly greater than certain threshold – sometimes business 
entities with performance (sales, investments, contracted amounts etc.) above 
certain limits may get special status in their relationships with state authorities, 
banks or other business entities (selection method) 
- multiple  payments of same type paid same day (or in short time interval) with sum 
above or below certain threshold (summarization, selection and join methods) 
 
On the contrary, if auditor can not relate clustering, i.e. non conformance to Benford’s Law 
distributions, to evasion of certain business rules, it is possible data set simply does not 
follow Benford’s Law first digit distribution. Auditor may conclude deviations from first 
digit Benford’s Law distributions are result of normal business conduct. As it is already 
stated, more focused tests should be applied on data. Use of selection, summarization, 
number duplication and rounded values checks are required. Using these methods auditor 
can focus on data causing deviations, after selecting and summarizing according to defined 
criteria. One reasonable example is selection of certain types of transactions committed by 
certain employees. Then number duplication and rounded values check may be applied on 
some number subsets. If considerable number of values falling into come clusters is 
duplicated or rounded, perhaps fraudulent behaviour is on scene. 
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Also, if application of selection method showed clustering of transactions in certain time 
period, then summarization of transactions according to certain employee and transaction 
type in relevant period could be of special audit focus. Additional review based on 
duplication and rounded values should be also performed. 
Nevertheless, even if it is possible to make conclusions about fraud, omissions and/or 
errors solely on the first digit Benford’s Law test, it is indispensable to continue with next 
Benford’s Law test. It is the second digit Benford’s Law test (step 6). This is mandatory, 
since other types of deviations may be spotted after application of rest of Benford’s Law 
tests. 
However, if data are deviated from the Benford’s Law first digit test and there is no proof 
of fraud, omissions or errors in business conduct, auditor must again check audit sample 
data on relevance and completeness (step 4.2). It is possible that first check on relevance 
and completeness performed in step 2 was not adequate and that auditor made wrong 
conclusions. In auditing work it is possible to commit such wrong judgement which is the 
most often consequence of: 
- insufficient knowledge of business system and underlying data (resulting in 
wrongly performed step 1) 
- inadequate application of selection, summarization, join and/or stratification 
methods (step 2) 
- insufficient knowledge of underlying data organization and structure (steps 1 and 2) 
 
If auditor believes there is considerable possibility that data is not fraudulent but not 
relevant and complete (“no” result in step 4.3), data provision must be repeated. The same 
methods as in step 1 and 2 may be carried out after auditor additionally improves his 
knowledge of business system, data organization and data structure. Of course, extensive 
knowledge on methods in focus is indispensable. So, steps 1 and 2 must be accomplished 
again not bearing in mind that data was not appropriately sampled and checked in first 
place. Also, there is possibility that data is relevant and complete but simply not enough 
focused. If audit sample is not focused enough, but consist of data from different business 
entities, various types of transactions within business entity or whole industry branch (as it 
will be shown in chapter 7.3.3) then CAISAM will not be efficient. It is a normal 
consequence since the gaining of focus is prerequisite for adequate audit of business 
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function or process. So, capability to clearly relate data to auditable business process or 
business entity is indispensable condition for effective CAISAM. 
If, after additional checks, it is concluded data is relevant and complete (“yes” result in 
step 4.3), auditor should proceed with Benford’s Law testing. The second digit test (step 6 
– “BL SDT on AS”) should be next in sequence. This test is also fairly broad, not very 
focused on certain data subject and usually will not be enough for final judgement on 
eventual fraudulent, omitted and/or erroneous data. The second digit test will show 
distribution of second digits in observed amounts and similar to the first digit test it is not 
very efficient auditing method. It results in only 10 data subsets (digits 0 to 9). Such small 
number of resulting subsets has consequence of quite large proportions. Any of 10 subsets 
will often be too large for audit conclusions. However, the second digit test may show 
significant deviations which may be reflection of certain limits evasions resulting in 
number clustering.  
Comparing to steps that follow after first digit Benford's Law, there is slight difference in 
steps following the second digit test. Namely, auditor does not have to recheck on 
relevance and completeness of audit sample. So, there is no "AS OK?" check which was 
mandatory if fraud, omissions and/or errors check were not found after noticed 
discrepancies in the first digit tests. This is the result of experience - it may be said if audit 
sample was checked twice (steps 2 and 4.2) that auditor finally extracted appropriate i.e. 
complete and relevant data from database. 
The rest of steps following immediately after the Benford’s Law second digit test (steps 
6.1, 7, 7.1, and 8) are in essence coherent with corresponding steps performed after 
Benford’s Law first digit test (steps 3.1, 4, 4.1 and 5).  
However, it is possible that step 1 resulted in reasonably focused data set i.e. audit sample. 
If it is so, there is higher probability that already the first and/or the second digit Benford’s 
Law test and following selections, summarizations, duplication and rounded values 
checking methods will be enough for conclusions on some fraud, omissions and/or errors 
in business system. Although in some cases deviations of data set from Benford’s Law first 
and second digit distribution are easily explained after additional focusing by selection, 
summarization, duplication and rounded values checking methods auditor has to continue 
with more focused Benford’s Law tests, specifically the first two digits and the first three 
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digits tests. These tests could give additional information and conclusion why deviations 
occurred. Also, if no deviations where noticed by the first and the second digit tests it is 
mandatory to accomplish the first two and the first three digit Benford's Law tests. As it is 
already stated, these tests are much more focused and their application result in much 
focused audit samples so the conclusions about certain deviations may be more precise. 
The first two digits Benford's Law test (step 9) has much more audit relevance than the 
first digit and the second digit tests. It is more focused since it takes into account 90 
combinations of first two left most digits. The first two digits test is much more sensible 
(in theory exactly 9 times) than the first digit test. This means auditor will have much more 
potential in noticing deviations and recovering fraud, omissions and/or mistakes in 
business activity. After performing this test, auditor can spot finer irregularities or 
discrepancies and then perform additional analysis with other methods (summarization, 
selection, rounded amount, duplication, join) belonging to CAISAM methodology as 
shown in step 4. Each significant deviation on the first two digits should be thoroughly 
checked and compared to certain business rules (steps 10 and 10.1). Furtherly, whatever is 
outcome of step 10.1 (deviations are result of fraud, omissions and/or errors or not), next 
and final Benford's Law test must be executed on audit sample. 
The first three digits test (step 12) is the most specific of all Benford's Law tests. It is 
highly focused because it gives considerably smaller subsets than any other Benford's Law 
test. This test covers 900 three leftmost combinations (digits 100 to 999 inclusive). It is 9 
times more sensible than the first two digits test. Since it has greater precision it will be the 
best choice for recovering abnormal data duplications. So, duplication method should be 
performed with more care especially for three digits combinations that are deviated from 
Benford's Law distribution. Also, this test will be much more beneficial for analysis and 
conclusions on clusters or so called "positive spikes" on diagram representations resulted 
from deviations from Benford's Law distribution. Background for explanation why this test 
is more efficient in cluster analysis is the same as for duplications: test is simply more 
focused, resulting in larger number of subsets (900) what causes smaller average number 
of elements in audit subsets. Apart from that, steps 12.1 to 14 are already appropriately 
described in previous paragraph on the Benford's Law first two digits test.  
After conclusion on existence of fraud, omissions and errors concerning the first three 
digits test (step 14), auditor has to review whole audit process defined by methodology and 
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make final conclusions. This step is necessary as individual tests may show different 
deviations so auditor may discover various discrepancies resulted from fraud, errors and/or 
omissions.  
7.3 Verification of Designed Methodology 
The designed methodology will be verified in practical audit activity. For the purpose of 
verification, methodology will be used in auditing of cross-border payments system data. 
These data are collected by Croatian National Bank which uses them for purposes of 
balances of payments of Republic of Croatia, as well as for auditing and control purposes. 
7.3.1 Description of Cross-border Payments System  
Cross-border payments system includes all payments on the basis of import and export of 
goods, services and other payments between domestic and foreign entities (individual or 
business). In the Republic of Croatia, cross-border payments are transacted by banks which 
have approval of Croatian National Bank.  
Basically, there are two categories of transaction payments in cross-border payments 
system: 
- domestically initiated payments for imported goods or abroad services 
(ordering payments) 
- collection payments received from abroad for exported goods or services 
(receiving payments) 
 
Each transaction must be documented in specific type of payment document within bank 
receiving or ordering payment. All payment transactions must be collected and sent to 
Croatian National Bank on monthly basis in strictly defined file format. Banks must follow 
formal and logical instructions which define how each payment transaction should be 
recorded within data file. If Croatian National Bank finds any formal or logical errors in 
data file, it informs bank about it, demands fixing and resending of data. 
The most important attributes in payment transactions are the following: bank code, 
account number, code of payment purpose, type of payment document, date of transaction, 
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currency, amount, country of order/receiving payment, code of payer (if it is payment 
order). 
When receiving payment transactions data file, Croatian National Bank calculates some 
additional attributes (columns). The most important are amount in kunas, amount in US 
dollars and amount in euros. 
One of the attributes in considerable focus of analysts is code of payment purpose. That 
attribute holds information which is necessary for determination of reason of payment i.e. 
why and for what payment was received or ordered. Some of payment purposes are: 
- goods – goods that can be transported and which change the ownership between 
domestic and foreign business entities or individuals. 
- military weapons and other military equipment 
- cargo maritime transport 
- passenger maritime transport 
- cargo air transport 
- passenger air transport 
- railway cargo transport 
- railway passenger transport 
- road cargo transport 
- road passenger transport 
- river cargo transport 
- river passenger transport 
- pipeline transport of oil and gas 
- tourist traveller charges 
- charges for scholarships and education 
- business trips 
- telecommunication services 
- construction works abroad done by domestic companies 
- construction works in Croatia done by foreign companies 
- insurance premiums 
- insurance claims 
- financial services fees 
- consulting services 
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- fees and salaries of employees – abroad and inland 
- stock dividends 
- shares from profit 
- interests earned and paid 
- money transfers – workers transfers 
- pensions, disabled support fees and social expenditures 
- financial transactions – purchasing stocks 
- loans – short term 
- loans – long term 
- money deposits 
- options 
- currency exchange 
- transfers of foreign currency between domestic banks 
 
Combination of code of payment purpose and type of payment document is sufficient for 
realizing if certain payment is received from abroad or ordered to abroad. Considering very 
detailed and excessive information about each payment is reported to Croatian National 
Bank, it is possible to control and audit how cross-border payments are initiated and 
transacted. 
Also, Croatian National Bank regularly uses collected data in order to create and control 
the balance of payments of Republic of Croatia. So, income and expenditures can be very 
effectively monitored with the aim to react if necessary. 
7.3.2 Requirements on Cross-border Payments System Auditing  
Objective is set to perform data audit of cross-border payments i.e. cross-border payment 
messages ordered or received by Croatian commercial banks and central bank. Since these 
data are confidential, no information on any single payment message, any single bank or 
any single payer will be presented. Data that are included into in this examination are from 
period 1st of February to 30th of April 2008 which totalled in 1.745.311 payment messages. 
Doubtlessly, exchange of various goods between Croatia and foreign economies is in 
constant focus of Croatian economists. Lot of economy analytics consider that information 
on this exchange shows status of Croatian economy. Changes in economy are often 
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described and explained by changes in foreign exchange and values exported or imported. 
Not bearing in mind considerable dependency of national and world economies on these 
parameters, it is especially interesting to answer the question if it is possible to note 
whether there are some irregularities or deviations in creation of payment messages i.e. 
payment amounts. Amounts in original currency should be analyzed for certain groups of 
transactions (e.g. received payments for exported goods) as well as for all payment 
transactions. Special treatment should be given to data subsets that are deviated from 
Benford’s Law distributions. 
Checking on possible fraud, omission and error should be performed on entire collected 
data set. Data should be audited by computer assisted information systems auditing 
methodology (CAISAM) developed in chapter 7.2. After data is provisioned and audit set 
is checked on completeness and reasonableness examination should commence by use of 
Benford’s Law. Examination of conformity with Benford's law according to first, second, 
first two and first three digits i.e. examination of frequencies of certain first, second, first 
two and first three digits in payment amounts must be included, as described in CAISAM. 
During the audit, additional care should be given to analysis of payment purposes. 
Whenever some deviation occurs according to Benford’s Law analysis, summarization or 
selection according to certain payments purposes should be performed. The reason why 
payment purpose should be in the audit focus is because of very important information on 
nature and intention of payment that it contains. Afterwards, very useful information may 
be gained from selection and summarization according to certain amounts which show 
excessive appearance according to Benford’s Law distribution within payment purpose in 
focus. For example, if it is observed that first digit “2” is non-conformant to Benford’s 
Law, first action could be summarization with payment purpose as aggregation base 
attribute, and count as aggregation function. That way, auditor may note which payment 
purposes are deviated i.e. which payment purposes mostly take part in the deviation. Also, 
auditor may choose amount (or amount in euro/dollar) as aggregation values attribute on 
which sum or average calculation is performed. After summarization, only the largest data 
subsets of certain payment purposes should be furtherly investigated. The very effective 
yet reasonably simple methods are rounded values and duplication check. Auditor should 
recover the most repeated values in data subset of certain payment purpose. If those 
amounts which are the most often are not rounded, than additional search for rounded 
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values should be done. That way auditor can find out if number invention occurred while 
bearing in mind that number invention is very often consequence of fraud, omission or 
error. Of course, summarization and selections on banks and some other attributes can be 
advisable. 
Since cross-border payment system generates huge volumes of data, appropriate increase 
of data focus is of a crucial importance. Increase of data focus is achieved by choosing 
certain data subsets. It can be done by selection, summarization or even stratification. After 
those methods are applied, search for rounded and duplicated values may follow. Auditor 
should understand data patterns of cross-border payments in order to adequately explain 
clustering of values and deviations from Benford’s Law.  
7.3.3 Cross-border Payments System Auditing 
The principal objective of this chapter is to perform auditing of cross-border payment 
system in accordance with computer assisted information systems auditing methodology 
designed in chapter 7.2. So, auditing process is focused on data created in cross-border 
payments i.e. payment messages. 
Audit process included payment messages in Croatian banking system in period between 
1st of February 2008 and 30th of April 2008. The following are the most interesting data 
that were in focus of audit process: 
- date of transaction 
- amount (in original currency) 
- amount in kunas 
- amount in EUR 
- code of payment purpose 
- bank code 
- type of payment document 
 
Total number of data rows of cross-border payment messages in observed period was 
1.745.311. 
Chi-square (χ2), Z-statistics and Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD) tests are used in order to 
evaluate conformance of payment amounts with Benford's Law. The objective was to show 
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if eventual deviations of frequencies of observed phenomena from Benford's Law 
frequencies are incidental or not i.e. if frequencies follow Benford’s Law. A goal was also 
to compare practical usefulness and note differences between these conformity tests in 
auditing environment. 
According to computer assisted information systems auditing methodology, first step of 
audit process that follows after strictly established audit plan is data provision. Data 
provision process should ensure that data are adequately extracted from production 
database. That means extracted data is relevant and complete. 
For the purpose of audit, records on cross-border payments were extracted with only one 
restriction: date of transaction. Only transaction committed between 1st of February and 
30th of April 2008 were included in the audit process. Data provision statement was based 
on selection method and was very simple: 
SELECT date_of_transaction, amount in original_currency, amount_in_HRK, 
amount_in_EUR, code_of_payment_purpose, bank_code 
FROM cross_border_payments  
WHERE date_of_transaction BETWEEN “01-FEB-08” AND “30-APR-08”; 
Above statement was prepared in Oracle syntax since data on cross-border payments is 
stored in Oracle database management system. However, statement is written in 
accordance to SQL standard, so it can be applied in any contemporary database 
management system with only minor changes. 
Data table containing cross-border payment transactions also has two related data tables 
which provide important three columns for each individual transaction (bank_code, code of 
payment purpose and type of payment document). Without these columns, it would not be 
possible to determine which bank issued the payment, what the type of the payment was 
and what original payment document was used for payment initiation. These columns 
contain only codes of three described attributes, not descriptions. Descriptions are stored in 
separate three tables. This work is not focused on any specific bank, but will audit different 
types of payment messages for the whole banking industry. Also, Croatian National Bank 
which provided cross-border payment messages gave permission for examination of data, 
but without disclosing any information about any specific bank and any individual 
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payment transaction record. So bank codes and related banks were not in a focus of audit 
process.  
Code of payment purpose contains description in form of a fixed list stored in related data 
table. However, since list is static and constrained concerning a number of records it was 
not necessary to perform join of tables with cross-border payment transactions and 
payment purposes. The same is worth for table containing description of types of payment 
documents.  
Even if joins of bank table, payment purposes table and payment documents table with 
cross-border transaction were performed that would only give additional description of 
records. However, in this case, additional description would not assure any crucial 
information for significant improvement of audit activity quality. 
Delimited ASCII text file was required export format. So, no direct access on production 
database was performed by computer assisted auditing tool software. Procedures of 
database logon, execution of select statement, export of selected records to a text file and 
copying of created text file to auditor’s computer environment was performed by IT 
database administrator. Those steps have been under constant supervision of auditor, in 
order to assure complete and relevant audit sample. Prerequisites for efficient supervision 
are knowledge of auditor in specific IT infrastructure configuration (database and 
operating systems) as well as data structure in specific database. 
According to step 2 of CAISAM, audit sample has to be checked on data relevance and 
completeness. As noted in chapter 7.2, methods that can be used for audit sample check are 
stratification, join, summarization and selection. The first test performed on data sample 
was based on stratification method. Data was stratified on transaction date, with 7 days 
periods starting on Fridays and ending on Thursdays. The only exception was the last week 
ending on Wednesday (30th of April 2008) because that was the last day on which 
transactions were extracted. 
stratum no date from (inc) date to(ex) no of records % of records 
1 1.2.2008 8.2.2008 121.419 6,96 
2 8.2.2008 15.2.2008 125.859 7,21 
3 15.2.2008 22.2.2008 128.186 7,34 
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4 22.2.2008 29.2.2008 129.961 7,45 
5 29.2.2008 7.3.2008 134.504 7,71 
6 7.3.2008 14.3.2008 138.123 7,91 
7 14.3.2008 21.3.2008 142.769 8,18 
8 21.3.2008 28.3.2008 84.607 4,85 
9 28.3.2008 4.4.2008 157.837 9,04 
10 4.4.2008 11.4.2008 145.462 8,33 
11 11.4.2008 18.4.2008 150.499 8,62 
12 18.4.2008 25.4.2008 154.793 8,87 
13 25.4.2008 2.5.2008 131.292 7,52 
   1.745.311  
  LLE 0 0 
  ULE 0 0 
Table 13. Stratification according to 7 days strata periods applied on transaction dates  
Column “date from (inc)” contains beginning date of strata. That dates are included when 
calculating membership in each strata. Column “date to (ex)” contains ending date of strata 
for which transactions are not included when calculating strata. Each stratum has one 
weekend, starting and ending on each day of the week, which should have eliminate 
consequences of different weekdays in some strata. It can easily be noticed number of 
transactions (“no of records”) slowly grows with almost every next with exceptions of 8th, 
9th and 13th week. The growth of number of transactions in each consecutive week from 
February to April is normal seasonal behaviour. At the beginning of year (January) the 
number of transactions is usually the smallest and rising until May inclusively. Drop in 
number of transactions in 8th week can be justified by Easter Sunday which fell on 23rd of 
March and Easter Monday which fell on 24th of March. Even on Saturday, 22nd of March, 
number of transactions was lower than on usual Saturday. A significant rise in number of 
transactions in 9th week can also be explained by Easter. After the Easter, lot of 
transactions postponed from week following the Easter were committed in 9th week. Lack 
of records in last week can be justified with a fact that it had only five working days since 
1st of May was not included in the audit sample and is also a national holiday in Republic 
of Croatia. Also, it is shown that according to transaction date there were no upper (ULE) 
or lower (LLE) level exceptions. 
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Furthermore, summarization and join methods were applied in order to check audit sample. 
This time, different column in data table was used in order to check relevance and 
completeness of audit sample. Summarization column was code of payment purpose. The 
objective was to check if all relevant codes of payment purpose were selected into audit 
sample i.e. if some were omitted. Summarization shown there were 93 different payment 
purposes in audit sample. After the completion of summarization, outer join with payment 
purposes table was executed. The common column used as a basis of outer join was code 
of payment purpose. The objective was to check if some payment purposes are not found 
in extracted audit sample but otherwise exist in list of payment purposes table. However, 
all usual payment purposes were found in audit sample. The most representative were 
banking deposits, payments for goods, financial services, buying and selling of currency in 
exchange transactions and traveller payments. Summarization and outer join results were 
in accordance with expectations.  
After these steps, it could have been confirmed that audit sample was relevant and 
complete. 
After audit sample check, the first digit Benford’s Law test was applied on data (step 3 of 
CAISAM). Analysis was based on payment amounts in original currency. The results are 
shown in Table 14. 
D fo fs fs-fo Po χ2 Z 
1 525.392 565.119 39.727 7,56 3.003,94 65,56 
2 307.335 318.481 11.146 3,63 404,26 22,16 
3 218.057 211.775 -6.282 -2,88 181,00 14,39 
4 169.138 151.429 -17.709 -10,47 1.854,24 45,31 
5 138.196 163.018 24.822 17,96 4.458,34 69,59 
6 116.843 102.665 -14.178 -12,13 1.720,43 42,96 
7 101.214 92.205 -9.009 -8,90 801,91 29,17 
8 89.277 73.562 -15.715 -17,60 2.766,30 53,98 
9 79.861 67.057 -12.804 -16,03 2.052,90 46,40 
 Total: 1.745.311  10,80 17.243,32  
Table 14. First digit (d) analysis of amounts in original currency for all payments 
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Explanation of used symbols: 
fo – expected frequency – number of observations expected according to Benford's Law 
fs – actual frequency 
fs-fo – difference between actual and expected frequency 
Po – percentage of deviation of actual from expected frequency 
MAD – Mean Absolute Deviation - average deviation from percentages of deviation (sum 
of absolute values Po divided by number of frequency categories i.e. 9) 
Z – Z-statistics for fs values with respect to fo values  
 
In order to perform Chi-square test, a null hypothesis was set and significance level tested 
on 5%. According to 8 degrees of freedom and testing on significance level of 5%, in order 
to confirm our first hypothesis, value of χ2 should be less than 15,507. Since it is not the 
case, assumption that number set of cross-border payment amounts in original currencies 
conform to Benford's Law according to chi-square test should be reject. It can easily be 
noted that significant (positive) deviations exist for digits 1 and 5 i. e. there is notable 
surplus of payment amounts in original currency with digits 1 and 5. 
For Z-statistics 5% significance level is set which means there is only 5% probability that 
difference between actual and expected frequency values is accidental. Cut off value for 
each Z-statistics value is 1,96. All values that exceed this value should be flagged as they 
deviate according to Z-statistics. In our case it is easily observed that all individual 
frequencies are far exceeding the Z-statistics cut off value. As with chi-square analysis, it 
can be concluded that the largest deviations are for digits 1 and 5. 
MAD consists of three components. Deviation (Po) measures difference between actual 
and expected frequency. In Table 14 it can be noticed that for first digit 1 the actual 
frequency (fo) is 525.392, expected frequency is 565.119. Deviation may be denoted in 
percentage values as it is shown in Table 14. Second component is absolute function which 
is applied to all deviations. Third component is the mean which is total of absolute 
deviations divided by number of frequency categories (9). The largest individual positive 
deviation according to MAD is for digit 5, which is in surplus for almost 18% when 
compared with Benford’s Law expected frequency. Digits 1 (+7,56%) and 2 (3,63%) are 
also in surplus. As a contrast, all other digits are in deficiency. Usually in the auditing 
context digits that are in surplus according to conformance tests deserve additional 
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attention. Auditors should carefully and furtherly investigate what is in a background of 
surpluses. Digits in deficiency usually do not deserve audit focus and too much additional 
work because their shortage is only the reflection of before mentioned surpluses. 
It is clear from first digit analysis that banks are paying and receiving payment in amounts 










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Po
 
Figure 9. Frequency deviation from Benford’s Law for first digit for all payments in 
original currency 
 
However, since data obviously do not follow first digit Benford’s Law (step 3.1), audit 
sample should be furtherly analysed in order to eventually find frauds, errors or omissions. 
It is not correct to immediately state that irregularities exist because of fraudulent 
behaviour or errors. The first digit Benford’s Law test is not focused enough so it is usually 
good only as a starting point of data analysis. For correct conclusion concerning this 
phenomenon additional data from business entities (companies, state organizations and 
agencies) and individuals should be investigated as well as other Benford’s Law tests must 
be applied. According to deviations spotted after the first digit test, it may be assumed 
business entities and individuals pay their invoices and get paid in amounts which are 
significantly more often results of rounding and psychology of payer than exact 
calculations. Since audit sample is too large, consisting of all transactions of all types for 
all banks during three months period it may be stated that although within steps 2 and 2.1 
of CAISAM it was concluded audit sample is relevant and complete, it is not focused 
enough. For purposes of audit, it would be necessary to narrow down audit sample. That 
means, some data in audit sample should be additionally extracted in order to focus on 
  145 
business activity that can be concretely analysed and compared with specific business 
activity. 
Also in the step 4, auditor should focus on data which caused deviation and perform 
additional analysis. Analysis may be based on selection, summarization, rounded values 
and duplication methods. In this case, it means further inspection should be performed on 
payment messages which payment amounts start with digits "1" and "5".  Analysis may be 
provided by summarization method where aggregation base attribute (column) was code of 
payment purpose and summarization function was count of records. This application of 
summarization method resulted in generation of groups according to each unique payment 
purpose. For each group, number of actual transactions was counted. It was realized that 
only two payment types had significant deviations – all other payment types were in 
accordance with Benford's Law.  The following payment types have significant surplus of 
transactions having starting digit "1" in payment amount: 
- banking deposits (code of payment 870) - in total 96.684 records which is more 
than 17% of all records starting with digit "1" 
- buying and selling of currency (currency exchange transactions, code of payment 
912) - in total 32.056 transactions which is 6% of all transactions starting with digit 
"1" 
If these two payment types did not have such significant surpluses, the Benford's Law first 
digit test would not indicate excess of 39.727 records (deviation of 7,56% from expected 
frequency) starting with digit "1" (Table 14). So, these payment types deserve additional 
attention and explanation. 
Banking deposits are payments resulting from acceptance and withdrawal of capital 
denominated in foreign currency. It is known that clustering of numbers is usual with 
individual payments related to deposits. Further investigation shown that considerable 
rounding and duplication appeared in this particular case (Table 15): 









Table 15. Specific rounded and duplicated payments amounts (deposits) 
Data in Table 15 shows that 5.386 payment messages with amount 10.000 in original 
currency resulted in deposit or withdrawal from the bank i.e. related to deposit type of 
payment. Total of 15.729 rounded and duplicated payment amounts were identified in 
rather small set {100, 150, 1.000, 1.500, 10.000, 10.500}. If psychology would not have 
influence on managing deposits, then the frequencies of each of these rounded and 
duplicated values would be much smaller. E.g. according to the Benford's Law first two 
digit test, frequency of first two digits combination starting with "10" is 5,6%. However in 
case of deposit payments there are 2,7% of payments starting with digit "1" that fall into 
set {100, 150, 1.000, 1.500, 10.000, 10.500}. So, only 6 values represent almost 3% of 
payment transactions starting with digit "1". That deviation is result of psychology factors 
that influence creation of deposit payment transactions. It may be stated that deposit 
transactions follow the same logic as some other payments and withdrawals for example 
ATM payments and withdrawals. The only difference is that ATM transactions are much 
smaller in amount. 
So called currency exchange transactions participated in 6% of transactions starting with 
digit "1". Additional check on set {100, 150, 1.000, 1.500, 10.000} was performed and it 
was noticed that there are 22.656 exchange currency transactions which payment amounts 
are member of that five-element set (Table 16). That is 71% of all exchange currency 
transactions starting with digit "1". 







Table 16. Specific rounded and duplicated payments amounts (currency exchange) 
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Rounded and duplicated values of currency exchange transactions considerably 
participated in deviation of digit "1" according to Benford's Law. When duplicated and 
rounded values are compared to surplus of transactions with first digit "1" (totalling 
39.727) it is noticeable that they participated in surplus with more than 57%. If number of 
rounded and duplicated banking deposit (15.729) and currency exchange transactions 
(22.652) is summed it is obvious these two types of payments, which are under strong 
psychological influence of bank customers, almost equalled total surplus of transactions 
with first digit "1" (38.385 vs. 39.727). It may be concluded that psychological influence 
caused deviation of first digit Benford's Law distribution for transactions starting with digit 
"1" and that in this audit phase there is no evidence of any fraud, error or omission. 
The similar analysis was performed for transactions with first digit "5" which was also in 
significant surplus in comparison to Benford's Law distribution. First step of analysis was 
based on summarization method where aggregation base attribute (column) was code of 
payment purpose and summarization function was count of records where only records 
starting with digit "5" were included. Summarization method resulted in grouping 
according to each unique payment purpose. For each group, number of actual transactions 
was counted. It was found that significant surplus of transactions having starting digit "5" 
in payment amount are following payment types: 
- banking deposits (code of payment 870) - in total 26.018 records which is 16% of 
all records starting with digit "5" 
- buying and selling of currency (currency exchange transactions, code of payment 
912) - in total 17.018 transactions which is 10% of all transactions starting with 
digit "5" 
It may be assumed if these two payment types did not have such significant surpluses, the 
Benford's Law first digit test would not indicate excess of 24.822 records (deviation of 
17,96% from expected frequency) starting with digit "5" (Table 14). So, these payment 
types deserve additional attention and explanation. 
As it is already explained previously, number clustering is usual with individual payments 
related to deposits. Further investigation shown that considerable rounding and duplication 
appeared in this particular case (Table 17): 
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Table 17. Specific rounded and duplicated payments amounts (deposits) 
Data in Table 17 shows that 5.551 payment messages with amount 500 in original currency 
resulted in deposit or withdrawal from the bank i.e. related to deposit type of payment. 
Total of 10.417 rounded and duplicated payment amounts were identified in rather small 
set {50, 500, 550, 5.000, 50.000} which is 6,4% of payment transactions starting with digit 
"5". As with deposit payments starting with digit "1", significant clustering is result of 
psychology factors that influence creation of deposit payment transactions. 
Currency exchange transactions participated in 10% of transactions starting with digit "5". 
Additional check on set {50, 500, 550, 5.000, 50.000} was performed and it was shown 
there were 15.937 exchange currency transactions which payment amounts are member of 
that chosen set (Table 18). That is 94% of all exchange currency transactions starting with 
digit "5". 






total:  15.937 
Table 18. Specific rounded and duplicated payments amounts (currency exchange) 
Rounded and duplicated values of currency exchange transactions significantly 
participated in deviation of digit "5" according to first digit Benford's Law. When 
duplicated and rounded values of currency exchange transactions are compared to surplus 
of transactions having first digit "5" (totalling 24.822) it is noticeable that currency 
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exchange transactions participated in surplus with more than 64%. If number of rounded 
and duplicated banking deposit (10.417) and currency exchange transactions (15.937) is 
summed it is obvious these two types of payments, which are under strong psychological 
influence of bank customers, almost equalled total surplus of transactions with first digit 
"5" (26.354 vs. 24.822). It may be concluded that psychological influence caused deviation 
of first digit Benford's Law distribution for transactions starting with digit "5" and that in 
this audit phase there is no evidence of any fraud, error or omission. 
Since after applying steps 4 and 4.1 of CAISAM it could not be concluded that frauds, 
omissions or errors in business process exist (step 5 of CAISAM), it should be again tested 
if audit sample is relevant and complete (steps 4.2 and 4.3). This step is important, 
although it was already performed (steps 2 and 2.1) because already after the Benford's 
Law first digit test (step 3 and 3.1) and additional analysis of data because deviation 
existed (steps 4. and 4.1) auditor surely gained supplementary knowledge on data an 
business which can be used in re-checking of completeness and relevance of audit sample. 
Also, as it is noted in chapter 7.2, audit sample could be narrowed down to relate it with 
concrete business process and/or entity.  
Summarization was performed according to month-year period of transaction date and 
bank that issued or received payment transaction. So, aggregation base attributes were 
month-year and bank code while summarization function was count of records: 
month/year no of banks no of transactions 
2-2008 35 525.662 
3-2008 35 523.846 
4-2008 35 695.803 
 total: 1.745.311 
Table 19. Summarization based on month-year period and bank code 
Further analysis checked if each bank reported all codes of payment purpose (payment 
types). Analysis results were correct and according to expectations, so it was finally 
concluded audit sample is complete and relevant. According to CAISAM, after this second 
check of audit sample, there is no need for further check on its completeness and 
relevance. 
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The next step in CAISAM is the second digit Benford’s Law test (step 6). It shown that 
digit 0 on second position in amounts appears significantly more often than it should 
according to Benford’s Law - for more than 150% (Table 20).  
d fo fs fs-fo Po χ2 Z 
0 208.878 532.141 323.263 154,76 500.288 753,85 
1 198.774 137.669 -61.105 -30,74 18.784 145,60 
2 189.928 144.835 -45.093 -23,74 10.706 109,60 
3 182.088 131.357 -50.731 -27,86 14.134 111,16 
4 175.069 130.741 -44.328 -25,32 11.224 111,19 
5 168.732 207.378 38.646 22,90 8.851 83,88 
6 162.968 114.398 -48.570 -29,80 14.476 149,48 
7 157.693 111.087 -46.606 -29,55 13.774 159,71 
8 152.837 113.449 -39.388 -25,77 10.151 153,60 
9 148.347 122.256 -26.091 -17,59 4.589 131,21 
 Total: 1745311  43,12 606.977  
Table 20. Second digit (d) analysis of amounts in original currency payments 
Digit 5 also appears significantly more on second position. It is noted that positive 
deviation is larger than 22%. This finding shows amounts are more often rounded on 0s 
and 5s than expected according to Benford’s Law. It may be observed that business entities 
and individuals pay amounts (or get paid), deposit or withdraw and transfer or exchange 
money in rounded numbers more often than it could be expected according to Benford’s 
Law. This is of course possible and again not immediate proof of errors, misstatements or 
frauds. It is also visible that all remaining second digits (1-4 and 6-9) have significant 
relative deficiency which is in fact result of excess in digits 0 and 5 on second position in 
numbers. 
 
Since second digit "0" had the largest deviation it deserved more audit attention. 
Summarization method was executed including only payment transactions with digit "0" 
on second position in original payment amount. Code of payment purpose was aggregation 
base attribute and count of records as a summarization function. Summarization resulted in 
91 different payment purposes. However, the following payment purposes had the most 
issued payments: 
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870 banking deposits 84.771 15,93 
912 currency exchange 63.492 11,93 
340 financial service fees 45.312 8,52 
110 payments for goods 43.586 8,19 
Table 21. The most frequent payment purposes (“code of pp”) with digit "0" on 2nd 
position in payment amount 
During analysis in steps 4. and 4.1 it was shown that amounts related to banking deposits 
and currency exchanges are often reflection of psychology. It was concluded that 
deviations of the Benford’s Law first digit test performed on whole audit sample resulted 
from deviation in amounts in transactions of these two payment purposes. Additionally, 
since in tables 15, 16, 17 and 18 it was observed that both “0” and “5” repeated in 
extremely high frequencies in amounts starting with digit “1” it may be concluded that 
banking deposits and currency exchange amounts drastically influence high frequencies of 
second digits “0” and “5”. 
Consequently, further analysis must be performed for financial service fees (code of 
payment purpose 340) and payments for goods (code of payments for goods 110). Table 22 
is a result of summarization according to payment amounts which are member of a set {10; 
20;30;40;50;60;70;80;90;100;200;300;400;500}. That set is used as aggregation base 
attribute, while count was used as summarization function. 
 

















Table 22. Summarization of payments with purpose code 340 and specific amount set 
According to explanation of properties for conformance of number set to Benford’s Law 
(chapter 6.3), number series should not have defined minimal and maximal values. Also, 
observed number set should not have cut-off values causing discontinuation. As it is 
known from the experience, banking policies are very often set with minimum and 
maximum fee, while fees in between these ending values are set with certain cut-off 
values. From example shown in Table 22 it is clearly noticeable that fees have a number of 
repeating values which probably result from banking policies concerning fees and their 
breaking values. So, fee amounted to 10 in original currency is represented in 60% 
(appears in 26.974 cases) cases of financial service fees. Also, 40.297 fee amounts are in 
fact result of rounding and duplication. So, it may be said that financial fees will not follow 
Benford’s Law because underlying fee amounts usually have minimum, maximum and cut-
off values. Furtherly, a number subset which does not follow Benford’s Law may cause 
discrepancy for whole observed number set. Since fee values from rounded and duplicated 
set shown in Table 22 participate with 12,5% in whole surplus of amounts with second 
digit “0” (323.263) it may be stated that fee amount subset significantly implicate deviation 
of second digit Benford’s Law distribution. 
 
Further analysis of payments for goods should also be performed (code of payment 
purpose 110). Table 23 is a result of summarization according to payment amounts which 
are member of a set {[10..100]mod10=0, 500,1.000,2.000,3.000,4.000, 5.000,6.000, 
7.000,8.000,9.000,10.000,20.000,30.000,40.000,50.000}. That set is used as aggregation 
base attribute, while count was used as summarization function. 
 
 
amount no of records 
[10..100]mod10=0 764 

















Table 23. Summarization of payments with purpose code 110 and specific amount set 
Total of 14.867 payment for goods transactions are in fact result of rounding and 
duplication which is 34% of this type of transactions with second digit “0”. Also, 
transactions shown in Table 23 participate with 5% in surplus of all payment transactions 
with second digit “0” (323.263). The question that must be answered is why payments for 
goods are deviated in such manner and why there are so many rounded and duplicated 
values. Firstly, it should be noted payment for goods are usually transacted in a few 
annuities. Respectably often, annuities are not result of calculation but rounding. So payee 
may agree with payer certain dynamic and rounded amount payments. Those roundings 
may be a cause of deviations. Probably it is true that roundings based on agreements 
between beneficiary and buyer caused deviation in above explained case. More on this 
issue can be found on page 146 when deviations in the first two digits test are analyzed.  
Second digit "5" also had the positive deviation so it earns additional analysis. Execution 
of summarization method including only payment transactions with digit "5" on second 
position in original payment amounts resulted in Table 24. Code of payment purpose was 
aggregation base attribute and count of records was a summarization function. 
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Summarization resulted in 91 different payment purposes. However, the following 
payment purposes had the most issued payments: 
code of pp description no of records 
% of 
transactions 
870 banking deposits 34.846 16,80 
110 currency exchange 25.205 12,15 
340 financial service fees 20.216 9,75 
912 payments for goods 9.025 4,35 
Table 24. The most frequent payments purposes (“code of pp”) with digit "5" on 2nd 
position in payment amount 
As it can be observed, 43% of all payments having second digit “5” is belonging to 
banking deposits, currency exchange, financial service fees and payment for goods. It was 
already explained that all of these types of payments may be:  
- negotiated and agreed between parties while agreement does not have to correspond 
to any calculation but to number invention which is under strong influence of 
psychology (payments for goods) 
- result of psychology and number simplification of bank’s customer (banking 
deposits and currency exchange) 
- result of minimum, maximum and cut-off values which break sequence continuity 
of number set (financial service fees) 
 
Consequently, all of these payment types are subject to rounding and duplication. Such 
rounding and duplication reflects in significant surplus of certain second digits as it is 
visible for second digit “5” in payment messages. In addition, analysis shown that more 
than 92% of second digit “5” surplus (38.646) was inflicted by following rounded values: 
- values divisible by 5 but not with 10 between 10 to 100; and divisible by 50 but not 
with 100 from 100 to 500 - for financial services fees;  
- values from set {150,550,1.500,15.000,25.000} for banking deposits, currency 
exchange and payments for goods.  
Outcome of the summarization based on above mentioned parameters is displayed in Table 
25. 
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Table 25. Rounded values of selected codes of payments with second digit “5” 
As it is shown in Table 25 there are 33.306 rounded values for selected codes of payments. 
That is 86% of surplus amount for all payments with second digit “5”. If these rounded and 
duplicated amounts would be distributed over all second digits, surplus would be 
considerably smaller and possibly even insignificant. 
 
Finally, it is shown that second digits positive deviations are not result of an error, mistake 
or fraud, but are result of a normal business conduct. These deviations are simply outcome 
of psychological influence when bank customers deal with certain types of payments (bank 
deposits, currency exchange transactions), agreements or payment contracts between payer 
and payee (payment for goods transactions) and result of business rules (financial service 
fees transactions). 
 
According to CAISAM, the first two digits Benford’s Law test is the next method that 
must be applied on data (step 9). It was executed on all payments from audit sample. The 
first two digits test shown significant positive deviation of all first two digits divisible by 
10. Deviation ranged from 53% for digits “90” to almost 430% for digits “50”. In Figure 
10 percentages of deviation of actual from expected frequency are shown for two digit 
combinations (10 - 99). Significant deviations can be easily spotted. Also, it is obvious that 
there are positive deviations for some digits divisible by 5 and not by 10 (15, 25, 35, 65, 
75). 
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Figure 10. Frequency deviation from Benford’s Law for first two digits for all payments in 
original currency 
 
In absolute value, there were 179.205 amounts in original currencies beginning with digits 
“10” which is 148% more than frequency according to Benford’s Law. Also, this is more 
than 10% of all amounts i.e. observed transactions. According to first two digits Benford’s 
Law, only 72.243 transaction amounts should begin with digits “10” which is probability 
of 4,14%. 
Deviations of numbers starting with digits “50” are the largest. In absolute value, there 
were 79.325 amounts in original currencies beginning with digits “50” which is almost 
430% more than frequency according to Benford’s Law. However, this is only 4,5% of all 
amounts i.e. observed transactions. According to Benford’s Law, only 15.010 transaction 
amounts should begin with digits “50” which is probability of 0,86%.  
This characteristic was examined in more details by searching for rounded numbers 
starting with “10”. It was shown that there are 127.593 amounts in original currency which 
are members of set {10, 100, 1.000, 10.000, 100.000, 1.000.000, 10.000.000} which is 
more than 7% off all transactions. That shows that too many transactions had amounts 
from above defined set. 
Also, concerning rounded numbers starting with “50” search shown that there are 70.066 
amounts in original currency which are members of set {50, 500, 5.000, 50.000, 500.000, 
5.000.000, 50.000.000} which is 4% of all transactions. That also shows that too many 
transactions had amounts from above defined set. 
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Further, different type of payments participating in surplus were searched for and 
discovered that important percentage of rounded transactions and transactions starting with 
digits “10” or “50” are again banking deposits, currency exchange, financial services fees 
and payments for goods. The same payment purposes participated in significant surpluses 
when first and second digit Benford’s Law were applied (steps 3 and 6). For example 
number set of amounts in currency exchange has 30.448 more amounts beginning with 
“10” than it should be expected according to Benford’s Law which is 353% difference. 
Also, there are 25.142 more occurrences of amounts of same type starting with digits “50” 
which is 14 times more than Benford's Law distribution for those digits (1.792). These 
deviations can be explained by psychology or custom in exchanging (buying or selling) 
rounded amounts or amounts starting with digits “10” or even more with digits “50”. As it 
is already stated, these deviations can be explained by custom in number creation and 
influence of psychology when inventing numbers. For example, it is more usual to 
exchange (sell or buy) 100 EUR for kunas then to exchange 98 EUR or 112 EUR.  
However, it was noticed that also currency transfers to Croatia and to abroad constituted 
surpluses for digits “10” and “50”. Transfers of money from abroad to Croatia and from 
Croatia to abroad related with worker’s payments to their families, transfers connected 
with migration abroad or to Croatia, payments for memberships in organizations and 
associations and transfers of government funds from abroad that begin with digits “10” 
appeared in 92% more values than it should be expected by Benford’s Law distribution. 
However, majority of these transactions are money transfers initiated by workers 
temporarily or permanently working abroad who support their families living in Croatia 
through money transfers. 
This deviation can be again explained by custom in number creation and psychological 
factors. Croatian workers temporarily or permanently working abroad will more often than 
it is expected by Benford’s Law (and uniform) distribution send money amounts in 
rounded numbers or numbers beginning with digits 10 or 50 (e.g. 500 or 1.000 EUR) to 
their families residing in Croatia.  
All other payment types showed no discrepancy from Benford's Law first two digits test. 
In previous tests, quite reasonable explanation of positive deviation surpluses of certain 
digit combinations was given for banking deposits, currency exchange, financial service 
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fees and money transfers. Deviations of amounts of these payment types were explained by 
psychology factors, customs in number creation, minimum/maximum values allowed and 
cut-off values causing discontinuance. Payments of goods were also identified as cause of 
positive significant deviation. It was commented that was outcome of the way payment 
amounts were created: often payment annuities amounts are agreed upon and again 
influenced by psychology and customs in number creation. However, this type of payment 
deserves some additional analysis. 
It is skipped back to step 3 so the first digit Benford’s Law test of payment amounts in 
original currency is performed. The results are shown in Table 26. 
d fo fs fs-fo Po χ2 Z 
1 74.123 74.540 417 0,56 2,34 1,83 
2 43.359 43.656 297 0,68 2,03 1,57 
3 30.764 30.558 -206 -0,67 1,38 1,26 
4 23.862 23.797 -65 -0,27 0,18 0,45 
5 19.497 21.429 1.932 9,91 191,45 14,42 
6 16.484 15.428 -1.056 -6,41 67,70 8,52 
7 14.279 13.464 -815 -5,71 46,57 7,03 
8 12.595 12.067 -528 -4,20 22,17 4,83 
9 11.267 11.293 26 0,23 0,06 0,25 
 Total: 246.232  3,18 333,89  
Table 26. First digit (d) analysis of amounts in original currency payments for goods 
Deviations for first digits 1,2,3,4 and 9 are not significant. This is obvious even for very 
sensitive chi-square and Z-statistics tests. Z statistics test falls within cut off value (1,96). 
Also, chi-square values for mentioned digits are not the cause for excessing cut off value 
(15,507). There is significant surplus of amounts starting with digit 5 (almost 10%) and 
deficit of amounts starting with digits 6, 7 and 8. Deficits can be explained by surplus for 
digit 5, i. e. digit 5 surplus caused deficits in some other digits. Since value for χ2 (333,89) 
is still above cut off value (15,507), it must be concluded that this number subset does not 
follow Benford’s Law. However, it can easily be noticed that deviations are significantly 
lesser than with previously mentioned types of messages. Since only significant surpluses 
should be furtherly investigated, auditor should focus only on first digit 5. This deviation 
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again can be explained by customs in number creation as well with contract terms which is 
explained in more detailed manner further in the text.   
The first two digits Benford’s Law test on payments for goods transactions shown 
significant deviation of all first two digits divisible by 10. Deviation ranges from 26% for 
digits 90 to 135% for digits 50. In Figure 11 percentages of deviation of actual from 
expected frequency are shown for two digit combinations (10 - 99). Significant deviations 
can be easily spotted. Also, it is obvious that there are positive deviations for some digits 
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Figure 11. Frequency deviation from Benford’s Law for first two digits of original 
currency payments for goods 
Additional investigation of payments from abroad for goods exported from Croatia to 
abroad was performed. 
D Fo fs fs-fo Po χ2 Z 
1 19.540 19.514 -26 -0,13 0,03 0,22 
2 11.430 11.429 -1 -0,01 0,00 0,01 
3 8.110 7.951 -159 -1,96 3,10 1,88 
4 6.290 6.413 123 1,95 2,39 1,63 
5 5.140 5.316 176 3,43 6,06 2,57 
6 4.345 4.288 -57 -1,32 0,76 0,91 
7 3.764 3.763 -1 -0,03 0,00 0,02 
8 3.320 3.234 -86 -2,60 2,24 1,53 
9 2.970 3.001 31 1,04 0,32 0,58 
 Total: 64.909  1,39 14,91  
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Table 27. First digit (d) analysis of amounts in original currency payments from abroad for 
exported goods 
According to Z-statistics test, only significant deviation appeared for digit 5. The same can 
be concluded for MAD test. Chi-square test shown that observed subset of payments for 
goods follows Benford’s Law distribution. 
 
Figure 12. Actual (PRs) and Benford’s Law proportions (PRo) of original currency 
payments from abroad for goods 
 
Figure 12 serves as useful visualization of actual and expected (Benford’s Law) 
proportions of payments from abroad for goods in original currency. It is visible that 
deviation is considerable only for digit “5”. However, all conformance criteria (MAD, Chi-
square, Z-statistics) are within acceptable limits so it may be stated that amounts of 
payments from abroad for goods conform to Benford’s Law first digit distribution. 
Usually, when focus is given to specific subset of data, in this case payments from abroad 
for goods exported from Croatia, deviations from Benford's Law distribution are 
significantly smaller. Following table shows differences in deviations for entire set of 
payments for goods and subset related to payments from abroad for goods exported from 
Croatia. 
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transactions MAD Chi-square Z-statistics (no of 
exceeding digits) 
payment for goods – 
entire set 
3,18 333,89 4 
payment for goods – 
from abroad 
1,39 14,81 1 
Table 28. Comparison of deviations between payments for goods 
Generally speaking for all previously performed investigations of payments for goods, total 
amounts on invoices that equal to value of corresponding contracts for goods may not be 
deviated in the same manner, i.e. only single payment amounts may be deviated according 
to contract terms. Business entities may agree to pay amounts in more than one rate, i.e. 
according to contracted terms and/or subsequent arrangements and to apply payment 
method which will more often than expected according to Benford’s Law produce rounded 
numbers or numbers starting with multiplies of 5 (and 10) for payments. For example, 
although contracted value was 42.342 EUR, business entities (buyer and seller) might have 
agreed on five payment annuities. First annuity could be 10.000 EUR, as well as annuities 
resulting in second through fourth payment. Last, fifth payment could have covered the 
rest of contracted value (2.342 EUR). That way clustering of rounded values is easily 
explained. However, to audit and proof this assumption, certain number of business entities 
should be chosen and their contracts and defined payment methods checked. Identification 
of business entities is performed in each payment transaction for goods, so this is not 
impossible task for state authorities. However, this is beyond the scope of this paper and 
also beyond the capabilities of author. 
For purpose of audit it is possible to identify individual payer or payee and then perform 
Benford’s Law tests on its received or ordered payments. If tests against Benford’s Law 
significantly deviate, auditor may perform some additional tests only for certain digits 
which deviate from Benford’s Law frequencies in order to check against fraudulent or 
erroneous activity. These tests could, for example, include:  
- rounded amounts, amounts starting with multiplies of 10 or 100 
- counting frequency for each amount – searching for multiple occurrences (number 
duplication) of the same amounts (especially in short period of time) 
- rounded and duplicated amounts on very same day 
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- rounded and duplicated amounts for the same type of payments in specific period of 
time 
- rounded and duplicated amounts in specific or different banks 
- amounts slightly below certain threshold – this can be done to check if payer or 
payee wanted to evade entering certain tax limits or additional checks by authorities 
(for example, if person transfers amount above 100.000 kunas) 
- amounts slightly greater than certain threshold – sometimes business entities with 
performance (money spent, invested, bought etc.) above certain limits may get 
special status in their relationships with state authorities, banks or other business 
entities 
- multiple  payments of same type paid same day (or in short time interval) with sum 
above or below certain threshold 
 
Also, it is advisable to choose among certain business entities which have the largest 
number of rounded and duplicated values or values slightly lesser or greater than certain 
threshold and perform detailed audit. 
These tests can be quite easily performed by use of computer assisted auditing tools 
(CAAT). CAATs have a number of predefined auditing methods to ease data examination 
and conclusions brought by auditor. 
According to CAISAM, one more Benford’s Law test must be executed. It is the first three 
digits test (step 12). This test takes into consideration 900 first three digit combinations. 
After this test was performed on payment transaction amounts, it was noted that all three 
digit combinations divisible by 50 had significant positive deviations. Table 29 contains all 
first three digits combination that had positive deviations. 
D fo fs fs-fo Po χ2 Z 
100 7.542 132.786 125.244 1.660,59 2.079.781,22 1.445,27 
150 5.036 37.595 32.559 646,46 210.478,55 459,44 
200 3.780 74.374 70.594 1.867,33 1.318.212,04 1.149,38 
250 3.026 24.854 21.828 721,38 157.464,55 397,16 
300 2.522 49.283 46.761 1.853,81 866.854,47 931,72 
350 2.163 17.097 14.934 690,59 103.135,25 321,35 
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400 1.893 29.391 27.498 1.452,95 399.538,49 632,43 
450 1.683 8.582 6.899 410,07 28.292,33 168,28 
500 1.514 71.158 69.644 4.598,60 3.202.630,70 1.790,37 
550 1.377 6.275 4.898 355,74 17.424,40 132,05 
600 1.262 19.171 17.909 1.418,80 254.088,59 504,26 
650 1.165 5.166 4.001 343,35 13.736,48 117,24 
700 1.082 15.848 14.766 1.364,61 201.498,05 449,03 
750 1.010 8.344 7.334 726,16 53.257,02 230,84 
800 947 15.114 14.167 1.496,19 211.966,97 460,52 
850 891 3.949 3.058 343,10 10.491,26 102,45 
900 842 9.214 8.372 994,65 83.274,81 288,64 
950 797 3.549 2.752 345,04 9.494,05 97,46 
Table 29. Selected results of the first three digits Benford’s Law test 
Also, much larger surpluses could have been noticed on first three digits divisible by 100. 
That is in conformance with the first two digits test which also shown larger surpluses of 
all first two digits divisible by 10 than of first two digits divisible by 5 and not by 10. Of 
course, since the first three digits test is more focused (has 10 times more digit 
combinations than the first two digits test) it can express more details on audit sample.  
Further examination i.e. summarization of transactions with amounts starting with first 
three digits contained in table 29 according to aggregation base attribute code of payment 
purpose and count aggregation function shown that banking deposits, currency exchange, 
financial service fees and payments for goods transaction were cause of these significant 
discrepancies from Benford’s Law distributions.  
Earlier in the text it was explained that these four payment types caused deviations since 
their amounts are:  
- under strong influence of psychological factors in number creation (banking 
deposits and currency exchange amounts), 
- outcome of difference between contracted values and rounded and duplicated 
annuity amounts (payment for goods), 
- influenced by minimum, maximum and cut-off values (financial service fees). 
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So, it may be stressed that on the basis of the first three digits Benford’s Law test no fraud, 
error or omission was found in the audit sample (step 14). 
At final of CAISAM, it must be concluded on audit process (step 15). As it was stated 
during previous methodology steps, there were no significant findings that could prove 
existence of fraud, omission or errors in business conduct. However, it was noticed that 
some deviations from Benford’s Law exist in payment messages data. Those deviations 
which were outcome of number rounding and duplications were explained by psychology 
of payer in creation of payment amounts, agreed dynamic of payments and customs in 
number invention as well as with fact that some number sets are simply not in accordance 
with Benford’s Law.  
It is worth to write a few observations on practical usefulness of conformity tests we used 
(chi-square, Z-statistics and MAD) in auditing environment. 
A problem with chi-square test in auditing environment, which is of course different than 
statistic environment, is its excess power problem. When the data set becomes significantly 
large, chi-square test will almost always be higher than the cut of values which could force 
auditor to make a non conformity conclusion about observed frequencies. The problem 
usually occurs for data sets larger than 10.000 observations which mean that small, even 
immaterial differences will result in conclusion that data set does not follow Benford’s 
Law [17 , page 78].  
In our investigation, when any individual value for Z-statistics exceeds 1,96 it may be 
concluded the difference is significant at 5% probability. To be more precise, there is only 
5% probability that the difference is caused accidentally. However, this is still quite a big 
probability and such differences, caused by chance, are quite often in auditing. Z-statistics 
values are calculated for each digit separately. If we have 9 digits in focus (e.g. in the first 
digit test), each digit has 5% probability of having accidental Z-statistic greater than 1,96. 
Then, the chance that at least one of the nine digits will have Z-statistics out of limit is 
37%. To furtherly emphasise importance of this, we may conclude that for audit purposes 
it is not enough to use only Z-statistics test in order to confirm whether data are Benford’s 
Law compliant. 
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Chi-square and Z-statistics tests are too sensible in statistical sense for practical value in 
making audit conclusions. This is especially true when Chi-square tests are applied on 
large volumes data because tests are then even more sensible.  
However, these tests can be used for narrowing down which digit(s), whose frequency 
deviations are out of cut off value in case of Z-statistics or cause sum of chi-square 
calculations moves out of boundaries, should auditor investigate by other auditing and data 
analysis methods. For example, if the threshold for payment transactions monitored by tax 
authorities is 50.000 kunas, then a surplus of two digit combinations of 49 for such 
transactions in certain bank will be very significant. It may suggest that persons and 
business entities having account with specific bank are splitting amounts in order to avoid 
threshold. 
Also, if data simply does not conform to Benford’s Law then many digits will have Z-
statistics greater than 1,96. Also, many digits will cause sum of chi-square value is above 
limit (15,507 for 8 degrees of freedom with 5% significance). This kind of noncompliant 
data means that:  
1. the data is fraudulent, or 
2. the data sample is incorrectly extracted i.e. it is not representative, or 
3. on the contrary to our assumption, the Benford’s Law is simply not applicable 
to audited data 
 
It is very important to bear in mind that usually only positive deviations have importance 
for auditors. So, all chi-square and Z-statistics values with negative deviations should not 
be in audit focus. 
MAD is the average deviation between the Benford’s Law frequencies and actual 
frequencies. The higher the MAD, the larger is average difference between actual and 
Benford’s Law frequencies. One of very important advantages of MAD in comparison 
with chi-square is its independence of the size of data set. Also, auditors claim it is the 
easiest to understand and therefore most often used. Although there are still no strict and 
widely accepted cut off values for MAD, in [17, pages 118-122] some rules are set for 
creation of MAD limits. We conclude that MAD in combination with individual average 
deviations is appropriate goodness of fit technique which can easily be used for detection if 
data set conforms to Benford’s Law. Also, individual average deviations (Po) can be used 
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as guidelines in data auditing. Each significant positive average deviation should be 
investigated in more details in order to conclude if deviations are outcome of errors, frauds, 
negligence or chance. 
7.4 Evaluation of Developed Methodology 
Business processes are supported and enabled by information systems. As a consequence 
of constant change and development of business processes information systems that 
support them tend to become very complicated and use enormous volumes of data. It 
brings the conclusion that often it is not possible to audit information system without 
computer assisted auditing. Although various methods for computer assisted auditing of 
information systems exist that are even supported by computer assisted auditing tools, 
there is need for development of unified methodology.  
In chapter 7.2 such methodology (computer assisted information systems auditing 
methodology - CAISAM) was designed and based on Benford’s Law tests. Four Benford’s 
Law tests were chosen as a basis of methodology: the first, the second, the first two and the 
first three digits tests. From the very first step it is strongly focused on completeness and 
relevance of audit sample. In the practice, lot of audits were inadequate because of 
incomplete or non-relevant data. Surely, in order to choose adequate audit sample, auditor 
must have solid knowledge on business processes and data. Especially important is 
knowledge and capability of auditor to match data structures (tables and columns, 
relationships between tables) to business events and processes.  
Methodology includes very efficient methods for checks of entire data set (the first and the 
second Benford’s Law tests, stratification and summarization) on reasonableness, 
completeness and adequacy. Also, more focused Benford’s Law tests (the first two and the 
first three digits) are provided and ways of their usage are explained very extensively. 
Methodology is strongly directed toward interpretation of Benford’s Law tests results. 
According to results of tests, it gives guidance on further data analysis with other 
supporting methods: summarization, join, stratification, selection, rounded values and 
duplication checks.  
Inputs, outputs and assessed strength of specific methods in all steps of developed 
methodology are presented in Table 30. 
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Step of CAISAM Method Inputs (I) and Outputs (O) Strength  
1. Data provision selection Rows of relational table (I) 
Rows of relational table satisfying 
WHERE clause criteria (O) 
V 
 join Rows of two relational tables usually 
with at least one common attribute (I) 
Rows of newly formed temporary 
relational table satisfying join type 
and criteria (O) 
P 
2. AS check selection The same as in step 1. V 
 summarization Rows and attributes of relational 
table, aggregation functions (I) 
Rows grouped on unique attribute 
values, aggregated on selected 
attributes with certain aggregation 
function (O) 
V 
 stratification Rows and attribute of relational table, 
strata limits, mathematical functions 
(I) 
Data layers with counted and 
summarized rows together with 
calculated percentages for chosen 
attribute (O) 
V 
 join The same as in step 1. P 
3. BL on AS FDT Attribute of relational table containing 
number values (I) 
9 subsets for digits 1-9 with actual 
frequencies and corresponding 
deviations (O) 
P 
4. AS check FOE selection The same as in step 1. V 
 summarization The same as in step 2. V 
 duplication Rows and attribute of relational table 
(I) 
Rows grouped and sorted descending 
by  frequency and descending by 
numeric value of chosen attribute (O) 
P 
 rounded Rows and attribute of relational table P 
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values (I) 
Rows grouped and sorted descending 
by  frequency and descending by 
numeric value of chosen attribute (O)  
5. Conclude on 
FOE 
selection The same as in step 1. V 
 summarization The same as in step 2. V 
 rounded 
values 
The same as in step 4. P 
 duplication The same as in step 4. P 
6. BL on AS SDT Attribute of relational table containing 
number values (I) 
10 subsets for digits 0-9 with actual 
frequencies and corresponding 
deviations (O) 
P 
 FTDT Attribute of relational table containing 
number values (I) 
90 subsets for digits 10-99 with actual 
frequencies and corresponding 
deviations (O) 
V 
 FThreeDT Attribute of relational table containing 
number values (I) 
900 subsets for digits 100-999 with 
actual frequencies and corresponding 
deviations (O) 
V 
Table 30. Methods used in CAISAM 
Abbreviation “FDT” stands for “First Digit Test”, “SDT” for “Second Digit Test”, FTDT 
denotes “First Two Digits Test”, while “FThreeDT” means “First Three Digits Test”. “BL 
on AS” means “Benford’s Law on audit sample”, i.e. specific Benford’s Law test applied 
on selected audit sample of data. 
The column “Step of CAISAM” contains the short name of CAISAM step as described in 
chapter 7.2 within the model of methodology. The column “Method” contains each method 
that should be applied in each CAISAM step. “Inputs (I) and Outputs (O)” column 
includes inputs and outputs of each CAISAM method. The column “Strength” contains 
usability level of each method within certain step. In this notation, “P” stands for 
“powerful” meaning method is useful in certain CAISAM step and helps in improvement 
of the audit process. On the other hand, “V” stands for “very powerful” which means 
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method is very useful in specific step of CAISAM and significantly improves the audit 
process. Of course, usability of the same individual method may vary in different steps of 
CAISAM. 
 
CAISAM leads auditor from less to more data focused steps which is very reasonable 
approach. That way, auditor gradually improves its knowledge of data and business rules 
that influence data creation. Conformance criteria for evaluation of conformity of data sets 
with Benford’s Law distributions ensures the enhancement of auditor’s focus on data 
subsets thus significantly improving further data examination process. It is shown how 
relatively simple methods like rounded values, duplication checks and summarization may 
be very effective in data analysis when combined within methodology. 
Methods, steps, input and results of each method together with possible conclusions in 
practical situations are established. With such methodology, whole auditing process can be 
improved, become consistent, standard, comparable and executed faster with fewer 
resources. 
Complex and data extensive audit was successfully completed by use of CAISAM in 
chapter 7.3.3. Methods prescribed by methodology were applied on real-world data and 
certain deviations were detected. These deviations were successfully analyzed by 
CAISAM and explained in details. Thus, methodology was proven efficient and useful in 
practical audit of information systems i.e. large data sets. 
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8. Improvement of Computer Assisted Auditing Tools 
Functionality and Auditing Quality 
As companies and institutions use information systems to store and process constantly 
increasing amounts of data, the necessity grows for definition and use of auditing 
procedures in producing adequate risk assessment concerning data management. Computer 
assisted audit tools (CAATs) are becoming increasingly important tool in evaluation of the 
control mechanisms in more efficient course. Application of CAATs improves audit scope, 
completeness and consistency of data analysis. This all together leads to more effective 
operational i.e. information systems risk mitigation.  
CAATs can be a source of a large proportion of the audit evidence developed on 
information systems and business activity audits, so the auditor must carefully plan, 
execute, document and report use of CAATs during the audit process. Guideline G3 of 
ISACA set of guidelines for effective information systems audit provides direction in 
applying CAAT [45]. Although this guideline is the most widely accepted in the auditing 
community and became de facto standard, in forthcoming chapters (8.1 to 8.3) a number of 
recommendations on additional improvement will be given.  
No matter if CAAT is developed by auditor, by auditor’s internal IT staff or by 
commercially oriented IT company, it is vital that the auditor obtain reasonable assurance 
of the integrity, reliability, usefulness and security of chosen CAAT. This must be assured 
by adequate testing and review of CAAT documentation. Of course, this evaluation must 
be done before CAAT is used in any actual audit. The extent of testing is dependent on the 
commercial availability and broadness of the CAAT usage. Commercially produced and 
widely available CAAT should also be tested but not so extensively as internally 
developed tools. Internally developed CAAT must be thoroughly reviewed and tested in 
accordance to one of standard software development methodologies to ensure CAAT 
functions as planned. 
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8.1 Audit Phases and Necessary Characteristics of Computer Assisted 
Auditing Tools  
Computer assisted auditing tools may be: 
- Developed by internal programming staff or by outside programmers with audit 
department supervision; 
- Purchased generalized audit software, e.g., audit packages offered by commercial 
audit firms or software vendors; 
- Developed by IT auditors themselves;  
 
According to [38], whatever is the source of CAAT, it must remain under the rigid control 
of the audit department. For this reason, all documentation, test material, source listings, 
source and object program modules, and all changes to such programs, should be strictly 
controlled. In installations using advanced software library control systems, audit object 
program versions should be protected with passwords. This is acceptable if the auditors 
retain control over the documentation and the appropriate job control instructions 
necessary to retrieve and execute the object program from the libraries where it is stored. 
Computer programs intended for audit use should be documented carefully to define their 
purpose and to ensure their continued usefulness and reliability. 
Furtherly, there are certain characteristics in each auditing phase that should be 
implemented when using CAAT or within CAAT. In chapters 8.1.1 to 8.1.4 some 
important characteristics of necessary audit steps are explained in more details. 
8.1.1 Audit Planning 
The purpose of this phase is development of an audit plan. During the audit planning 
process, the auditor must evaluate the need and advantages of manual techniques and 
CAATs. Important factors in determining whether to use CAATs or manual approach are 
[45]: 
- Computer knowledge, expertise, and experience of the auditor 
- Availability of suitable CAATs and IT facilities 
- Effectiveness of using CAATs over manual techniques 
- Time constraints 
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- Integrity of the information system and IT environment; volumes of data 
- Level of audit risk 
 
Since large volumes of data become very often as well as significant complexity of 
business conduct, usually the CAATs will be the only option that is practical and efficient 
enough.  
The main steps auditor must address when plan for the implementation of CAAT cover the 
following: 
 
a) Understanding of business conduct  
It is very important that auditor using CAATs understands the business being audited. Of 
course, this is the most important prerequisite even if no CAAT is used but ordinary audit 
is performed. The aim is to map business activities to computer assisted audit methods. 
After auditor identifies certain risks in business conduct, he/she must define how audit 
methods will be performed and on what data. Clear objectives of the CAAT’s use in 
specific audit process must be defined. It must be formulated what methodology will be 
used and what data will be audited. In chapter 7 very useful methodology is explained in 
details. 
During this phase, auditor should start cooperation with customer being audited (the 
auditee). On the first meeting, auditor must explain to auditee planned activities. Also, the 
auditee should put forward his expectations and view of management on his business 
activities and governance. In addition, the auditee must perceive the purpose, scope, 
objectives, his/hers role or the role of auditee’s IT experts in the usage of CAAT’s in 
auditing process. Defining clear anticipations of the CAAT role should be communicated. 
Auditor should gather as much information as possible in order to further get knowledge 
on auditee’s business. Especially, auditor must be focused on the risks in client’s business. 
He/she must learn more on information system and information technology as well as their 
operating procedures and management, administrative and technical controls. 
b) Understanding of data 
However, when CAATs are being used, crucial component is mapping of business 
activities and business view of data (through documents, application forms, application 
reports etc.) to data structures in information systems. That means auditor must get 
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knowledge of database structures and their relations to client’s perception, views and 
interpretations of data. It must be stressed database structures and client’s views of data are 
usually very different. The task of data mapping may be extremely complex, especially if 
existing data structures are not sufficiently documented. Then, auditor must spend 
additional resources in order to learn about data and its relation to business. This task is 
strongly related to process of understanding the business. 
Furthermore, the accessibility and availability of the organisation’s data must be identified. 
It must be clear what procedure must be undertaken in order to export the data from 
production database, who will grant the access rights, who will give the authorization for 
extraction,  what will be the output format and how data will be checked for completeness 
and correctness. Auditor must clearly define which data should be extracted from database. 
In order to accomplish that task, data tables must be clearly identified, together with 
precise selection criteria, eventual joins and summarization definition. The use of these 
methods is explained in more details in chapter 7, however prerequisite for their 
appropriate use is the detailed knowledge of data already in the planning stage.  
It is obvious that during the data extraction, i.e. creation of audit sample, some sensitive or 
confidential information and data can be accessed. Of course, that information and data 
must stay confidential. The auditor must be informed and clearly understand auditee’s 
information and data classification together with their handling policies. Auditor is bound 
by non disclosure agreement which means he/she is obliged not to relieve any information 
or data to third parties. However, the auditor must also handle and safeguard the data and 
information with an appropriate level of confidentiality and security. In doing so, the 
auditor must use at least the level of confidentiality and security required by the auditee 
owning the data and any relevant legislation. The auditor must consult auditee if it is not 
clear which data is confidential and especially if mode of its protection and handling is not 
appropriately established. 
Output format requirements of extracted data must be established. Since extraction of data 
from production environment is usually executed by the IT personnel, auditor must 
formulate details of extraction format. Examples of file formats are ASCII text delimited, 
ASCII text fixed width, Excel, dBASE, Access, XML etc. Auditor also must define 
columns and their data type. For some data types, it is necessary to define formats. So, for 
numeric column it is needed to state if numbers will contain decimal point or comma, 
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whether numbers will have thousands separators and how negative numbers will be 
represented (minus sign before or after the number). Also, for date columns, date format 
type must be defined. Examples of date format types are various and their definition by 
auditor must be based on D (day), M (month) and Y (year) convention. 
Transactions in production databases are often only stored for a limited time, usually 
because operational management issues and system performance. So, the auditor must 
clearly define for which time frame he/she requires the data. If all data needed is not stored 
on production environment, auditee’s IT personnel will probably have to recover data from 
backups. That process can be time consuming, so auditor has to take it into account when 
developing auditing plan. 
Also, business entities usually have strict rules concerning execution of tasks which are not 
directly related to everyday operation. That means that data extraction activities should be 
arranged well in advance in order to minimise the impact on the business’ production 
platform. 
Even when CAAT is used to directly extract data from databases, the auditor must verify 
the data are correctly extracted. Also, when choosing CAAT for audit process, auditor 
must check correctness of CAAT’s extraction feature.  
c) Auditing team set up 
Very rarely auditing activity of any kind will remain on one expert. As it is already stated, 
volumes of data may be very large, business complexity may be significant, so 
interdisciplinary knowledge of business conduct, information systems and technology is 
required. The objective of this planning step is to form the auditing team, to communicate 
it among team members and agree on duties of each audit team member. Team members 
may include experts out of auditor’s organization, audit managers who will approve and 
sign the audit report, staff auditors who will perform audit work and any additional 
specialists indispensable for getting the work done. As it is emphasized in [30], the 
meeting for audit team set up must be held to communicate all open matters including 
client requirements and deliverables by the audit team, level of involvement of each audit 
team member, their roles and responsibilities. Very important point of this meeting should 
be the matters of business understanding, data understanding and most effective process of 
information compilation. In the case of auditee continuance, a review of prior audits should 
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be identified and analysed. That way it will be easier to assess scope of new audits and to 
double check gathered data. 
d) Knowledge of the information system and technology 
Apart from knowledge of data, auditor must determine processing environment from which 
data will be exported. Usually this is not a trivial question, since businesses have few 
processing environments. Very often there are at least development, testing, production 
and reporting (data warehousing) environments. These environments may be supported by 
different databases, applications and hardware equipment. Also, auditor must also define 
how gathered data will be verified. In some business entities auditor is permitted to 
connect the system and to extract data together with IT personnel. However, usually it is 
not accepted, so auditor must perform additional checks on data received as an audit 
sample. How these checks of audit sample should be performed is explained in chapter 7.2. 
e) Selection of methodology on which CAAT will be based 
A very useful methodology for computer assisted information systems auditing is 
developed, explained and verified in chapter 7. That methodology is largely based on 
Benford’s Law, although it assumes use of handful additional methods. However, auditor 
needs to define methods, their sequence and mutual relationships, input and output values 
from each method as well as flowchart of methodology. Of course, CAAT tool that will be 
used must support chosen and established at least key aspects of methodology. Auditor 
must bear in mind that those methods not supported by CAAT have to be supported by 
other software products or additional programming. It can be quite cumbersome and 
inefficient, so auditor should insist on coverage of as much methodology steps and 
methods with one CAAT as possible. Otherwise, audit activity could become extremely 
time consuming and require more experts (for each additional software or additional 
programming modules). Since data must be moved from CAAT tool to other specialized 
software product or programmed modules, data mergers become mandatory.  That 
inevitably brings additional complexity to data analysis. Switching from one tool to 
another together with data transformation and transfer between each tool also yields 
additional risks to audit process. Conclusion is that ideal situation is when only one CAAT 
is used in audit process.  
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8.1.2 Audit Execution 
The audit execution is a central step in audit conduct. It includes actual use of CAAT and 
audit methodology. The actual audit execution based on computer assisted information 
systems auditing methodology is described in chapter 7.3. Although that methodology 
enables auditor of adequate audit execution, it is surely not the only one audit may be 
executed. Obviously, a number of various methodologies could and would be developed in 
the future. Except the methods explained in chapter 5, the question that should be answered 
is what methods should be incorporated within CAAT. According to a practical view on 
CAAT efficiency the list of indispensable CAAT methods follows. It clearly shows variety 
of methods CAAT should support as well as plenty of approaches auditor could consider in 
execution phase of audit conduct, respectively to type of work and previously 
accomplished risk assessments:  
- Append - Explained briefly in chapter 5. 
- Index/sort - Explained briefly in chapter 5. 
- Summarize - This method is explained in more details in chapter 5.4. It is also one 
of methods forming CAISAM and its use in particular audit process is described in 
chapter 7. 
- Calculated column or field – Explained briefly in chapter 5.  
- Duplication detection - More on duplication detection method can be found in 5.6. 
It is also one of methods forming CAISAM and its use in particular audit process is 
described in chapter 7. 
- Selection (extraction) - Further explanation of this method can be found in 5.2. It is 
also one of methods forming CAISAM and its use in particular audit process is 
described in chapter 7. 
- Gaps - Explained briefly in chapter 5. 
- Join - This method is explained in more details in 5.3 and used in CAISAM as 
presented in chapter 7. 
- Stratification – A method is explained in more details in chapter 5.5 and used in 
methodology explained in chapter 7.  
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- Benford’s Law – Benford’s Law is and is explained extensively in chapter 6 and 
represents the basis of the computer assisted information systems auditing 
methodology designed and verified in chapter 7. 
- Rounded values - More detailed explanation is presented in chapter 5.7. It is one of 
methods included in CAISAM designed and verified in chapter 7. 
- Horizontal analysis - It is explained briefly in chapter 5. 
- Vertical analysis – Method is explained briefly in chapter 5. 
- Trend analysis - Explained briefly in chapter 5. 
- Correlation – Explained briefly in chapter 5. 
- Regression – Explained briefly in chapter 5.  
- Pivoting – Explained briefly in chapter 5. 
- Sampling – Explained briefly in chapter 5. 
Appropriate CAAT should include all of abovementioned methods. However, the final 
decision which methods will be used in specific audit should be dependent on the chosen 
methodology. That means usually just a portion of outlined methods will be used in any 
concrete audit. For example, if CAISAM developed in chapter 7 is used, only Benford’s 
Law, selection, join, summarization, stratification, duplication and rounded values methods 
would be applied. So, conclusion is that CAAT must be flexible enough to enable use of 
various sets of methods within different methodologies. 
Generally speaking, CAATs may be used in performing various audit procedures, 
including the following [38]: 
- identification of transactions that undermine predefined business rules, 
- transactions accuracy testing through recalculations, 
- testing of accounting entries and balances in the accounting system  
- identification of data inconsistencies and significant oscillations,  
- execution of sampling methods for audit, 
- compliance tests of general computer controls, e.g. comparing the 
configuration of the operating system, database, firewalls or other IT 
component recorded in documentation to actual situation, 
- testing the correctness of a programmed control, 
  178 
- checking of inappropriate or unauthorized use of applications and IT 
equipment 
 
More specifically, CAATs may be very efficiently used to test against risks associated with 
purchase, sales, inventory, accounting or financial functions. Examples of such tests that 
can be performed by CAATs are:  
- Purchase of goods for which current stock level is greater than established and 
accepted maximum  
- Purchase of goods that have turnover rates lower than defined and accepted 
- Purchase of goods with stock level already satisfying long period of needs 
- Analysis of automatic re-order procedures (relating to time and stock level) – some 
may be based on the past activities which are not valid anymore 
- Analysis of re-order procedure for low turnover goods 
- Comparison of purchase price and storage costs with selling price 
- Analysis of contract price breaks and actual purchasing in order to find uneconomic 
purchasing 
- Sales to or purchases from entities with whom employee is somehow related 
- Sales in month before the end of an accounting period with terms more favourable 
than previous months in order to get larger bonuses  
- Analysis of order cancellations by salesmen after the end of an accounting period 
- Sales not matching to terms set in customer contracts 
- Unusual entries to the accounts receivable 
- Differences between sales or purchase journals and the general ledger 
- Check of goods with exceeded shelf-life levels 
- Comparison of inventory turnovers for specific goods in a few past periods 
- Unacceptably slow inventory turnover 
- Analysis of decreases in inventory balances without corresponding increases in 
sales 
- Check of goods with high write off rates 
- Analysis of turnover rates by goods in different locations, if applicable 
- Check of goods with unusual changes in percentage differences between purchase 
and sales prices 
- Increases in certain goods in inventory previously not analysed by the auditors 
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- Check if purchase quantities are based on the quantity required to fill orders, not on 
quantity price breaks set in contracts 
- Analysis of amounts of invoices which is just below the threshold level for review 
and approval by management 
- Search for invoices received from companies with the same address and/or phone 
number as employees 
- Search for companies with different names and same corresponding address and 
phone number 
 
All of abovementioned tests should be based on predefined (built-in) data manipulation 
functions. Creation of specific tests should be enabled through query by example interface 
which does not force auditor to program specific functions since programming is usually 
cumbersome and complex, while auditors are usually not trained for such tasks. CAAT 
must enable use of predefined and intuitive interface towards audit methods allowing 
auditor to focus on his/her primary objective which is audit process and not on computer 
tools and/or programming.  
There are other useful characteristics apart from methods for data analysis that should be 
supported by CAAT in audit execution phase. One of mandatory properties of efficient tool 
is export function. Export function enables the auditor to create a new file filled with data 
from selected data table. It is welcomed if CAAT ensures different exporting formats like 
Microsoft Excel, ASCII delimited and/or fixed width column files, RTF, XML, HTML, 
dBASE, Lotus etc. With exporting function it is possible to share data with other auditors 
(e.g. internal audit, state officials and institutions), who does not need to use the same 
CAAT software, or to present results to auditee.  
CAAT should incorporate adequate script or programming language for additional 
automation of customized auditing functions invented and designed by the auditor. It is the 
fact that auditing tasks and use of methods are differing substantially. That fact will never 
be changed and commercially developed CAATs will probably never include every 
imaginable function or method. Also, since computer assisted auditing methodologies are 
not developed and widely accepted, auditors still have different needs for automation of 
existing methods which are included in CAAT. However, it is necessary that adequate 
change management and development procedures are managed properly and that 
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cooperation is established between auditing team and information technology personnel. 
Auditing team should specify, design and test additionally programmed auditing methods, 
while information technology personnel should execute programming task. 
Macro recording option should be enabled. That option ensures generation of program 
code based on scripting or programming language. Generated program code, called simply 
macro, may be used for automation of audit function. Macro recording should be enabled 
on the level of so called point&click, which means that auditor generates a macro by 
mouse clicking certain menu choices, button and data contained within CAAT. Generated 
code must be based on scripting or programming language otherwise supported by CAAT. 
That way, auditor or an IT programmer may inflict changes in generated code in order to 
additionally customize its behaviour. By the use of macro recording, certain automated 
audit function can be implemented quicker and without necessary programming 
knowledge. So, it may be said macro recording function of CAAT is a natural extension to 
its script or programming language. A number of audit activities may be automated using 
macros. Only reasonably advanced functions will not be covered by macro generation but 
will have to be programmed instead. Of course, auditor must take reasonable care about 
recorded or programmed macros. It is mandatory to assure documentation, adequate testing 
procedures and integrity of custom developed macros.  
Very useful option that should be included in CAAT is descriptive statistics capability. It 
provides basic statistical information about all date and numeric columns within any 
chosen data tables. It should be available and displayed on demand for all records in the 
data tables without any selection criteria. At a minimum, descriptive statistics for any 
number column should include following: 
– Total value of the column, with positive or negative sign considered (net 
value) 
– Sum of the absolute of the values in the columns (gross value). 
– Number of records in data table. 
– Number of records with a zero value in the column. 
– Number of records with an empty (null) column. 
– Sum of debit (positive) values in the column. 
– Sum of credit (negative) values in the column. 
– Count of records with debit (positive) values in the column. 
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– Count of records with credit (negative) values in the column. 
– Average value of column. 
– Minimum value in the column. 
– Maximum value in the column. 
– Ordinal number of the record that contains the minimum value in the 
column.  
– Ordinal number of the record that contains the maximum value in the 
column. 
For any date column in a data table, descriptive statistics should comprise: 
– Number of records with an empty column. 
– Number of records in the database. 
– Earliest date in the column of a data table. 
– Latest date in the column of a data table. 
– Ordinal number of the record that contains the earliest date in the column. 
– Ordinal number of the record that contains the latest date in the field.  
– Number of records for each particular day of the week. 
– Number of records for each particular month. 
– The day of the week that most frequently appears in the date values in the 
column. 
– The month that most frequently appears in the date values in the column. 
Descriptive statistics give a valuable initial analysis of the data table, helping auditor to 
improve his/her understanding of data and even identify some initial problems that should 
be furtherly investigated. 
During the course of audit process assisted by CAAT, auditor often needs to create 
mathematical expressions i.e. equations. Equations could be used in various situations: 
when defining selection equations, creating calculated column, search across all columns 
etc. Writing such equation expressions without any additional help could be quite 
complicated and time consuming. Therefore, equation editor is a solution for such 
situations. It can help with creation of various functions like character, numeric, financial, 
date and time, matching, conditional etc. The equation editor should assist with entering 
equations by offering column and table names, functions in their syntactically correct form 
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and including checking the syntax of entered expressions. Equation editor should enable 
use of columns, functions, mathematical operators, logical operators, and constants.  
Audit work must be based on original and correct data. The integrity of the data should not 
be jeopardized even during the audit process. That is the reason why CAAT must prevent 
data from being modified after they are already stored in the tool. Of course, formatting 
and generation of new data which are the outcome of audit process must be allowed (like 
results of selection process, calculated columns or fields, summarization totals etc.), but 
these changes should not affect the integrity of original data imported from production 
databases. 
Visualization may be of additional help during the audit process. Effective CAAT should 
include the capability to generate diagram charts based on the original data or on data 
resulting from audit methods application. Diagrams are used to display series of numeric 
data in a graphical format to make it easier to understand large quantities of data and the 
relationship between different series of data. Diagrams based on both two-dimensional and 
three-dimensional views are desirable. Also, at least few diagram styles are required 
(column, curve, pie). This option is also very useful in reporting phase of audit process 
when the results of audit are presented to customer (auditee), auditor’s management or 
legal institutions. 
In the course of time, auditor is engaged in a number of different audit processes. All 
documentation should be preserved and separately stored for each audit. The same 
situation applies when CAAT is used during the audit. That means CAAT itself must 
enable separation of data and audit results for each individual audit process. This must be 
implemented on a logical level of the CAAT, so that data from different audits are stored 
within separate working area. Working areas may be based on database structure or on file 
structure on the operating system level. It is mandatory request that working areas can not 
unintentionally interfere with each other, so that data can not be accidentally mixed. A way 
for easy identification of each working area must be ensured within CAAT. It may be done 
by assigning properties of each audit such as name of company being audited, name of 
auditor, time period of audit conduct, business function being audited etc. 
One of very efficient properties that should be supported by CAAT is so called search 
capability. Search capability looks for certain string (text, number or date) within whole 
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data table independently of columns. So, auditor needs to define string which will be 
looked for and the data table across which the search will be performed. Search is always 
executed across all columns and records in data table and it may or may not generate new 
data table. It is very useful as a mean of quick scan for certain data without previously 
guessing in which column data of interest could reside. 
Very useful and already default capability of any modern software product is so called 
“copy&paste” attribute. Copy&paste enables copying of selected values in columns and/or 
records and pasting them in another, or target, location. In CAAT, pasting is allowed only 
if it will not change the data in tables. So, pasting should be allowed only in equations and 
expressions as well when the need for pasting to different software tools is needed. For 
example, it may be useful to copy data from result of audit method and paste it in 
Microsoft Excel or Word. 
Since some data tables may have a fairly large number of columns, it is very practical to 
have an option for certain columns freeze. When certain columns are frozen, auditor will 
always see those columns while scrolling across the remaining columns is also enabled. It 
makes much easier insight in all columns and comparison of frozen and scrolled columns 
across records. Also, for the same reason of better data inspection, it is desirable that 
auditor may hide certain data table columns. This option temporarily hides chosen columns 
from the CAAT board and enables focus of auditor to remaining columns. 
Efficient situation sensitive help system within CAAT is necessary.  It must offer help 
topics according to position in menus or methods being used. Help system must cover at 
least following topics: 
- what is the specific CAAT and its basic capabilities 
- how the use of CAAT should be planned and controlled 
- what audit methods are included and how they may be used 
- how CAAT can be navigated (explanation of menus, windows and toolbars) 
Especially important component of help system is the one that explains what real life 
business activities may be audited and how. Also, web based help desk for reporting of 
issues, bugs and questions concerning usage of CAAT is indispensable.  
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8.1.3 Audit Documenting 
The complete audit process supported by CAAT must be adequately documented. Only 
documented audit process makes sense, because basic and mandatory prerequisite is to 
ensure valuable audit results. The audit documentation must include extensive description 
of CAAT implementation during the whole audit process (planning and execution). 
Documentation in the planning audit phase must define: 
– Objectives of CAAT application and business function and processes that 
will be covered  
– What CAAT will be used 
– What CAAT methodology will be applied 
– What experts on auditor and auditee side are necessary 
– Time and other resources 
Documentation in execution phase should include: 
– Process of data acquisition and eventual preparation for audit 
– Description of data acquired 
– Step by step description of audit execution according to applied methodology 
Documentation must include all steps performed within execution phase including the 
creation or deletion of data tables, as well as each method execution. All changes must be 
saved in the detailed audit trail which must be inaccessible for change by the auditor. That 
way the steps and methods performed may stay intact, authentic and available for further 
inspection if needed.  
Documentation of audit results must comprise of: 
– Data outputs from applied audit methods 
– Description of the audit work performed on the output of audit methods 
– Audit findings 
– Audit conclusions 
– Audit recommendations 
All original and resulting data must be stored in a secure storage. It is mandatory that all 
audited data is encrypted and keys for encryption stored in accordance with assessed risks. 
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Furthermore, the same procedure must be followed for temporary classified data used or 
created in the audit process. 
8.1.4 Reporting 
The audit report must contain detailed description of planning and execution audit phase. 
The facts for the report must be sourced from documentation phase which should assure all 
information from planning and execution. So, it is obvious that reporting phase largely 
depends on quality of documentation generated during planning and execution phase of the 
audit conduct.  The audit report must contain clear definition of objectives, scope and 
CAAT methodology. Methods used in methodology must be briefly introduced and CAAT 
that was used must be described.  
All deviations from the audit plan must be described and explained. All input data, their 
relation to business function and processes must be described. Results of CAAT use must 
be commented. Special attention must be given to errors, omissions or frauds.  
CAAT must have important role in reporting phase. It must cover the printing of results in 
adequate report format. Also, CAAT must include export of generated reports in widely 
accepted formats (Excel, Rich Text Format, Word, Extensible Markup Language, 
HyperText Markup Language, or Portable Document Format). Adequate integration with 
existing de facto standard word processors is indispensable. 
8.2 Improvement of Auditor’s Work Quality 
A number of benefits of CAATs use are already noted in previous chapters. However, 
CAATs advantages that can improve auditor’s quality of work will be briefly described. 
As companies and institutions use information systems to store and process constantly 
increasing amounts of data, the necessity grows for definition and use of auditing 
procedures in producing adequate risk assessment concerning data management. CAATs 
are becoming increasingly important tool in evaluation of the control mechanisms in more 
efficient course. Application of CAATs improves audit scope, completeness and 
consistency of data analysis. This all together leads to more effective operational and 
information systems risk mitigation. 
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With CAAT it is much easier to implement strict auditing methodology. It is possible to 
define strict steps and use of specific methods in order to perform comparable and 
standardized audits. That way, it is possible to compare audits along longer timeline and to 
employ early warning system through continuous data audits. Continuous data monitoring 
is an ongoing process for data provisioning, analysis and reporting in order to identify and 
react to operational risks. To assure comprehensive approach for provisioning, analysis and 
reporting, auditors should give the recommendations how continuously monitoring of user 
activity on all computer systems supporting business transactions and applications. With 
such system, efficiency of an auditor using CAAT in discovering fraud, omissions and 
errors would drastically improve. 
CAATs ensure auditor’s work is flexible and innovative as well as providing improved 
audit performance. The application of CAATs during the audit execution phase can also 
help auditors to adjust and improve their initial methodology in response to audit results. 
Of course, changes in methodology must be controlled and under strict change 
management process. CAATs enable auditors to more focus on audit work and reasoning 
than to lose their time and resources on manual audit steps. Also, result of CAAT use can 
often lead to unexpected findings in audit data sets.  
As it is illustrated in [3] use of CAATs improve data analysis, increase audit scope, assure 
better use of audit resources, more precise and valuable results. 
As data volumes constantly grow and at the same time management expectations on 
adequacy of auditing process rise, random manual verifications and testing do not produce 
the desired value. The use of CAAT assures complete coverage of transactions in the audit 
focus and identification of erroneous or exceptional transactions, even when data volumes 
are huge. Data analysis tasks like selection, Benford’s Law tests, sorting, joining, 
summarization or stratification may be performed in extremely small amount of time 
comparing to manual techniques.  
CAATs can provide audit organizations with the ability to perform audits which were not 
feasible before. Business systems that contained tens of millions transaction records are 
difficult to audit using manual techniques. So, together with today’s enormous computing 
power of personal computers, CAATs may analyze millions of transactions in matter of 
minutes.  
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CAATs enable conduct of audit process off-site. That means, after data is provisioned and 
stored on personal computer, auditor may audit the data out of client’s premises. So, travel 
costs may be significantly reduced as well as the time needed for audit execution. This 
advantage of CAATs is even more emphasized if data must be collected from large number 
of different locations. If auditor would have to travel to and perform complete audit on 
each location, expenses and time needed for audit conduct would grow significantly. 
Knowledge and abilities of auditors is considerably rising as a consequence of use of 
CAATs. If auditors must perform a numerous manual and thus non-productive procedures, 
they will have little time left to focus on important data issues. CAATs may free auditors 
from routine, simple, repetitive but time consuming tasks. They will allow auditor to spend 
more times on activities requiring the application of auditor’s judgement and reasoning. 
Forcing the computer to handle repetitive tasks, calculations, selections and other auditing 
methods the auditor’s resources and focus on audit may be maximized. As auditor’s work 
is usually expensive, this means auditor may perform more tasks in less time thus reaching 
better cost effectiveness levels. Additionally, freeing auditor from repetitive and routine 
tasks usually improves job satisfaction. 
Conduct of thorough analysis of entire audit data set in significantly shorter time is enabled 
by CAATs. CAATs provide numerous specialized auditing methods which can be applied 
on huge volumes of data in a fraction of time. 
CAATs also provide log or audit trails which allow easy review of audit results for 
accuracy. Such log files may also serve as a proof that certain methods and steps were 
executed during the audit conduct. That can be of a major importance when auditor’s 
findings differ from management opinion which is declared through management comment 
letter. 
CAATs can positively influence on development of audit reports with statements of 
significance and materiality. Report will be more focused on audited business function, 
complete, accurate, better supported by the audit evidence, finished on time and easier to 
understand to management of auditee since it is based on their business data. Those 
improved characteristics may contribute to the acceptance of the audit findings and 
recommendations. Also, auditee’s opinion on capabilities of an audit organization may be 
significantly elevated. Also, results of audit in form of reports may be stored and organized 
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within auditor’s knowledge base which can be accessed by other auditors according to 
access rights and sensitivity of information. That can serve as basis for improvement of 
auditors’ knowledge on computer assisted audit methodology and business function being 
audited. Furtherly, since CAATs generate adequate audit trails and thus enhance audit 
documentation during audit execution phase, reporting phase may be less time consuming, 
more informative and understandable. Information gathered through CAATs can amend 
the planning, execution, documentation and reporting phase of other audits. Also, it must 
be used in eventual follow up audits. 
Audit conducts are usually organized as projects, with assigned project leaders, time, 
personnel, money, hardware and software resources. Project management is usually very 
demanding, since usually more projects are executed at the same time, and unfortunately, 
the same experts and other resources are often assigned to more than one project. 
Fortunately, CAATs may be used to support audit projects. More precisely, project leader 
can easier review ongoing results and give each team guideline or advice when needed if 
audits are performed with CAATs. The ability to extract and analyze data, examine and 
control auditor’s results can provide team leader with assurance that audit work is 
performed adequately and in alignment with pre defined methodology. Use of CAATs can 
result in better planning of audits, management of audit resources, better control of 
alignment with accepted audit methodology, clearer identification of risks and significance 
of results. The ability of audit organization to execute audits in given timeframe and 
considerable quality can be amended by effective access and analysis of data with CAATs. 
The integrity and relevance of audit findings can be made more trustworthy if checked, 
analyzed and proved by CAATs methods.  
Improvement of auditor’s work can be indirectly obtained by transfer of audit technology. 
As it is described in [3, pages 101/2] “once the audit organization has embraced the use of 
automated tools and techniques, it will be better positioned to have a major impact on the 
operations of the (client’s) organization. This can include the provision of tools and 
techniques to the clients. Traditionally, whether to ensure independence or for other 
reasons, many audit organizations have attempted to maintain their distance from the 
client. More recently, audit sees the client as more of a potential beneficiary of audit’s 
services... Auditors are trying to keep pace with the organization as a whole and are 
interested in assisting clients in improving their efficiency and effectiveness. This can take 
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many forms, from the development of self-assessment tools to the transfer of knowledge, 
tools and techniques.” With the transfer of CAATs to client’s internal audit department, lot 
of internal audit functions may be improved. That may further enhance the work of 
external auditor who will be able to focus on more complex business functions or those 
functions not covered by internal auditors.  
Important feature of CAATs is user friendly interface which enables auditor to perform all 
audit methods, irrespective of the database structure or corresponding information 
technology which is basis for information system. Such interface uses much of standard 
windows properties so learning curve may be extremely steep and short.  
To conclude, basic benefits of CAATs include:  
1. Possibility to use consistent and standard computer assisted auditing methodology. 
2. Many audit-specific methods are included, thus analytical capabilities are 
enormously increased. 
3. Improvement of auditors’ knowledge about the audited area. 
4. Auditors are more focused on judgement, reasoning and thinking. 
5. Improved integration of business system and information system audit.  
6. Better environment to improve audit methodology.  
7. Increased cost-effectiveness because of reusability and customization of methods. 
8. Independency of the system being audited by use of read-only copy of the file to 
avoid any corruption of an organization’s data.  
9. Complete coverage of data sets avoiding errors in data sampling.  
10. Provision of documentation of each test performed in the software that can be used 
as documentation in the auditor’s work papers. 
11. Improved reporting capabilities. 
12. Possibility of off-site audit conduct. 
13. Improvement of management of audit organization. 
14. Standard interface assures quick learning process. 
 
It may be concluded that this chapter contains some most important advantages of CAATs 
which can distinctively improve the quality of auditor’s work. Of course, there are 
numerous additional features that some auditors may find very useful which are not 
included here. 
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8.3 The Challenges in Implementation of Computer Assisted Auditing 
Tools 
Although it is explained that CAATs are extremely useful software tool, there are also 
numerous challenges that should be understood. These challenges must be treated 
adequately in order to prevent problems and even cancellation of CAATs use within audit 
organization.  
It is very important that auditors get and improve sufficient knowledge on CAAT, its 
capabilities, possible ways of use in audit process as well as risks in CAAT use. Auditors 
also must have certain knowledge of information technology, especially some basics of 
relational theory. That is mandatory since data records are stored in data tables, uniquely 
identified by primary keys and related to each other by foreign keys. Understanding of data 
and business (chapter 8.1.1), relating data to business processes and events is of crucial 
importance to successful use and implementation of CAATs.  
Definition and acceptance of computer assisted auditing methodology is one of major 
prerequisites in reaching the adequate level of CAAT use. It is not sufficient if auditor only 
understands the technical and analytical capabilities of CAAT. What is of even bigger 
importance is necessity to understand, accept and use appropriate methodology. Only then, 
auditing work within certain audit organization may be standardized, comparable and 
repeatable. Also, use of methodology has the advantage of permanent improvement of 
audit process since auditors may comment and suggest changes in steps, methods and their 
relationships. Of course, process of methodology change management should be 
established with objective to adequately control modifications.  
Although acceptance of computer assisted auditing methodology is indispensable, auditors 
should also identify additional CAAT opportunities. That means auditors should actively 
seek for business areas in which CAAT were still not used and assess usefulness of CAAT 
application. It may be useful if auditors within audit organization develop guidance which 
explains different applications and specifies examples of the information that can be gained 
from each application. Some lessons learned could be listed including successes and 
failures. These lessons can be used to help audit organization continue to learn and 
improve the use of CAATs. Monthly summaries which briefly outline the use of CAATs in 
each current audit can help auditors realize additional opportunities for the CAATs use. [3, 
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page 168]. That could result in additional quality of audit work since more business areas 
would be included in audit process. Also, that will help an audit organization to widen its 
scope of audit and to gain more market share. Identification of additional CAAT 
opportunities should be associated to change management of computer assisted auditing 
methodology. 
Management must be devoted to the use of CAATs and has to actively promote their use 
and development of methodologies that are basis of CAATs. Management support should 
not cease with promotion and formal commitment, but with assurance of enough resources 
needed for adequate education and use of CAAT. As it is noted in [3, page 170] the 
implementation of CAATs in the audit environment will probably involve change in 
ordinary audit processes and procedures. Usually, audit resources (experts, time, 
knowledge) are already close to the limits and quite restrained concerning new initiatives 
and ideas. If audit organization works on a fee from external customers then the question 
who will bear the development and implementation cost of a new idea is usually very 
important. In order to ease these problems, audit management should find so called 
“champions of idea”. Champions of idea are auditors who accepted the idea of CAATs and 
are willing to implement it in audit environment. Some other important issues that must be 
ensured and resolved by management are: 
- money for education and CAAT software purchase and maintenance 
- time for education  
- permanent use and update of adequate methodology  
- resistance to change by some auditors 
- relieving auditors using CAAT from other audit duties 
Some auditors will very quickly adopt and understand most of the CAAT capabilities and 
methods, while others will require support and help. Also, each auditor or audit team will 
surely need help within some auditing steps (planning, execution, documentation and 
reporting). Technical and analytical support and advice is of major importance when using 
CAAT. Auditors using CAATs should not be let on their own, but supported by knowledge 
of other auditors, specialized CAAT help desk and/or support provided by vendor of 
CAAT.  
Although CAATs are very powerful software tools, expectations of audit management may 
not be met. As described in [3, pages 170/1] even when the effort to use CAAT in audit 
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automation is perceived as innovative and advanced, management’s expectations may be 
unreachable or completely different. Auditor should bear in mind that lot of projects fail 
because they did not meet the expectations which were too optimistic and probably 
unattainable. So, well defined deliverables and timeframes should be established and 
accepted. It must be agreed what resources (personnel, time, hardware, software) will be 
assigned to CAAT implementation project. As automation of audit function by use of 
CAAT is usually not a primary task of those resources, it must be clearly determined what 
priority will be given in comparison to other tasks. Management’s expectations must be 
answered by clear and understandable statements. Special attention must be given to cost-
benefit analysis which is usually crucial factor in management’s decision of whether or not 
to start CAAT implementation. So, in order to minimise the risk of CAAT implementation 
failure their use must be linked to the objectives of the audit organization.  
Although some audit organizations were determined in introduction of CAAT in their audit 
environment which resulted in appropriate implementation, certain auditees did not 
welcome the idea. This misunderstanding is more often if there is no legal act which binds 
auditees and auditor on usage of CAATs. Anyways, auditor should inform client that more 
value will be gained from audit process if CAAT is used. Crucial issue is to appropriately 
explain cost and benefits of CAATs use in order to establish client’s clear expectations. 
There is also a necessity to communicate and agree on access to production database to 
client’s information technology department. Some misunderstandings are possible, so 
auditor must clearly state what are audit needs and how and what data should be extracted. 
More on the issue of data provision may be found in chapter 8.1.1. 
A number of audit clients are reluctant to export production data to auditor’s computers. 
The principal reason is concern that data will not be managed appropriately i.e. lost, 
accessed by unauthorized persons within or out of auditor organization or inappropriately 
manipulated. Auditor must define clear procedures on client’s data management and 
storage especially concerning confidentiality of data. Client’s data should be encrypted and 
all computers storing data must be protected by authentication procedure on operating 
system and database level. These procedures must be communicated to client. Although 
clients are legally obliged to present all data to auditors, and auditors are legally bound to 
appropriate data management and data secrecy, some form of personally signed non 
disclosure agreement between each individual auditor and client could be arranged.  
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The only contact between client’s management and CAAT is during the presentation of 
auditor’s findings and recommendations. In order to show auditing was valuable for client 
and to adequately promote the use of CAAT, presentation must concentrate on relevant 
findings and recommendations. Auditor must spend considerable time in relating data 
analysis findings to business activities and to prepare presentation of data analysis findings 
in the way management sees data. It is quite important since client’s management usually 
does not have relational view of data in mind. Presentation of recommendations can be 
especially demanding and auditor must find the appropriate way to present what measures 
must be undertaken to avoid eventually recovered errors, omissions or frauds. 
Use of CAATs must prove itself among auditors and business entities being audited as a 
useful software tool. If CAAT is not used adequately, as presented in chapters 8.1.1 to 
8.1.4, and if it does not prove its usefulness, then the results will not justify efforts made to 
apply CAAT. The outcome could be that both auditors and auditees will start to deny 
adequacy of CAATs. Such situation will inevitably lead to abandoning CAAT or, if its 
usage is required by legal acts, using it just to fulfil formal obligation. That will of course 
result in even less appropriate use and less useful audit findings. 
Sometimes auditors develop CAAT on their own believing they can build a software tool 
which is more appropriate and more specialized for use in their audit processes. However, 
the advantages of computer assisted auditing tools and their built-in functions in 
comparison to self developed programs and functions by the auditors themselves are 
numerous: 
- auditors focus on audit instead on spending time and resources on development of 
programs and functions 
- burden of program and functions development is transferred to specialized 
company 
- accuracy, quality and choice of functions is in favour of commercial product 
because commercial companies which develop software usually have specialized 
staff and adequate advanced expertise in software development 
- commercial companies usually have broader knowledge on different audit cases 
and possible use of computer assisted auditing tools  
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It is very important that auditors do not spend their time and effort in development of 
CAATs since on the market there is considerable number of commercial CAATs with 
fairly advanced capabilities. 
It may be concluded that challenges explained in this chapter are not the only auditing 
organization could encounter in implementation of CAAT in audit environment. However, 
following directives outlined in this chapter should help in avoidance or mitigation of 
majority of risks and problems that inevitably appear during the CAAT implementation. 
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9. Achieved Objectives and Confirmation of Hypotheses 
In this chapter, achievement of objectives and confirmation of hypotheses set in chapter 
1.2 will be discussed. 
 
In many institutions and business entities, data are the most valuable assets which are very 
often identified as extremely important means on which management bases its decisions. 
Also, in chapter 2 few examples based on improper data manipulation that ended with 
enormous financial losses and even bankruptcies are presented. It was shown that all of 
these cases could have been prevented if data were appropriately audited. Of course, 
manual execution of audit was out of question since data quantities were extremely large. 
Only possibility is to perform computer assisted auditing i.e. audit of data stored in 
databases with the help of specialized software tools consisting of various data auditing 
methods. Thus, needs for application of computer assisted information systems auditing 
are identified.  
Approaches, frameworks and methods for information systems audit were introduced by 
Information Systems Auditing and Control Association, Bank for International 
Settlements, International Monetary Fund, central banks, auditing authorities and legal 
acts. Some frameworks and approaches were explained and evaluated in chapter 4. A 
number of methods for computer assisted auditing were presented in chapter 5. Evaluation 
ended with conclusion that adequate methodology for computer assisted auditing does not 
exist. More details on achieving objective of identification, systematization and evaluation 
of existing approaches, frameworks and methods for computer assisted auditing can be 
found in chapters 4 and 5. 
In chapter 6, various Benford’s Law tests are explained in details: the first, the second, the 
first two and the first three digits tests are encompassed. Benford’s Law proved to be very 
powerful method for computer assisted auditing. One of its principal strength is the fact 
that auditor does not have to define in advance what type of fraud, error or omission should 
be investigated. Only after the specific test is executed, auditor should question results and 
compare eventual deviations with previously set business norms, data creation and 
modification rules. More on conclusion that Benford’s Law may be used as backbone 
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method within computer assisted information system auditing methodology is noted in 
chapter 5. 
Methods that form computer assisted information systems auditing methodology 
(Benford’s Law, selection, join, summarization, stratification, duplication, rounded values) 
are defined and adequate conclusion is brought up in chapter 5. Benford’s Law, as the 
fundamental method of developed CAISAM, is very extensively explained in chapter 6. 
Meta-model of CAISAM is designed in chapter 7.1. That meta-model represents a model 
suitable and applicable to any particular CAISAM. After meta-model is designed, model of 
particular computer assisted auditing methodology is created and explained in details in 
chapter 7.2. 
Sequence and relations between specific methods are defined in chapter 7.2. Developed 
CAISAM is defined with 15 steps in which particular methods are applied on data. In some 
steps more than one method is used. After data provision step, supported by selection and 
join methods, audit sample check must be done by use of selection, summarization, 
stratification and join methods. All four Benford’s Law tests explained in chapter 6 are to 
be executed on complete audit sample – if certain subset is created and Benford’s Law 
subsequently executed, findings may be erroneous. Checks if audit sample proves fraud, 
omission or error are supported by selection, summarization, duplication and rounded 
values methods. Final conclusion on fraud, omissions or errors is also based on selection, 
summarization, duplication and rounded values methods. 
All audit phases including audit planning, execution, documenting and reporting are 
covered by recommendations for extending of CAAT’s functionality. Very valuable 
instructions for improvement of audit execution phase are given in chapter 8.1.2 like use of 
descriptive statistics function, methods that should be included in CAAT, export function, 
scripting or programming language, macro recording function, equation editor, read only 
data sets, visualization options, search capability, differentiation between audit activities 
etc. Recommendations for audit documenting are given in chapter 8.1.3. CAATs must 
perform automatic logging of all important audit activities. Reporting phase must rely on 
documentation generated automatically by execution of certain CAAT methods and on 
guidelines set in the audit planning phase. 
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Developed CAISAM is applied on cross-border payments system data and thus verified. 
Used audit sample contained of 1.745.311 payment transactions. Certain deviations were 
detected and explained with significant help of designed CAISAM. Additionally, with 
CAISAM audit process becomes repeatable, comparable, consistent and executed faster 
with less auditing resources.  
 
There are two hypotheses set in chapter 1.2: 
 
H1: It is possible to develop CAISAM 
Hypothesis is proved in chapters 7.1 and 7.2 since meta-model and model of particular 
computer assisted information systems auditing methodology are defined. Instructions for 
use of methods within defined methodology are presented. Sequences and relations 
between methods that form CAISAM are demonstrated and explained in details.  
 
H2: Auditing process may be improved if developed CAISAM is applied 
CAISAM is applied on cross-border payments system data (chapter 7.3.3). It is clear that 
without CAAT auditing of 1.745.311 data rows would not be feasible. Additionally, use of 
developed CAISAM proved significant improvement in audit process. Certain deviations, 
that would not be recovered otherwise, were found. Since strict methodology enables 
execution of repeatable, comparable and consistent audit processes, which are unreachable 
properties if computer assisted audit is not based on methodology but on improvisation, it 
proves audit process is significantly improved. 
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10. Conclusion 
Because of increasing data volumes that should be regularly audited, it can be easily 
concluded that technology must be used in order to make considerable improvement of 
audit conduct. Today, manual audit of business data is practically impossible task. Even if 
it is performed, it lacks completeness since it is not feasible to audit all data without 
technology support. Also, use of manual auditing methods is by definition prone to 
omissions and errors. So, in order to adequately perform audit work, auditor must use 
computer based tools. 
Of course, in order to find flaws which can result in frauds, omissions or errors, auditor 
must have extensive knowledge not only about computer technology and application 
development but, what is even more important in this case, business knowledge and 
knowledge about data used in certain business environment. Auditor must clearly 
understand what data is expected on input side, what formal and logical controls should be 
implemented at the entry i.e. input level and in which form data should be stored in the 
system. Also, mapping and matching the data in the system with data on some other media 
i.e. paper forms could also be mandatory. That is necessary in systems which are still based 
on paper documents as means for storing data prior to computer data entry function. Only 
person who has such knowledge can analyze data and make conclusions about correctness 
of input controls. Of course, in order to check data processing algorithms, auditor should 
have detailed knowledge of business logic and how it transforms data (calculations and 
formatting, for instance). Whether business logic is implemented accordingly, can be 
concluded by checking application code or by comparison between input and output 
(result) data. For application code check, auditor must have advanced knowledge of certain 
programming language, development environments and, of course, certain business 
function. Anyways, it can be quite cumbersome task since business logic can be supported 
by very complex application code modules. Reading and analysing underlying program 
code requires significant time and specialized technical knowledge. In practice, 
comparison between input and output data is more usual way of business (application) 
logic audit. When using such approach, it is not necessary to check through application 
code. Business logic part of application is considered black box, and concentration is set on 
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creation of input data set and evaluation of resulting output data. If output data is correct, 
one can conclude application logic is correct. This approach requires more knowledge 
about data and its transformation from input to output, but less or none knowledge about 
underlying programming languages and development environments. Some specialized 
computer based tools can be of enormous help to this approach. A family of extremely 
practical tools are computer assisted auditing tools (CAATs). CAATs have numerous 
benefits over manual techniques, especially in following: 
- achieving complete data check even on large databases 
- providing many pre-defined audit specific methods 
- ensuring methods standardization  
- ensuring independency from the audited information system by various data access 
methods 
- using only read-only copy of business data 
- enabling import to personal computers, thus avoiding performance degradation of 
targeted computer system 
- assuring documentation of each applied method or step of methodology 
However, supporting technology in audit work already exist for years. Anyways, audits are 
still inappropriate i.e. incomplete and often without added values. Also, such audits can 
encourage fraudulent activities, errors and negligence. Although prominent organizations 
for audit improvement (ISACA) as well as state authorities (e.g. FED, CNB) promote and 
force specific audit frameworks and approaches, still numerous problems exist. Previously 
mentioned regulations together with frameworks and approaches give an overview and 
specific highlights how audit should be executed. Their primary fault is lack of details, thus 
increasing possibility of various understanding and interpretations. Furtherly, although data 
auditing is indispensable component of each auditing process and use of CAATs is 
promoted and forced by use of authorities, still there is no accepted computer assisted 
auditing methodology. Without strictly established methodology each audit is commenced 
with different methods, their order and mutual relationships so conclusions on errors, 
omissions or frauds are based on different premises. One of outcomes of such situation is 
that two data audits of same data and business subject are usually not comparable and have 
different conclusions. Data auditing methodology is indispensable for improvement of 
audit process and adequate use of computer assisted auditing tools. 
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In this thesis it was proved it is possible to develop computer assisted information systems 
auditing methodology (CAISAM). CAISAM was developed on the basis of Benford’s Law 
and six other supporting methods: selection, join, summarization, stratification, duplication 
and rounded values.  
Second hypothesis, that auditing process may be improved if developed CAISAM is 
applied is proved in practical auditing of cross-border payment system. During that audit it 
was shown that CAISAM is very useful and that it significantly improves auditing process. 
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